László Valki
NATO Enlargement: The Hungarian Interests
[...]
Thus the answer to the question as to why the countries involved so much desire to join NATO is self-evident: joining NATO would put an end to the sense of insecurity of the CEE political elites as regards the fate of the region and their own country. One consequence would be to increase the self-confidence of the elites, a rare commodity in these parts, which is necessary for development, and would make it possible for them to concentrate on the social and economic progress of their countries or on other, no less important problems. Another consequence of major significance would be that the governments concerned could participate in the work of the staff of NATO and its political and military decision-making bodies. This would facilitate even closer and more regular contacts with the leading political circles of the Euro-Atlantic region. Being present at a short, often purely formal NACC6 session or bilateral meeting is one thing, taking part in decision-making as a representative of a member of an organization is another. The latter involves also contacts among bureaucracies. It would, of course, also mean that the CEE governments would have a say in major foreign policy decisions, and especially in those involving the area. The public is not fully aware that NATO is far from being a military organization only, for their attention is focussed on the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, which are necessarily of a military character. It is important, however, that member states shape the foreign policy of the West largely within the framework of the organization. It matters whether this foreign policy is being shaped with or without the participation of the CEE countries. Accession to NATO would mean, apart from military integration, the beginnings of a limited political integration. That would not lead to the creation of a supranational structure, of the type aimed at by the European Union, but would play a major role in the life of the countries concerned.
In addition, accession would naturally increase the security of the new member states. The organization would guarantee their defence, a fact that any state which for whatever unforeseeable reason might threaten the security of a CEE in the future would be aware of. The key word is prevention. In the past decades, the allied states created an integrated military structure which is capable of protecting the security of any member state, and can consequently prevent any act of aggression. NATO's recent Strategic Concept is correct in stating that in the changed structure of international relations "risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territories of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties" in CEE. The latter might trigger off unpredictable social and political processes which could "lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers..."7 After enlargement it is hardly conceivable that the new member states would become involved in armed conflict, since there would be a force capable of deterring. (True, deterrence in Bosnia was ineffective for a long time, but conflict there began as a civil war, and the subject of protection was not a member of NATO.)
Membership would also help to handle the conflicts between the new member states themselves. The very fact that the new members would enter into a closer political and military integration with each other would add to the interfaces between them, and help them to reach some kind of compromise. It may be taken for certain that NATO would not undertake the role of arbitrator, and would not resolve the dispute between the parties. However, by means of its less spectacular multilateral diplomatic means which have developed over several decades, it would certainly prevent the conflict from spreading, and contribute to the elimination of its original causes. It is in no small part due to NATO that the conflicts between Greece and Turkey have never led to armed clashes (even though NATO failed to prevent the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus).
Accession would, if indirectly, also increase the internal security of the countries concerned. The political integration taking place within NATO, the close contacts among top-level political elites and government administrations would have a beneficial effect on the smooth democratic evolution of the new member states. In principle, it is not NATO's duty to deal with internal political issues. The consultation processes, however, would cover that area, too. Joint action would be taken only if in one of the countries the central power was threatened or seized by extremist forces.
Internal security would also be enhanced by being part of the military integration. Owing to their close integration, member states are in possession of accurate information on the armaments, role and operation of each other's armies, their military development projects, the views of leading military circles, etc. That means that measures could be taken in time to prevent any national armed force from achieving too much independence or influence in any given country.
Admission into NATO would have favourable economic consequences for the new member states. Above all, the influx of foreign capital could be expected to grow. Investors prefer to place their money in countries which they regard as stable and safe. As a result of accession to NATO, a large portion of the costs of the unavoidable modernization of the Hungarian army could be avoided. A NATO member state does not have to develop an all- inclusive defence system all of its own. That is, indeed, one of the major advantages of military integration.
[...]
The "Russian Question"
[...] In August 1993 in Warsaw, Yeltsin was still able to say that he did not oppose the enlargement of NATO.12 In September 1993, however, he already wrote to President Clinton, that "not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country, as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space. And generally, we favour a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe." According to the letter, Yeltsin was ready "to offer official security guarantees to the East European states with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and maintenance of peace in the region. Such guarantees could be stipulated in a political statement or cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO."13
The new Russian military doctrine, made public in 1993, also opposed the idea of an enlargement of NATO. It mentioned "expansion of military blocks and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation's military security interests" among the potential sources of military danger. Moreover, according to the doctrine, "the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of States bordering the Russian Federation" would be perceived as a "direct military threat".14 To this very day, nobody has even mentioned the possibility of the deployment of foreign troops on the borders of Russia, yet the authors of the doctrine have achieved their purpose: from that time on, the number of articles showing anxiety regarding the reactions of Russia has multiplied in the Western press.
In 1995, the Russian military-political elite announced its profound opposition to the enlargement of NATO in a major new document, the Karaganov Report.
The Report alleges that at the time of the signing of the 2+4 agreement on the reunification of Germany, the Western powers undertook an obligation, "that went without saying" not to enlarge NATO. There is, however, no evidence to support this allegation.16
According to the authors of the document, enlargement would
- contribute to the "military-political" isolation of Russia;
- result in anti-Western evolution of even the most pro-Western elites;
- turn Russia into a "revisionist" power, interested not in strengthening, but in undermining the emerging political order in Europe;
- undermine the geopolitical, as well as the conceptual basis of most arms limitations, and could actually trigger off an arms race;
- eliminate the belt of de facto neutral, weakly armed states between Russia and NATO;
- encourage Russia to seek new allies in the South and the East ;
- strengthen the cohesion of the member states of the C.I.S. within the framework of a collective secu-rity and defence system, thereby deepening the division of Europe;
- contribute to the gaining ground of hard line opponents of NATO expansion in relation to the mismanagement of domestic reform, as well as to the low profile of Russia in the contemporary world, and finally
- Moscow would be compelled to examine the possibility of greater politicalreliance on "nuclear containment" in Europe.17
According to the Karaganov Report, Moscow ought not to continue the exploratory talks began with Brussels at the beginning of 1995, aimed at finding out in what form the West might compensate Moscow for the "losses" suffered in consequence of the enlargement of NATO. Negotiations may create an impression in the West that Moscow was, after all, ready to consent to enlargement. Indeed, according to the available information, the outlines of a new compromise seemed to emerge: NATO would not deploy land forces and nuclear weapons in the new member states, it would sign a non-aggression treaty with Russia, and would be ready to maintain a special relationship with Moscow within the framework of a permanent forum. Granted all this, the latter would eventually accept the enlargement of the organization.18 Establishing a forum of this kind would make it possible to consult the Russians on issues of security policy before a NATO decision was taken. It was supposed to be satisfying Moscow's demand for a "special relationship".19 Hopes of a compromise, however, were dispelled by the American-Russian summit meeting of May 1995, and there was no contact between the two parties on the subject after that.20
According to the Report, the aim of Russia should not be to make Brussels reject the CEE candidates once and for all but only to postpone negotiations on admission by four or five years. In the meantime, Moscow ought to maintain good
relations with the West, especially with NATO, and ought not to make declarations (or consider) that it might begin to increase its armed forces as a countermeasure. The idea of postponement, however, must not be taken seriously, as the authors are well aware that the system of international relations will not change substantially within a few years time, so they will have no reason to modify their present opinion.21 Their observations concerning the development of the armed forces are obviously meant seriously, since they are aware of the present capabilities of Russia and of the fact that any special effort by the arms industry would only result in deepening the severe economic crisis.
Since the authors and signatories to the Report cover practically the entire Russian foreign and security political elite, what the document - otherwise restrained in tone - is really about is not the eventual consequences of the enlargement of NATO for Russia but what the elite itself is and is not willing to do in the case of the accession of the countries of Central and East Europe to NATO. One way of putting it is that, in the Report, the elite is threatening to retaliate.
[...]
Whatever the cause was, in developing its new strategy the Russian elite thought that a foreign policy pursued in a tougher, confrontational style (or "power politics", if you like) would help Russia win back its lost status as a superpower. Russian policy is aimed at blackmailing the West in the interest of obtaining new resources and of having its position as a great power accepted. Blackmail as a tool flashes up the image of an aggressive, authoritarian Russia. It seems as if several Russian manifestations had served only to call the world's attention to the fact that the federation was still a great power whose interests could not be left out of consideration in the shaping of international relations.
The conviction may have arisen in Moscow that if the special Russian interests were not emphasized on every possible occasion, then the world would forget about Russia which would then soon find itself in the second-class position of a middle power. As Kozyrev put it, "some analysts cannot accept the idea of a strong Russia, whether it be imperial or democratic. ... The majority of Russian political forces wants a strong, independent and prosperous Russia. [Thus] the only policy with any chance of success is one that recognizes the equal rights and mutual benefits of partnership for both Russia and the West, as well as the status and significance of Russia as a world power."24 However, such a status of Russia would only be
recognized by the West if it were capable of a major-power-class performance also in other areas such as the economy, scientific development or the art of diplomacy. Its incapability of doing so is one of the reasons why it tries to place the security question at the centre of its foreign policy. Russia fails to recognize that in reality it no longer has sizeable potentials in that field either.
Although the potential danger inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons is considerable, the Russian military and political leadership has been aware for a long time that nuclear forces can play no role, in other words, there is no room for nuclear blackmail. Nuclear weapons can serve a single purpose only: to deter the other party from using nuclear weapons.
[...]
The aversion of the "Russian bear" to the enlargement of NATO has only increased since the determined action of NATO forces in Bosnia. Already during the Gulf War, Russian leading circles had been anything but happy about the spectacular display of Western military technology; this time, however, they watched the employment of high-precision weapons, with which the Serb politicians were forced to the negotiating table in the end, with special anxiety. The Bosnian war was fought close to the territory of Russia, and Moscow felt it had an interest in the area. Indeed, it had supported Serbia for months or even years despite the UN embargo. With its bombing raids in Bosnia, Yeltsin declared, the organization had shown what it was capable of doing. "NATO was inclined to bomb first and calculate the losses suffered by the civilian population only afterward", he noted, adding that in such circumstances the enlargement of NATO would be a grave political mistake involving the danger of "engulfing the whole of Europe in flames".
Nevertheless, those are right who say and think that Moscow should not be given the right to veto on the issue of enlargement. NATO must not create the impression in Russia that it could really veto the admission of new member states. That could give rise to false illusions in Moscow regarding the actual role and potentials of the Russian Federation. It would be especially wrong to have Moscow believe that despite everything, the CEE countries still belong to its zone of influence in one way or another, and this is actually recognized by the West.37 At the same time, it is of paramount interest both to the West and CEE that Russia remain an active participant of the international community. Otherwise it is inconceivable that a new world order resting on rational foundations would come about.38
According to some political scientists, an interesting phenomenon is observable in modern societies: when, for some reason, a group sets out to establish an institution - in the present case, enlargement - during the course of which it enjoys the support of certain political forces, then the institution in question begins to develop even if the majority of the political forces are not interested in or actually opposed to it. The first steps - in our case, the launching of the programme known as partnership for peace, the establishment of the national and international working groups on admission, the preparation of the Study on NATO Enlargement, cooperation in the peacemaking mission in Bosnia, etc. - start a process which snowballs, continuing to grow with a peculiar automatism.
The actors should not necessarily keep in mind the end result of the process. It is enough if, to reach a compromise, they complete the next move. In a fortunate case, the conflicts inevitably occurring during the process are solved from time to time on the basis of "escaping forward". In less fortunate circumstances, when the solution of contradictions fails, and the forces with contrary interests take a tougher stand, the process is, of course, reversible.
Politicians in Central and East Europe act wisely if they exert political pressure on the West in the interest of their admission with the same patience and resolution they have shown thus far. They must be aware that there is no social automatism which would function even without that.
László Valki
is Professor of International Law at Eötvös University, Budapest, and Secretary General of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society. He has published numerous works on the social theory of international law, the legal problems of European integration, and, more recently, on questions of international security. The present article contains excerpts from a larger study on NATO enlargement, prepared with support from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen/Munich.
