János M. Rainer
The Road to Budapest, 1956
New Documentation on the Kremlin's Decision to Intervene
Part Two
(Click here for part one)
[...]
An Exchange of Views on the Hungarian Situation.
[Kádár:] Assessment. The intelligentsia is in the lead, the oppositionists: the followers of Nagy, party members are at the head of the armed groups.
[...]
When the uprising had ended, we spoke with rebels - they were workers - the leaders of the rebel groups,13 they joined the coalition government14 they did not want this, were for the removal of the Rákosi clique. They fought for the withdrawal of troops, for the people's democratic system. […] At first we failed to recognize this, identified it as counter-revolution, thus turning [the people] against us - they did not feel themselves to be counter-revolutionaries.
I personally attended a rally (discussion), nobody wanted a counter-revolution,15 when we spoke to the leaders of the armed groups. Within these groups, armed groups of counter-revolutionary character emerged.
It must be said that they all demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We did not succeed in finding out how the counter-revolutionaries were able to spread this counter-revolutionary propaganda.
The strike - the demand for the withdrawal of troops - we will be hungry but the troops must be pulled out.
There was a debate yesterday.
The Declaration of the Soviet government and the declaration of neutrality were already discussed. It was announced that "we will go back to work".16 But the Soviet troop movements [began] - and news spread fast.
The authority of the government will not be taken into account17 because of its coalition character.
They will use all their strength to re- establish their parties. They all want to seize power themselves. That undermines the authority of the government even more. The social democrats are especially prominent. The social democrats were given one seat in the inner cabinet. But they refused to name their candidate, in other words, they do not want to accept solidarity with Nagy.18 There are counter-revolutionary elements in Nagy's policy. Cardinal Mindszenty was freed by soldiers.
[...]
The weak link: the HWP ceased to exist. Some functionaries have been killed19, others have escaped.
In 1/3 of the county committees: the leaders take part in the revolutionary committees (on a district, county level). The lower-level organizations have been destroyed.
[...]
The parties of the coalition don't want a counter-revolution. Tildy and other comrades20 are afraid of Ferenc Nagy. They are afraid of those who are in exile.21
[...]
The position is shifting more and more to the right hour by hour.
Two questions: 1) the government's decision on neutrality, 2) the issue of the party.
How was the decision on neutrality born? Strong impression: the organized withdrawal of the troops. The declaration: [created] a good impression and had a reassuring effect. But tension in the masses is running high, they react vehemently. Soviet troop movements have taken place - they provoked the government and the masses. The government acts differently from the troops.22
It was announced that the Soviet troops had crossed the border using motor cars. The Hungarian units dug in. What should they do, shoot or not? We summoned Andropov.23 Andropov said these were railwaymen. The Hungarians at the border telegraphed that these were [not] railwaymen. Then came the news that Soviet tanks were on the move toward Szolnok. That happened at noon. The mood in the government was nervous. We summoned Andropov. He replied: regrouping. Then new reports came in: the airports were being surrounded by Soviet tanks. Andropov was summoned again. He answered: wounded soldiers were being . taken away. Nagy was convinced: a Soviet attack on Budapest was in preparation. Tildy asked for Hungarian tanks to move to the parliament.
In the army - Revolutionary Committee. Maléter, Kovács, Király do not obey the government.24 They do not want the bad ministers.
The entire government tended to the opinion that if the troops continued to push forward in the direction of Budapest, Budapest should be defended. It was in that atmosphere that the idea of neutrality was born. The initiator: Zoltán Tildy. He was supported by everybody. I was of the opinion that nothing should be done before we spoke to Andropov. With the exception of Kádár, the whole government declared that the Soviet government was deceiving the Hungarian government. It was postponed by two hours. 25 They were not calmed by the explanation of the Soviet government. They declared to Andropov that they would make that move. When Andropov was gone, they made their decision on neutrality, and [decided on] the issue that they would turn to the UN.26 If this was manoeuvres only, then they will withdraw their appeal to the UN. When Andropov was gone, then he (Kádár) too, voted for neutrality.
Changing of the name of the party: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (a name from 1925)27 The HWP was discredited in the eyes of the masses. The prestige of the HWP was at its height in 1948 (fusion with the social democrats). The Rajk affair undermined its prestige.
On the future. Yesterday I cast my vote in favour of these two government decisions. If the Soviet troops were pulled out within a short time (two-three months) - the important thing is that there be a decision on the withdrawal of troops - then our party and the other parties could take up the struggle against the counter-revolution. But I am not altogether certain of success. There is no unity within the coalition. My opinion: if the Social Democratic Party and the Smallholders' Party will revive their old programmes, they will be disappointed. The people believe in nationalization, and regard it as their own cause. If the communists declare that they support nationalization, then the prestige of the other parties will not grow. The real danger: these coalition parties may eventually be swept away by the counter-revolution.
In my view: there is another way. To keep Hungary using armed force. But then there will be armed clashes. Crushing by military force equals bloodshed. And what will there be after that? The moral position of the communists will be nil. It will cause damage to the other socialist countries. Is there any guarantee that in such a case the same situation will not occur in other countries?
The counter-revolutionary forces are not inconsiderable. But that is a question of struggle. If the restoring of order happens by armed force: the prestige of the socialist countries (will be damaged).
[...]
It is clear from the long and detailed notes on Kádár's report that even if he had an inkling about why he had been "required" in Moscow, he still knew nothing for certain at the time. He was probably asked to describe the situation, to explain his view. A born politician, he set forth his view in a way so as to be "covered" for every possible outcome. He analysed the situation from an "outsider's" point of view, as an observer, a loyal subject simply briefing the leaders of the empire. He explained his own moves, cast light on the motives behind them as if he were giving some kind of action report to vindicate himself. At other instances he spoke as a genuine member of the Imre Nagy government and the party leadership, accepting the responsibility for their common decisions. He touched upon the possible "solutions", sketched out perspectives, taking a quite distinct position, too, but also making it apparent that he could imagine both solutions. Meantime he must have watched every move, every reaction to what he was saying, trying all the time to make out if the leaders of the CPSU had already come to a decision, and if so, what the decision was. However, this time his "hosts" remained silent; he was being scrutinized.
The disjointed character of his narrative must have been due to his anxiety, to the complex state of mind he was in. He had evidently meant to relate events in chronological order but halted time and again, sometimes to offer a political analysis, sometimes to add his own impressions as an illustration, and finally, to explain what had been done - and especially why - in the given situation by himself or the government. Another reason for the disjointedness may have been that he was being bombarded with questions, unrecorded by Malin, by the Soviets. An "interrogation" of this kind, however, is not really probable. The "leaps" in the notes were most likely due to the circumstance, unusual for Malin, that what Kádár, who could not speak Russian, said was coming through an interpreter.
[...]
Notes
[...]
13 * Kádár's description of the leaders of the revolution was based on his October 30 meeting with the largely reform-communist leaders of the Budapest Tûzoltó utca armed group. He did not meet any other leaders. That was, in fact, the only rebel group whose leaders included intellectuals close to the opposition wing of the party.
14 * The meaning of this part of the sentence is vague. It may concern the rebel leaders of whom Kádár has just spoken - in which case it is not their joining of the government that is meant but the fact that they sought out Kádár for the purpose of negiotiations. It is more likely, though, that Kádár was speaking about his own membership in the government, explaining why he had accepted a position in the Imre Nagy government, of which he had been a member as a Minister of State since October 30, the formation of the narrower cabinet.
15 * He was probably talking about his meeting with the leaders of the Tûzoltó utca group again.
16 * This must be an allusion to the November 1 meeting of the Budapest workers' councils and revolutionary committees with the members of the government, which finally passed an appeal for the resumption of work. Kádár was not at the meeting. The appeal was broadcast by Hungarian Radio at 11 p.m.
17 * The probable meaning is that the government will lose its prestige.
18 * On October 30, 1956, a narrower coalition (multi-party) cabinet which constituted a kind of presidium to the government was established by Imre Nagy within the government. Its members were: Prime Minister Imre Nagy, Ministers of State János Kádár and Géza Losonczy, representing the communists (then still under the name of HWP), Zoltán Tildy and Ferenc Erdei, representing the Independent Smallholders' Party and the Peasant Party, respectively. A seat was kept for the Social Democrats; however, their representatives, Anna Kéthly, Gyula Kelemen and József Fischer, would only join the transformed and extended cabinet that was established on November 3.
19 * In fact, only a very few HWP apparatchiks lost their lives during the revolution.
20 * Sic.
21 * Former Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was in exile in the United States at the time. At the end of October he happened to be in Paris, and travelled to Vienna on hearing of the outbreak of the revolution. A day later, and at the request of the Austrian Government, he returned to Paris and subsequently to America.
22 * I.e. the Soviet government.
23 * On November 1, 1956.
24 * At the time of the departure of Kádár, Major General Pál Maléter was First Deputy of the Minister of Defence, Major General István Kovács was Chief of Staff and Major General Béla Király the President of the Revolutionary Law-Enforcement Committee and the commander of the National Guard. All were members of the Revolutionary Defense Commission established at the Ministry of Defense on October 31, and, quite to the contrary of what Kádár claimed, they carried out the instructions of the government.
25 * I.e. the decision on the declaration of neutrality.
26 * I.e. in order to inform the United Nations of the declaration of neutrality, and to ask the four permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union) to guarantee Hungary's neutrality. The government also asked the Secretary General to put the Hungarian issue on the agenda of the imminent General Assembly.
27 * The radical party founded in 1925 by the leftist opposition who had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party was called the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Its leadership was in contact with the then illegal Communist Party.
[...]
János M. Rainer's
publications include pioneering statistical accounts of the reprisals following the 1956 Revolution (in samizdat 1986-89), and a book on the 1953-56 debates in the literary press. The first volume of his biography of Imre Nagy was published, in Hungarian, in 1996 by the Institute for the Research of the 1956 Revolution, Budapest.
