György Barcza

My Memories as a Diplomat 1911-1945

Excerpts

London, 1938-1941

Talks with Lord Halifax. First visit to Mr Eden

(Vol. 1, Part 5, Chapter 15)

[...]

Soon after being named Foreign Secretary, Mr Eden summoned me to him. Eden, whom I had known from Geneva, greeted me as an old acquaintance and said he would like to talk to me about Hungary's situation quite openly. He had been informed, he said, of the political guarantees which Prime Minister Teleki had provided and which gave him satisfaction. Yet he could not leave it unsaid that the way the situation as a whole was developing in Hungary filled him with apprehension. Our entire policy was, to his knowledge, more and more turning to the service of the German cause. Our hapless geographical situation could still be cited in a justification of sorts for our quitting the League of Nations7 and joining the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis and for the entirely pro-German tone of our press. However, he had been informed that the pro-German position in Hungary was going from strength to strength, that the German demands that we were complying with, mainly in the economic field, were more and more intense, and he feared that such complaisance could eventually lead to a complete surrender of our national sovereignty. He trusted in Teleki's good intentions and even in his determination not to go beyond a certain point, but would he indeed, Eden asked me, be able to stop there?

In reply, I told Mr Eden that I too would speak frankly and I thanked him for giving me the opportunity to do so. His trust in Teleki the politician and the man was entirely well-placed. As long as Teleki retained control over Hungarian politics, the country would never abandon national sovereignty and blindly serve the German cause. I told him how, in the autumn of 1939, Teleki had denied the Germans the right of transit towards Poland8, despite Germany's offer to Hungary of the region of oil fields in Poland in return. Of course, I could not know what would happen once Teleki was no longer prime minister. Since I wanted to play it fair with him, I had to admit that the apprehension he had brought up struck me even more. If the war were to last long and the Germans were to have great diplomatic and military successes, it would be difficult to convince the Hungarian public that the Germans would still be defeated in the war. As for me, I was convinced that Great Britain and the United States, once they could exert their force of manpower and military capacity, which was many times more than that of Germany, eventually would be invincible. Unfortunately, however, the Hungarians, dazzled by German propaganda and by the initial German successes, were much less aware of this. British propaganda in Hungary was either inefficient or nonexistent, while German propaganda worked perfectly. Great Britain was far away and Germany close, it was no wonder that wide sections of our nation believed in the invincibility of the Germans. In addition, they put down the return of Northern Hungary9 to the goodwill of the Germans, while they were aware that Great Britain for twenty years had never shown any concern for us. This I was telling him in sincerity, for I wanted him to have a clear picture of the situation and the mood in Hungary, and of the factors that contributed to and drove them. Teleki and many of the leading figures in Hungary believed, as I did in London, in Great Britain's eventual victory, but as he would know best, no government could work without the support of or against public opinion, and public opinion played a great role in Hungary as well. I would do my utmost and use any means available to prevent Hungary from eventually drifting into the camp of Great Britain's enemies. Teleki was doing likewise in Budapest. But we needed understanding and patience, for our plight was especially grave. It should be noted that there was constant and increasingly violent German pressure on us in every field; he should also note that the territorial revision, for twenty years longed for, had been carried out partly through German support, for which the Hungarian man in the street was obviously grateful to Germany and Italy and wished to see them victorious, otherwise all that we had regained would again be lost. Mr Eden followed my words with attention; when I called his attention to the fact that the Hungarian public believed that in the event of an Anglo-French victory, the country would have another unjust peace dictated to it like that of Trianon, he eagerly protested. He said he was fully aware that the Trianon treaty was a bad peace treaty, it was unsound, and he asked me to inform Budapest that once victory was secured, Great Britain would in no way want or approve of another Trianon. As long as we did not enter the war we could expect to be rewarded; however, if we did, we could no longer count on any consideration on the part of the victors. I replied that I was convinced of that; however, I thought it would be useful if either he or another British politician in a position of authority would openly declare what he had just told me, so that the Hungarian public as a whole could learn of it. German propaganda in Hungary was still stirring up the Hungarians by claiming that in the event of an Anglo-French victory we would be dealt another and even more unjust Trianon, consequently a Germany victory was in Hungary's interests. Thi [...]

In his memoirs, Barcza deals with the Yugoslav crisis, its consequences for Hungary, and Pál Teleki's death by suicide in great detail. In an East-Central Europe rapidly drawn under German influence after 1938, the Teleki government, intent on preserving Hungarian sovereignty, made an agreement of permanent friendship with Yugoslavia, still then relatively independent, on 12 December 1940. However, on 25 March 1941 Yugoslavia too joined the Tripartite Treaty (see Note 2). Three days later, on 28 March 1941 the Yugoslav military overthrew the country's subservient government. Hitler immediately decided to wipe away Yugoslavia. On the day following the military takeover in Belgrade, Hitler sought for permission from Horthy, via the Hungarian envoy in Berlin, for German troops to march against Yugoslavia through Hungarian territory, and suggested that the Hungarian army join the action on Germany's side. In recompense, he offered to return to Hungary its former regions of the Bácska and the Bánát, ceded to Yugoslavia after the Great War. While Horthy and the military leadership were immediately willing to support this act of German aggression, Prime Minister Teleki strongly resisted. After he had learnt on 2 April that Horthy had gone back on his word, issued mobilization orders and was set to attack Yugoslavia along with the Germans, Teleki shot himself in the small hours of 3 April.

[...]

Appendix

Report by György Barcza to Foreign Minister István Csáky on a talk with Winston Churchill

(Source: DIMK IV, No. 229)

London, 14 July 1939

Strictly confidential

74/pol.-1939

The other day I had occasion to talk at length with Mr Churchill after lunch at Lord Londonderry's21 home. Your Excellency is no doubt familiar with the fact that Mr Churchill is the leader of the most extreme wing of the Conservative Party, that which advocates the necessity of a war of extermination against the Germans and which, while belonging to Mr Chamberlain's party, considers the foreign policy of the Prime Minister and his followers to be too weak, too slow and too irresolute. The difference between the two groups is best described by saying that Mr Chamberlain, despite many disappointments, still believes in the possibility of maintaining peace, which he seeks with endless patience, endurance and even at the sacrifice of his reputation. He considers actions by this peace front to be a means of defence to contain further attacks. Mr Churchill on the other hand is now definitely warlike and ends all his addresses, talks and articles with Carthaginem esse delendam. For this and other reasons I looked forward to speaking with him, though my acquaintances had warned that he was usually quite blunt when talking politics. This merely increased my curiosity.

I first asked Mr Churchill if he knew something of Hungary, and upon his positive reply a longer conversation ensued. He started by saying that the situation Hungarians find themselves in nowadays is extremely difficult; he, unlike other Englishmen, can read a map and draw the political consequences from it as well. He understands the foreign policy we are conducting, he went on, for a small country usually does not choose the policy it follows of its own volition; this is rather determined by its geographical position and economic needs. After all, he said, a country and its people should get on some way or other and try to be content, they cannot survive on fruitless political emotions. That is why he understands our foreign policy; however, he is afraid, and this he has to say quite frankly, that unless he is mistaken the international situation will sooner or later develop in a way that the smaller states will have to decide on which grouping of the great powers to join. When that happens we will be judged by, and our fate in the future will depend solely on who we adhere to, whatever sympathies he may personally feel for Hungarians. Whoever stands by the warmongers, the aggressors, the "political gangsters", as he said, the perfidious, will share their lot, and whoever stands by those who uphold peace and the rule of law will be supported, protected and rewarded, whatever roles they may have played before.

Mr Churchill went on to say that he saw a dark future ahead—dark even if no further attacks against the vital interests of independent states were launched by the Germans. He can see, though not approve of, why the Germans are trying to rid themselves of the decisions and consequences for them of the Treaty of Versailles, and he could also understand the German demands for reuniting with Germans living beyond their borders (excepting Austria). However, the occupation of Prague and Bohemia and Moravia was so brutal and a political mistake on the part of the Germans that it can have no excuse, legal, political, ethnographic, economic or other. Should that political regime continue to exist and not be restrained or even destroyed by fire and sword, Europe can expect to revert to the Middle Ages, Churchill said in anger. Bohemia and Moravia must and will be restored; nine million Czechs cannot be kept in slavery by an alien race and state.

For my part I corrected his comment, saying there were at most seven, not nine, million Czechs, and added that I noted with satisfaction that he too saw that Czechoslovakia, patched together artificially of several alien nationalities, was an unviable creation. This Churchill admitted and he could also only accede to my remark that as long as large numbers of nationalities were in the power of states alien and even hostile to them, Europe might enjoy political caesuras or lulls but no lasting and solid peace.

Mr Churchill subsequently spoke of the role Great Britain was to play. Militarily and diplomatically, he said, the country is fully ready to defend herself and within six months will also be ready to take the offensive, and then the world will see to its wonder what the Great Britain that some "over there" prefer to see as a shareholding company outmoded, obsolete, inefficient and lacking in dynamic force is capable of. Fascism and national socialism, he continued, claim with pride that a renaissance of the German and Italian nations has been achieved and these two nations, reborn in power and will, are invincible and can take on anybody. Well then, I can say, Churchill went on, that we were unfortunately asleep and idle for a long time after the peace treaties had been signed, but we are now awake thanks to Herr Hitler, and have made good progress on our way to renewal. It should also be taken into consideration, he added, that we and our allies have inexhaustible sources of money and raw materials and equally enormous human resources, and should a war break out we would grow stronger by the week and by the month, while the other side would rapidly decline, having no supplies whatsoever, human, financial or material. And a short world war, Mr Churchill concluded, is a myth that the Germans had already been taken in by in 1914.

In the past few days, news of Mr Churchill becoming a member of the Cabinet has been going around among those in the know. More recently I have heard that, despite constant and strong demands made by the radical wing in the Conservative Party, Mr Chamberlain cannot bring himself to invite him to join his government. The reason why is that he does not wish to take measures that could be seen as provocative by the Germans and which would further aggravate a rapprochement that, albeit little hope is held out for it, is still not entirely impossible. However, should the situation become more acute, either because of Danzig22 or other issues, unanimous opinion here has it that Mr Churchill's being taken into the Cabinet is highly probable.

Barcza
Minister Plenipotentiary

FM pol. 1939-2-3628.
Original copy.
Copies have been sent to the Prime Minister,
Chief of Staff of the Royal Hungarian Army and the missions.