László Varga
Watchers and the Watched
János Kenedi: Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv (A Concise State Security Reader). Budapest, Magvetõ, 1996. Vols. I-II, 44l, 510 pp.
[...]
A prominent role in the process of doing justice was given by the national conservative government of 1990-1994 to the Lustration Act which, however, managed to get through Parliament only in the second half of its tenure of office. In terms of this act, the names of a select circle of public figures (members of parliament, government ministers, general managers of government-owned firms, newspaper editors, etc.) who co-operated in the past with the state security department whose brief was to fight "internal reaction", would be made public, should they refuse to resign their posts after their "lustration".
The law was intended to cover four categories. First and foremost, it was to reveal the names of the agents and secret officers of the communist internal state security service. Secondly, to reveal those who, as part of their job, were granted official access to the reports of these agents. Within this category, however, even lawyers do not entirely agree whether this simply concerns employees of the "home defence department" or whether it also includes communist party and government officials who received the reports of state security in their official capacity.
The third category, swiftly dubbed "Lex Horn," covered those who had once belonged to the Kádárist paramilitary organization which had an active and illegal role in the crushing of the 1956 Revolution. Finally, as if it were ashamed of exposing - even if in a manner completely in keeping with a democratic, constitutional state - the communist state machinery, it also sanctioned National Socialist Party membership before 1945. In return for all this, the documents of the former state security service were, in practice, declared secret sine die.
The Constitutional Court deemed the law unconstitutional on two counts. First, it found it unacceptable that the range of those to be investigated was determined inconsistently, extending to the business community and, in the case of the media, even to those active in the private economy. More significantly, Parliament was criticized by the Constitutional Court for failing to guarantee the victims' right to information.
The decision of the Constitutional Court also called attention to something odd. This was the fact that decisions, even legislation affecting state security documents and even former state security agents, were being made by legislators and decision-makers who, at best, had only vague information on the documents themselves or the various categories of agents. Thus the law takes no notice of what was called the prison cell network (one of the most favoured ploys of state security, covering those who reported on their cellmates) and this it consequently ignores. The ploy was especially effective during the investigation stage when detainees exhausted by mental and physical abuse including torture easily confided to sympathetic cellmates. An even greater oversight, raising the issue of equality before the law, is that neither the act nor the decision of the Constitutional Court recognizes the category of "social contact". Individuals in that category supplied information to state security without being formally "signed up", simply on account of their official or social position.
[...]
The Organization Chart of the Former State Security Service
(Ministry of the Interior Section III)
INTERIOR MINISTER --------------- Central Committee
| of the
| Hungarian Socialist
| Workers' Party
Deputy Interior Minister responsible | |
for state security -------+ |
(also Chief of Section III of the IM) |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | +-----------------------------------+
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Dir I Dir II Dir III Dir III Dir V Autonomous Depts
Directorate I
(Intelligence)
Dept. 1: political and economic intelligence, Britain and the US
Dept. 2: other foreign affairs
Dept 3: West German affairs
Dept. 4: Israel, the Vatican, Church émigré affairs
Dept. 5: n. d.
Dept. 6: n. d.
Dept. 7: other Hungarian émigré groups
Depts. 8-13: n. d.
Directorate II
(Counterintelligence)
(Depts. 1-5: offensive work, 6-10: general defensive and investigative-screening work)
Dept. 1: countering the intelligence activities of the USA and some Latin American countries
Dept. 2.: West Germany, Austria
Dept. 3: NATO countries, Turkey
Dept. 4: Middle and Far Eastern countries + countering "international Zionism"
Dept. 5: operative measures abroad
Dept. 6: defence industry, telecommunications, traffic
Dept. 7: foreign trade + international technological co-operation
Dept. 8: investigation of hostile intelligence agents
Depts. 9-10: n. d.
Directorate III
(Internal Protection)
Dept. 1: countering Church reactionaries
Dept. 2: youth protection
Sub-dept. A: universities, institutions of higher education
Sub-dept. B: youth clubs, events
Dept. 3: countering "hostile elements" (e.g. convicted political offenders)
Dept. 4: countering of hostile cultural activities
Sub-dept. A: countering bourgeois revisionist attacks
Other sub-dept. (name unknown): countering attacks by sectarian-dogmatic and anarchistic platforms
Directorate IV
(Military Counterintelligence)
Directorate V
(Operative techniques)
Autonomous Departments
Dept. 1: state security investigation ("Gyorskocsi utca")
sub. depts: counterespionage, countering of internal reaction, military counterintelligence (including prison intelligence)
Dept. 2: undercover surveillance and environment investigation, operative observers
Dept. 3: secret checking of the mail
Dept. 4: tapping of telephones, operative-technical wire-tapping
Dept. 5: radio countermeasures and investigation (foreign broadcasts)
Dept. 6: Personnel
[...]
With his book, János Kenedi has breached the wall of silence. The book is based on an ingenious idea: it provides a view of the wide-ranging activities of the Kádár regime's state security by focusing on three commemorative days, October 23 (the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution), March 15 (the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1848 Revolution) and June 16 (the anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy and his fellows).
Following a brief introduction, the volume contains nearly a thousand pages of state security documents, for the most part previously inaccessible. These are completed, where necessary, with records of those meetings of the Communist Party leadership bodies relevant to the given topic. Thus the first chapter contains documents of the Budapest Party Committee, and the third those of the top bodies of the party, the Central Committee and the Political Committee.
The state security documents themselves show an astounding diversity. They include records, for instance those taken at interrogations of suspects and witnesses, or at the meetings of the "organs" responsible. The number of reports, however, is far greater, and in several cases it is possible to follow the process whereby an "incident", while moving upwards, gradually swelled into a "case," seriously threatening the security of the state. No less enlightening are the "notes" made for "internal use only", containing an agent's report, or a study of the en-vironment, contacts, etc., of a "target person",3 or an appreciation of the result of a house search.
These two large volumes close with a "Dictionary of State Security Slang", compiled on the basis of a "Dictionary of State Security Terms," published in 1980 and, of course, classified Top Secret.
[...]
The measures, records and reports of the authorities are followed in the first chapter by accounts of specific "cases". The first began - from a police viewpoint - in March 1957, when a young university student sent a small red, white and green (the national colours) ribbon to a friend who had left the country. It was the type customarily worn on jackets and coats by Hungarians, especially the young, on March 15 in commemoration of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. The ribbon had been given to the hero of our story by a girl he had once been in love with, and he sent it to France to be rid of a painful memory. However, he had foolishly enclosed the wish, "Let this little thing mean that we are guarding closely all that we set out to achieve in October [i.e. the Revolution half a year earlier]."
The ribbon was intercepted by the ever-vigilant postal guardians of the state's security, and from then on, his correspondence was watched, his circle of friends, his most confidential conversations, his political record, and especially his "activities" in the days of the Revolution, were carefully checked.In his reply, the friend in France asked questions, which were duly answered, and thus the act of "espionage" had been clearly committed. That was enough to set the machinery of state security in motion. The student was given a "personal file" and he was put under close surveillance. The "network persons" active at the university and among his friends were put on his trail, and the investigation was at once expanded. The outcome was relatively fortunate: only two were tried, charged not with espionage but with "incitement to hatred against the people's democratic government order", a much less serious crime. Our hero got away with five years' imprisonment, his companion with four.
Kenedi's second case study is the longest section, making up more than a tenth of the nearly 1000 page documentation. A Virgil of our absurd modern times, he guides us into the circles of state security never known to the outsider. The subject here is a genuine "organization". On October 11, 1957, in the small hours, the political police "seized 30 pieces of libellous trash. The majority of the envelopes is light blue, 7 of them are light green, 4 pink and 3 white. All 30 have been addressed by typewriter and mimeographed."
Of course, it was not the colour of the envelopes which aroused the interest of the Hungarian Stasi but what was inside: a leaflet calling on the recipient to commemorate the imminent anniversary of the Revolution in a proper manner. The 31 addressees included, in additon to the Hungarian news agency, the editorial offices of two arts weeklies, two hospitals, several universities and university teachers, as well as actors, directors, writers and religious denominations.
Following that, the alert custodians of the security of the state seized another 10 (white) envelopes from a mailbox next to the American legation. The report written on the operation made no attempt to conceal the fact that the original intention had been to lay hands on letters mailed by the American legation; it was sheer coincidence that they came upon the leaflets signed by "Hungarian Revolutionary Youth". Attached to the leaflet, there was a request in English asking the addressees (the legations of the U.S., Italy, India, Argentina, Sweden, France, Britain, Finland, Austria and Turkey) to forward the contents of the letter to Radio Free Europe or the European Service of the BBC.
During the day, a total of 68 envelopes and leaflets came into the possession of the political police. Few things can indicate the prevailing political mood in Hungary at the time better than the fact that 65 were intercepted in a "K" (conspirational) manner - i.e. postal inspection - and only three were handed in by the actual addressee (one of them by the party daily Népszabadság).
The investigation established immediately that the distribution of the leaflet was the work of an organized group. Efforts were made to deduce who the authors were from the nature of the addressees; total "K" control was immediately ordered and the agents' network briefed. Within four days, 138 envelopes were found, and the investigation followed two tracks. One dealt with the way the leaflets and envelopes (typewriter used, etc.) were produced, the other analysed the list of the addressees.
In another five days - and after five more envelopes - the analysis of the addresses seemed to yield definite results. The investigators established that the authors of the leaflet had to be sought among people connected with sport, and especially at the College of Physical Education. On the basis of that, a broad operative plan was drafted. The political record of the addressees was checked, members and activists of the professional and student organizations active before and during the Revolution investigated, so too were university and college students actively engaged in sports, especially swimmers; the typewriters and duplicating machines of universities and academies were inspected. The staff of the country's single sports newspaper was subjected to a particularly thorough investigation since the editors, quite incomprehensibly, were not among the addressees.
In November the investigation was extended to a possible connection conceiveable between the adressees and the circle of potential offenders. Moreover, in two specific cases, both involving university teachers, the political police actually decided to deliver the leaflets, to see how they would react to what they received. That minor point in the story shows up clearly the essence of the operations of the state security service. No individual addressee, or anyone spoken to, could ever be certain whether he or she was adressed by a bona fide "offender" or was caught up in an act of provocation organized by the political police.
In conjunction with that, the investigation of the typewriters of universities and other institutions of higher education continued and, for safety's sake, was extended to cover those in Western missions. The intensity of the "K" inspection was increased, and, in order to play by the rules, the help of the Public Prosecutor's Office was also enlisted. All letters "addressed and placed in envelopes in a similar manner" would be henceforward opened. All mimeograph machines of the "Rotaprint" type operating in the capital - 162 in number - were examined, and so were those operating them as "the operation of Rotaprint machines requires training". These measures clearly illustrate what makes a state totalitarian, even a regime which later would be widely referred to as "goulash communism".
It was established that although Rotaprint duplicating plates could only be bought on producing "a purchase book issued by the police", this did not prevent the plates from being re-used. As a result, the state-owned company using the greatest number of Rotaprint duplicators was also subjected to a thorough investigation; at the same time the circle of potential offenders was "explored" by recourse to earlier agents' reports on file. That filter still proved too wide: several hundred undergraduates and teachers were caught in the sieve (including some who were themselves active as agents as well as others who would become offenders, or rather the victims in other "cases" described in the volume). On that account, everybody against whom disciplinary action had been taken because of their activity in 1956 at the College of Physical Education was investigated.
By the end of 1958, the circle of possible offenders was narrowed down after a collation of the links between the addressees and the potential perpetrators. These were undergraduates of the Polytechnic University and possibly also of the Faculty of Natural Sciences of Eötvös University in Budapest, who had become friendly at a swimming pool with the two teachers of the College of Physical Education among the addressees. Two restaurants were identified which could have been regularly used by "the perpetrators", who also had contacts with three hospitals especially heavily involved in the "counterrevolution" of 1956. The investigation therefore began to concentrate on these circles and "facilities". More agents were drawn into "reconnaissance" work, and more potential offenders placed under observation. Thus a list was made of university students who had been bringing casualties to the "compromised" hospitals in the days of the Revolution (their leader was to be executed shortly afterwards); the investigation was then extended to university students who had been treated in those hospitals in 1956.
George Orwell himself would have found his vision of the totalitarian communist state naive compared to the scale of the investigation actually carried out because of an insignificant leaflet. Not surprisingly, though, it turned out that until May 1958, this all-embracing investigation had been on the wrong track. The first real discoveries were made, in fact by chance, only in May 1958 (but it is precisely the elimination of chance that makes an investigation "total"). Those first tangible results came from a secondary lead: the failure of the examination of the typewriters of the College of Physical Education.
It was "established" that the leaflet had not been written on any of the College's typewriters but part of a thesis submitted by a student - "The Role of Callisthenics in Physical Education in Schools" - had been written on the typewriter so long sought.
There is no need to bore the reader with further details of the absurd investigation lasting for another six months. The typewriter finally lead to the "culprits". What made matters complicated was the fact that the whole affair had nothing to do with the College of Physical Education; the author of the thesis worked briefly on a borrowed typewriter, and this nearly lead to a former minister of the Smallholders' Party, a prominent architect, already sentenced on trumped up charges in 1947. Ultimately he was dropped from the case even though the typewriter had been used by his sub-tenant too. In the end, to the greater glory of communist legality, only the real perpetrator, his relatives and friends were put on trial. Accordingly, Iván Kuklis "got away" with a prison term of eight years. One might venture the assumption that the total failure of the entire nation-wide investigation, the fact that the political police failed abysmally, finding the author of the leaflet by mere chance, had a part in the relatively mild sentence.
[...]
The day of June 16, 1989 went down in history as "the day of national reconciliation". This was one of the ways in which the secret service earned "undying merit" for itself, producing the slogan and making sure through its agents that the public took it up. What is really astonishing, however, is not this fact but the extent to which the factors shaping public opinion, especially the press, were dominated by the secret service even then. (See Appendix II) It becomes clear that some of the new, "independent" papers were created at the initiative of the secret service; furthermore, it had the right to instruct the media as to what its foreign correspondents should report from abroad.
Not only the opposition but also several prominent exiled politicians were the victims of that manipulation. Thus, for instance, a special operative plan was worked out regarding Béla Király, declared "Public Enemy No 1" by the secret service (as indeed, for every major figure) which covered the questions to be asked by the television crew sent to interview him as well as the bugging of his hotel room.
Beside Király, the man most feared by the state security service was György Krassó, a leading member of the democratic opposition, forced into exile in 1958. Since, like Király, he also came home for the funeral, agents were planted all around him, and efforts to discredit "the radical Krassó" were immediately initiated. After his return Krassó was indeed isolated, and his idea of revolutionary change was branded as extreme radicalism, a kind of "lunacy", by every democratic party.
The documents published do not, and cannot, expose the hidden moving springs in the background to the changeover controlled by state security. Thus it is merely an assumption on the part of this writer that it may have been the Polish transition - ultimately a failure from their point of view - which was regarded by the communist secret police as a model. They must have expected that the process of peaceful transition would be completed by the election-winning conservative-national government under the leadership of a post-communist Head of State. This attempt was thwarted by a clever move by democratic (or, to use the Hungarian terminology, "liberal") parties which succeeded in forcing a referendum.
However, Kenedi has done everything possible - and sometimes even the impossible - to publish at least some of these documents. Thus relevant Communist Party documents are added to the secret service documents (and not only in the last part of the book either). The records of the meetings of the Party leadership, and especially those of the Political Committee, are as important a part of the history of the June 16 funeral as those of the secret service. They make it evident that the majority of Party leaders, who presented themselves as reformers before public opinion here and abroad, were anything but dove-like - sometimes downright hawkish - when they were among themselves. History simply passed them by, in many cases without their awareness.
[...]
The odd nature of current legal regulations backfires in the book in a peculiar manner. Kenedi is forced to grant anonymity to individuals, providing only the names of those he managed to contact, and who were willing to have their names published. In that way, however, one of the most important dimensions of history - and a major task of history-writing - is lost. Without names, the story becomes an inventory of examples, and is unable to depict the real process. One of the "villains" appears in all three chapters - but he cannot be identified by the reader. In the first volume he is still a simple denunciator, in the second, prosecuting counsel in the case of the "March youngsters", in the third, now an undersecretary in a ministry, he plays a key role in the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy.
In his introduction, Kenedi makes it clear that the bulky documents published by him show the sewers of the regime, the way in which the state security service wished to see, and present, itself and its enemies, or rather the enemies of the regime. Its picture of the world was pieced together from observations, bugged apartments and telephone conversations, interference with the mail and informers' reports. The documents published make the perverse nature of that approach evident. It is the mentality of the voyeur who penetrates deep into people's intimate sphere wherever he can, with a special - far from chance - preference for the sexual, where he can enjoy his own impulses to the full.
The book, as one Hungarian reviewer has put it, points beyond itself: not only the secret services of dictatorship are judged to be guilty by our moral sense but every ideology, means and method which, either legally but mostly illegally, encroaches upon our privacy, putting the citizen at the mercy of an invisible power, and which, where it cannot condemn in a court, slanders and discredits, breaks careers, and radically interferes in lives.
Supplement
Top Secret
Serial Number:................
(to be completed by the registering organ)
Organ issuing data sheet ..................
No. of B file ................................
Covername ................................
DATA SHEET
On the Network of the Organs of State Security
A NAME OF THE NETWORK PERSON
Sex: male (1), female (2), date of birth..........(3)
Citizenship:
current:.............(4)
original:..............(5)
Nationality:...............(6)
MSzMP (Communist Party) member (7), KISz (Youth Communist League) member (8)
Educatuion: university (9), other institute of higher education (10), secondary school, finals (11), elementary (12)
Academic degree: academician (13), university professor (14), Doctor of sciences (15), Candidate of sciences (16)
Branch of science: technological (17), physics (18), chemistry (19), mathematics (20), medical (21), biology (22), arts (23), legal (24), philosophical (25), economic (26), history (27), other (28)
Personal qualification:
a)...............(29)
b)................
Position: top management (3), middle management (31), low-level management (32), independent subordinate (33), non-independent subordinate (34)
Work place: ............................(35)
Languages spoken: English (36), German (37), French (38), Italian(39), Spanish (40), Arabic (41), Hindi (42), Japanese (43), other European:............ (44), other Oriental: ............ (45)
Level of language skills: poor (46), good (47), perfect (48)
Marital status: single (49), married (50), divorced (51)
Place of resindece:
in Budapest:............district (52)
outside Budapest: .............locality (53)
B RECRUITMENT
Year...................(1), executing organ ...................... (2)
Classification: secret agent (35), contract agent (4), agent (5)
Grounds: patriotic (ideological, political) (6), evidence against compromised or discredited (7), financial gain (8), personal and other interests (9), combination of grounds (10)
Method of recruitment: rapid (11), gradual (12)
Changes in ground of recruitment ..........................classification of network .....................
function ...........................................
Objective of recruitment was: obtaining or discovery of secret information (13), execution of operative combinations (14), recognition or finding of person engaged in hostile activity (15), prison intelligence and information (16), preventive protection (17), operative control (18), execution of partial tasks in network operations (19), activities as resident (20), owner of "T" apartment (21), mail checking (22), special technical operative task (23), other special assignment (24)
Co-operation: accepted enthusiastically (25), hesitatingly, after a great deal of persuasion (26)
His/her conditions were: not be given a covername (27), will provide no written report (28), will not work against certain persons, groups or countries (29), will not have meetings at conspirational places (30), at public places (31)
C CURRENT AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT: I.................
(Select correct answer from those listed below and write its number after the Roman numeral I)
APART FROM CURRENT ENGAGEMENT, MAY ALSO BE USED FOR:
II. (SUITABLE):
(underline correct answer)
Infiltration, involvement, planting: in espionage matters on a domestic basis (1), hostile organizations (2), beside hostile persons (3), abroad in hostile intelligence, propaganda or émigré organizations (4), for the controlling of intelligence officers, agents (5), initiation and involvement of game operations, recruitment (6), operative cross-border actions (7), positioning in the long term (8), short term (9), liaison, courier (10), recruiting (11), investigation tasks (12), surveillance of incoming foreigners (13), of diplomats (14), infiltration through foreign representations (15), for defense against subversion and loosening up, organized operations (16), for the exposure and disruption of hostile activity and organizations (17), for the protection of military, defense industry and major government facilities (18), in the field of the protection of the national economy (economic organization, science, technology, international co-operation, etc.) (19), foreign trade (20), logistics and telecommunications (21), for the defense of state secrets (22), against Zionist subversion (23), other Church and clerical areas (24), for the observation and security of Hungarians travelling abroad (25), dishonouring and compromising operations (26), in the field of illegal currency dealings and other criminal activities (27), for misinforming the enemy (28), youth protection field (29), controlling of those with observation files (30), for the surveillance of former political convicts (31), of those engaged in a hostile activities in the cultural and scientific fields (32)
Other.................................(33)
D CONTACTS, TRAVEL
Has contacts abroad: with employees or agents of hostile intelligence organizations (1), with members of hostile organizations, institutions and émigré organizations (2), with other suspicious, hostile elements (3), with relationships through which he/she can get into contact with the above listed organizations and persons (4)
Which country? a.................
b................. (5)
Inside Hungary, has contacts with: Soviet (10), or Hungarian military personnel (including family members and civil employees) (11), important political and social (12), scientific (13), cultural personalities (14), internal security personnel (15), employees of foreign organizations under observation (16), with persons suspected of spying (17), of other hostile activities (18), persons previously sentenced for such activities (19), relationships through which he/she may infiltrate hostile foreign organizations or the environment of hostile persons (20)
Has been to the West: officially (21), as a tourist 22), on family visit (23), illegally (24)
May travel to the West: officially: on a long-term assignment (25), regularly (26), occasionally (27)
To which country? a)..................
b).................. (5)
On a private basis: for a longer period (28), regularly (29), occasionally (30)
To which country? a)...................
b)................... (5)
E POTENTIALS FOR OPERATIVE WORK:
Has opportunity: to receive officials of foreign representations (1), foreign nationals (2), in a private capacity: officials of foreign representations (3), foreign nationals (4)
To participate officially: at receptions of foreign persons (5), of officials of foreign representations (6), to participate in a private capacity: at receptions of foreign persons (7), at officials of foreign representations (8), to live a wide social life (9)
May be extracted from his/her workplace: for a longer period (10), shorter period (11)
May be extracted from his/her family: for a longer period (12), shorter period (13)
Because of present employment, may not be used for other purposes for a longer period (14), shorter period (15)
Due to his/her job and/or contacts, knows (may know) important state secrets (16), served in the People's Army or the Interior Ministry as an officer (reserve) (17), non-commissioned officer in the ranks (reserve) (18), received special training (missiles, signals, reconnaissance, etc.) (19)
There are important military or arms industry facilities or major traffic centres in the environment of his/her workplace or domicile (20)
Has bank account, property, financial interests in a Western country (21)
Through his/her Western contacts or financial conditions, can establish a livelihood abroad (22)
Has already been noticed and checked by hostile intelligence (23). Collaborated with intelligence organization during the war (24), after 1945 (including game run by us) (25)
Possesses and can use in operative work: rented apartment (26), holiday house (cabin, fishing hut, wine cellar) (27), automobile (28), motor boat (29), sailboat (30), other vessel (31), shop (32), workshop (33), studio (34), surgery, law office, other office (35)
F MORAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE, ENVIRONMENT
Was sentenced: for political crime (1), common crime (2), has committed any of these but has not been sentenced (3)
Enemy of the socialist system (4), loyal (5), a true supporter of the system (6), indifferent (7), a supporter of bourgeois democracy (8), nationalist (9), religious (10), atheist (11), indifferent (12), Zionist (13), anti-Semite (14)
Was expelled from the MKP, MDP or MSzMP [various names of the CP at various times] (15), resigned his/her membership (16), was a member of a rightwing party or organization before 1949 (or in the past) (17)
Origin: members of former ruling classes (18), members of former armed and police forces (15), bourgeois, intelligentsia (20), other employee (21), labouring classes: worker (22), peasant (23)
Environment: (relatives, friends): former ruling clases (24), members of former armed and police forces (25), labouring classes: workers (26), peasants (27). His/her attitudes, origins, environment are known among his/her Western contacts (18)
G CLEARANCE, TRAINING LEVEL
Cleared, trustworthy (1), reliable but not yet checked (2), trustworthiness not reliably cleared (3), not to be trusted (4), lost his cover (5), abandoned his cover (6)
Pursues the agent's work: with pleasure (7), with displeasure, reluctantly (8), out of fear (9), for career considerations (10), for financial gain (11)
Training: is familiar with network operation, has operated a network (12), has not yet operated a network but suitable for it (13), has received operative technical training (14), special intelligence-counterintelligence training (15), secret liaisoning (16)
Has executed secret operations abroad (17), against foreign representations (18), in operative investigatory work (19), job completed as a result of his/her work (20)
H CHARACTER, STATE OF HEALTH
Temperament: quick-tempered, agile (1), irritable, unbalanced (2), phlegmatic, impassive (3), melancholic, moody (4), calm, balanced (5)
In company? inhibited, introvert (6) uninhibited, extrovert (7), bold, takes the initiative (8), timid, dependent (9), ingenious, reacts fast in delicate situations (10)
Memory: good (11), passable (12), poor (13)
Squanders money (17), frugal (18), miserly (19)
Rude (20), polite (21), sincere (22), partly sincere (23), liar (24)
Keeps a secret (25), inclined to be talkative (26)
Lives a sober life (27), drunkard (28), moderate drinker (19)
Homosexual (other sexual aberrations) (30), prostitute (31), ready to enter into sexual relations (32), has harmful habits impairing his/her work as an agent (33)
State of health: healthy (34), has physical illness not impairing his/her work as an agent (35), suffers from organic illness (heart condition, nervous disease, diabetes) which does not allow him/her to be exposed either to mental or physical strain (excitement) (36)
I APPEARANCE, SPECIAL SKILLS
Tall (1), medium height (2), small (3). Thin (4), medium built (5), fat (6). Eyes: black (7), brown (8), blue, greenish (9). Hair: black (10), brown (11), red (12), blond (13), grey- greying (14), balding (15), bald (16), dyes hair to any colour when required (17)
Appearance: conspicuously good-looking (18), plain (19), ugly (20), physically handicapped (21), limb missing (22), hearing-impaired (23), has poor vision (24)
Hobbies: ham radio (broadcast-reception) (25), photography, film-making (26), stamp collecting (27), collection of paintings, sculptures, antiqques (28), coin collecting (19), automobile driving (30), flying (glider) (31), parachuting (32), hiking, pot holing (33), hunting (34), fishing (35), winter sports (36), water sports (37), ball games (38), soccer (39), gymnastics, indoor sports (40), fencing (41), tennis (42), horse riding (43), card games (44), chess (45), horse races (46), shooting, bowling (47), model building (48), fine art (49), literature (50), music, opera, ballet (51), film, theatre (52), dance (53), museology, history (54), archaeology (55), book collection (56), record collection, tape recording (57), radio building, D.I.Y. (58), gardening (59), other.................. (60)
J EXCLUSION, TRANSFER, IN RECESS
Cause of exclusion: has become a traitor (1), left the country illegally (2), refused to return (3), committed a crime: political (4), economic (5), other (6), refused to co-operate (7), failed to accomplish task (8), did not attend meetings (9), asked for the breaking of contact (10), gave up cover (11), lost cover (12), was recruited for a specific task and finished it (13), his/her opportunity for intelligence work ceased, change in operative situation (14)
Has become MSzMP member, leadership member (15), KISz leadership member (16), has become an Interior Ministry employee, position Secret Officer (17), change in personal or family situation (18), change of workplace or responsibility (19), immoral lifestyle (20), unreliable, insincere (21), released (22), ill (23), died (24), other.............. (25)
At the time of exclusion, his/her demands were: fulfilled (26), partly fulfilled (27), rejected (28)
Cause of transfer:.................................Date..........................
Name of associate organisation being transferred
to................................................Date.....................
Cause of recess:....................................Date..........................
(From............To............(recess initiated by: network person, operative organ
Date of completion of form:............year................month.......day
Inspected by:
Subdept. head, rank
[Excerpts from Order No. 0012 by Interior Minister András Benkei promulgated on July 31, 1972]
TOP SECRET
Until destroyed!
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
Directorate III/III
Approved
Dr István Horváth
Police Maj. Gen.
Minister of the Interior
Agreed:
Ferenc Pallagi
Deputy Minister
Subject : Ensuring the security of preparations for the burial
of Imre Nagy and his associates
Operative Plan of Action
On the basis of the permission of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the decision of relatives, the burial of Imre Nagy and his four associates will take place on June 16, 1989, in the New Central Cemetery in Budapest.
The family members as well as The Committee for Historical Justice are wishing to ensure the character of the event as an act of respect, recognizing at the same time that a political aspect will inevitably arise, but they will make efforts to keep it - as much as possible - within limits.
As opposed to them, certain extremist social groups - mainly SzDSz [Alliance of Free Democrats], FIDESz [League of Young Democrats] and the Republican Circle are attempting to turn the ceremony into a political demonstration. (...)
The main direction of the activity of the state security service must be to support with all force and means at its disposal the character of the event as one of respect, commemoration and rehabilitation, while preventing, halting, limiting, detouring and influencing toward a positive direction all extremist attempts which may be expected from both sides.
Accordingly, it should make special efforts:
* To obtain, analyse and evaluate the ideas of Hungarian émigré groups and the various internal alternative groups regarding the funeral. To provide up-to-date information to the political leadership, and to work out proposals for political and government action.
* To work out and carry out combinations and active measures abroad and at home, orientating toward the tribute-paying line of thought, placing rehabilitation and the paying of final respects to the fore. Pushing back and deflecting every initiative to the contrary.
* To initiate operations of misinformation emphasising that the events may be taken advantage of by extremist elements to stage provocations, which could lead to a halting of the process of democratization and to restoration.
* To initiate measures in the foreign affairs area, through our network of contacts, mainly toward the US State Department and the US Embassy in Budapest, calling attention to the fact that any action of extremist adventurism may disrupt increasingly broadening and strengthening Hungarian-American relations, and would negatively affect our initiatives made toward a pluralistic social order.
* In matters involving games,1 to convey information to the hostile special services suggesting that a course of events contrary to the intentions of the authorities may lead to a strengthening of the forces urging restoration [i.e., an abandonment of the current relative liberalism]
* To control the activity of politicians, businessmen, press correspondents and camera crews arriving from abroad.
* To investigate and reveal analyses and assessments by officials of foreign representations operating in Hungary concerning the funeral as well as to find out about any eventual effort to influence the events.
* The deliberate use of the Hungarian mass media - Hungarian Television, Hungarian Radio, the government and independent press - to spread the suggestion that it will be a proof of the maturity of the nation if the events of June 16 proceed in an orderly manner.
* To spread, through our system of contacts, information influencing the political mood in the desired direction, emphasizing that the current leadership is making positive moves and initiatives, for which reason it would be highly undesirable if extremist forces provoked restoration by their actions on June 16 or October 23. (...)
In order to co-ordinate state security efforts, an operative committee has been set up, consisting of appointed leaders of Directorate III/I, III/II and III/III of the Interior Ministry, which will have regular weekly meetings - at 16:00 o'clock every Monday - until the funeral. memoranda will be made of the meetings, which will be submitted to the leadership of the ministry.
For the operative control of the funeral of Imre Nagy on 16 June 1989 the following mutually related measures are being planned:
IM (Interior Ministry) Directorate III/I:
In the field of intelligence gathering: it will mobilize the operative forces at its disposal abroad, and will make efforts to provide continuous information on:
* the plans and activities of Hungarians living in the West regarding the events, and their general attitude and mood;
* it will pay special attention to the discovery and obtainment of information regarding the preparations, plans and activities at home of the Hungarian groups and émigré political personalities travelling to Hungary for the event; (....)
It will analyse and provide up-to-date reports on views and opinions observed in Church, especially Vatican circles. It will take steps to win the support of church circles with the purpose of moderating domestic tendencies.
In the area of the employment of contacts (agents, social, official) it will aid, by consistent positive influence:
* the loyalty of external émigré public opinion and that of the incoming groups, emphasizing the tribute-paying and mourning character of the events and playing down their demonstrative elements.
* Through cover organizations and diplomatic channels, it will influence the political and official circles of the receiving countries in a positive manner, in line with our interests.
IM Directorate III/II
* To inform, through official and informal channels, the government organs of the NATO countries - especially the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany - that certain extremist forces want to exploit the funeral to disrupt and prevent the paying of respect, and for adventurist political action, endangering thereby the increasingly vigorous process of democratization.
* To influence the diplomats, journalists, trade and business specialists of the capitalist countries accredited to Hungary through "friendly conversations" in the direction that, using their own means, they should make efforts to prevent the exploitation of the funeral for the purposes of political demonstration.
* Persuading the émigré politicians - especially Béla Király and Sándor Kopácsi - to declare themselves in support of the memorial character of the funeral through the press and T.V. (...)
Use of the channel of operative games:
* Contact covername [henceforward cn.] "Hedgehogcactus", employed in Game cn. "Tarot", will send - in a coded letter - the following information to the CIA centre: "Certain extremist groups are planing to exploit the funeral of Imre Nagy for anti-government disruption. In such a case, the authorities are expected to act harshly. The IM has been put on special alert."
* Contact agent (henceforward C.A.) cn. "Muddygrass", employed in Game cn. "Tarot", will verbally inform the officer of the BND [the West German Federal Intelligence Office] on the information regarding preparations for the funeral of Imre Nagy. Will talk about the plans of the extremist groups intending to disrupt the funeral and the expected reactionof the authorities. Emphasizes that he believes a conflict would have a negative impact on the process of democratic evolution.
Via the network
* C.A. cn. "Red Thorn" will remind USA Diplomat cn. "Stone Rose" in a personal conversation that he saw [U.S.] Ambassador Palmer on TV among the marchers at the March 15 celebration. Personally he is very pleased with the wholehearted sympathy of the Americans for the Hungarian cause and that they support the democratization process by their participation, but at the same time he is worried about the funeral of Imre Nagy. He has information from university circles that some extremist groups, in violation of the memorial character of the funeral, intend to provoke a political demonstration. He believes that such a step might seriously endanger the process of democratization. It might provoke violent action from the authorities.
The notions defined in the basic concept will be passed on:
* Via Agent cn. "Agave", a person in close contact with the Austrian Embassy in Budapest, to the Austrian government.
* Via Occasional Operative Contact cn. "Candleflower" to the "friendly" contact between the U.S. and British diplomats.
* Via S.A. cn. "Stonecrop" to British Press Attaché Stoneman. (...)
* Via S.A. cn. "Coralberry" to the press attaché of the French Embassy in Budapest and to French Intelligence.
* S.A. cn. "Cactus" will arrange that a camera crew of Hungarian Television interview Béla Király (USA) and Sándor Kopácsi (Canada) on the preparations of the organization of Imre Nagy's funeral. The report should emphasize the memorial character of the funeral will be emphasised and both persons should be made to condemn any attempt to take dvantage of the funeral for political purposes.
IM Directorate III/III
(...)
Department I:
* (...) follows continuously the attempts of the organizers of the funeral and the organizers of the planned demonstrations to build contacts toward the Church, takes the steps necessary to halt, prevent, and to influence these.
Department 2:
* (...) Follows by technical and network means the development of the position of FIDESz.
* Through S.As., cn. "Balsam" and "Flamingo Flower", it will strengthen the anti-demonstration position.
* Via S.A. cn. "May", it will leak the divisions within FIDESz regarding the issue to the press.
* It will keep the presidents of DEMISz [Hungarian Democratic Youth Organization] and MISzOT [National Alliance of Hungarian Youth Organizations] continuously informed on the developments (...)
Department 3:
* (...) obtains information (...) on the ideas of the TIB [Committee for Historical Justice] and the relatives.
* Wishes to influence, by using its operative positions, the activities of the TIB and some alternative groups for the purpose that no political demonstration should take place beyond the funeral.
* Among those operating in various alternative groups S.As cn. "Knotweed," "Passion Flower", "Rhododendron", "Agave" and "Sword-Flag" will be instructed to exert an influence on their environment, as a result of which they will abandon the idea of initiating, or participating in, a political demonstration.
* A special action plan is to be made for the employment of the services of S.A. cn. "Crown Imperial" inside the TIB (...)
* S.A. cn. "Inca Lily" will be employed on the basis of a special action plan in order to discover and influence the plans of Imre Mécs in connection with the above. (...)
Department 4:
* S.A. cn. "Calla" will follow the co-ordination meetings of SzDSz in connection with the demonstration. In selecting the scene for the mass rally, he will argue in favour of holding it in the cemetery. If other sites are suggested, he will vote in favour of the less important ones. (...)
* S.A. cn. "Friesia" will obtain information from Sándor Szilágyi at the meetings of the Shelter Committee about the conferences, the planned sites and the manner of organization. At the sessions of the board of the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society he will find out about the plans concerning participation of the organization.
* S.A. cn. "Lady's Mantle" as a leader of the (...) district group of SzDSz, will represent the position of "the relatives"' in the group, influence the members and Ferenc Kõszeg in that direction. If he is invited, he will accept to become an organizer... (...)
* S.A. cn. "Bellflower" will explore the plans and ideas of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and its participation in the mass rally.
* (...)
Departments III/III-4 and 6 will, in close co-operation, discover the travel and participation plans of György Krassó and Zoltán Zsille.
Department 5:
* In the period preceding the funeral, it will collect information through network persons, official and social contacts from the Hungarian National News Agency (MTI) and the print media on the preparations and planned moves of the various alternative organizations with special regard to information received by the MTI National Press Service from the (OS.)
* With the help of S.A. cn. "Sage" and S.A. cn. "Torch", it will collect information on the intentions of the leadership and members of the Openness Club. They will be instructed to initiate an appeal for calm on behalf of the Club regarding the funeral.
* With the help of S.A. cn. "Autumn Crocus" and "Bride's Eye" (...), it will plant articles appealing for peace and calm in the newspapers Reform and Unió.
* Through S.A. cn. "Bride's Eye", it will initiate the publication of articles suggesting national reconciliation and the keeping of calm in the daily Magyar Nemzet.
* Through the Foreign Relations Department of Hungarian Radio, it will obtain information on the foreign radio correspondents registering, and, in close co-operation with Department II/II-12, will check them.
* Will Instruct Secret Officer (henceforward S.O.) Í-87 to provide as much information as is available to him on the progress of activities within Hungarian Television (programme planning, live broadcasts, etc.) involving the funeral.
* Will instruct S.A. cn. "Artichoke" to provide information, as far as possible, on broadcasts planned by the MR PAF [Hungarian Radio, Editors of Political Broadcasts] involving the events (...)
* Follow with increased attention the activities of prominent actors who played a role during the events of 1956, and are now wishing to play an active part in the period preceding the funeral and during it. (...)
* Through S.O. Y-32, it will obtain information on the plans and participation of the leaders of the Union of Hungarian Writers in the events and on their possible speeches to be delivered there (...) attempts to achieve that the Union urges the avoiding of political provocation during the ceremony. (...) Will pay special attention to the activites of Dr [sic] Miklós Mészöly and Gáspár Nagy (...) Will pay increased attention to the activity of the Union's Deputy President, Gyula Fekete (...)
* Will brief and instruct those members of their networks who have specific tasks and memberships in the various alternative organizations in order to find out about the plans of those organizations regarding the funeral.
* S.A. cn. "Quince" (SzDSz, Széchenyi Casino)
* S.A. cn. "Rowanberry" (Openness Club)
* S.A. cn. "Scabious" (libraries)
* SZT Captain Y. 47 will report continuously on the ideas and plans of the Wallenberg Society.
Department 6:
(...)
* Will instruct S.A. cn. "Berberis" to mention, as his private opinion, his concern about the organization of political demonstrations and the dangers inherent in the incalculability of official reaction, in conversations with members of parliament belonging to the current governing parties as well as with representatives of the opposition parties of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his discussions with representatives of the SPD and the CDU he must stress that the reaction of the powers that be may halt the reform movement, and may have unforeseeable consequences even with regard to what has already been achieved. The S.A. will be in regular contact, to the extent of the need for news, with the representatives of cover organizations of the BND [German intelligence] and the CIA.
* during his visit to Austria, S.A. cn. "Camellia" (...) will deem the turning of the funeral into a political demonstration politically rash and irresponsible, as well as dangerous from the point of view of strengthening alternative organizations. (...)
* Will make it the task of S.A. cn. "Forsythia" active on the Board of the MDF, to voice his opinion that the already tense political atmosphere must not be further worsened, and the authorities irritated by a political demonstration mobilizing huge crowds. (...)
Will increase its control of the Solidarity Workers' Union in the period in the question. (...)
Responsible for the execution of the Plan of Action will be the heads of the services involved, and for its co-ordination, the head of Directorate III/III of the IM.
The Plan of Action contains the tasks of the period preceding the funeral.
A special plan - co-ordinated with the Budapest Police Force - will be prepared regarding June 16, 1989.
I request approval for the execution of the measures contained in the Plan of Action.
Budapest, May "..." 1989.
Police Major-General Dr József Horváth
Chief of Directorate
László Varga
is the Chief Archivist of the City of Budapest.
