András Bozóki
Regionalism, Competition and Geopolitics
[...]
In the following, I shall discuss the relations between states in Central
Europe after the collapse of communism and also their perception of "Europe".
I offer an overview of the political history of East Central Europe and
its subregions (Baltic region, Central European region, South Eastern European
region), focusing on the Central European countries, before, during, and
after communist rule. Finally, I shall discuss some obstacles to integration
concerning the internal con ditions of these countries, the chance of regional
cooperation and a number of scenarios for the integration of Central Europe
in the wider European structures.
[...]
European Union: What sort of integration?
Notwithstanding the desire for European integration and all the discussion
about it, one question is still not clear: what kind of Europe is this
about? Will it be a union of states, nations, or citizens? As Pierre Manent
(1997:96) puts it: "Does 'Europe' mean today the depoliticization
of the life of peoples--that is, the increasingly methodical reduction
of their collective existence to the activities of 'civil society' and
the mechanisms of 'civilization'? Or does it instead entail the construction
of a new political body, a great, enormous European nation?" Can there
be sovereignty other than that of the nation-state? Is supra-national democracy
viable without nations? Contrary to confederation in practice, the original
idea of European integration was that "federal institutions were to
relate direct to the citizens, not just to member governments. The main
powers were to be defence, currency, trade and enough tax to sustain the
necessary expenditure. Other powers were to remain with the democratic
institutions of the federal states: 'self-rule' as well as 'shared rule',
now known as the principle of subsidiarity." (Pinder 1993:45-46) In
practice, however, the EU has a dualized system of governance: it is a
"multilevel bargaining system" with its principles of subsidiarity
and solidarity, and, it is a "market-regulatory regime", where
monetary policy is strictly insulated from the political bargaining system.
(Hueglin 1997: 15) The structure of the European Union, into which the
East Central European countries wish to be integrated, is still not clear.
The Single European Act ratified by the countries of European Community
in 1987 made an attempt to form a political community out of the member
states so as to prepare them to bring about a future European political
union. (Kulcsár 1995:27) The Maastricht Treaty has had the purpose
of both accelerating and deepening this process. In the meantime, the East
Central European countries have become associated members of the European
Union. The nature and dimension of the Union, however, has not been clearly
defined and there are still different views as to the future of the Union.
Those who are skeptical about a unified Europe believe in a European federation
divided in terms of space, time or content, while others try to cling to
the original idea. In what follows, I shall outline five major approaches
as future perspectives.
In one influential concept, the Union will have a "hard core"
of those member states that can meet the requirements defined in the Maastricht
Treaty, and an outer ring of those countries that can only join later.
This is the "concentric circles" concept of Europe. This is viewed
in East Central Europe with skepticism, as it is understood as a new version
of "first class" and "second class" Europe. The newly
independent and democratic states in East Central Europe will need to be
persuaded to give up some of their recent achievements in order to go "beyond
the nation-state" as the EU is presently envisaged. (Holland 1993)
Another concept is one in which more time has to be given to the countries
that need to catch up in a way that does not prevent the already ready
countries from deepening their integration. This is the "multi-speed"
concept of Europe which has received a more positive reaction from the
aspirant countries, as this concept might allow them time to readjust the
least competitive areas of their economy.
The third approach is to leave it open for every member state to choose
from the "menu" of the European Union programme, depending on
the content of agreements they wish to participate in. This is the "à
la carte" concept of Europe. This, however, is hardly sufficient for
the newcomers or for the present members of the EU. Without commonly accepted
regulations, this approach could easily lead the Union toward disintegration.
The fourth concept is somewhat similar to the third but on the whole,
it can be seen as a compromise since it lays down that the Union should
be a unified market for all its member states. As to the other issues,
it will be up to each country as to whether it participates in separate
agreements such as those on policing, visa or refugees policies (Schengen
Agreement), the European Mone tary Union (EMU) or the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). This is the "flexible integration" concept
of Europe. From their point of view, the countries of East Central Europe
are in an ambiguous position as to this concept: on the one hand, they
want to reach full membership status in order to be "on the safe side",
on the other hand, they are not able to meet all the membership criteria.
Finally, the advocates of the fifth concept, though now fewer in number,
still emphasize the importance of rules that are valid for all member states.
Some candidate countries would prefer this solution whatever the cost,
others are more cautious. All in all, it has not been decided yet to what
extent the European federation will mean an international (between states)
or supranational (above states) organization. If the latter, the question
of "stateness" (namely, how to preserve democracy beyond states)
will again come to the fore.
For the time being, these issues are being discussed above the heads
of the future member countries with no information for public opinion.
In the member states themselves, contrary to expectations, national governments
and bureaucracies are more "pro-Europe" than their citizens.
Indeed, the latter express their reservations and disappointments by regularly
sending "anti-European" representatives to the European Parliament.
For many, voting for the European Parliament is simply a protest vote against
their own government. The very concept of representation is questionable
in the lack of a responsible vote. What people do know in the East Central
European countries is that the initial Western enthusiasm has abated and
once again decisions which concern them are to be made without them. (Tolnay
1995). Countries aspiring to European Union membership are not fully concerned
with issues of federation: that will probably come only when they become
full members. By joining the European Union, and other Western interstate
organizations for that matter, these countries are seeking long term solutions
for their economic and security concerns.
Jean Monnet's observation of fifty years ago on Western Europe (quoted
by Wistrich 1989:24) seems to be valid today for post-communist Europe
as well. "There will be no peace in Europe if states reconstitute
themselves on a basis of national sovereignty [...] European countries
are too confined to ensure prosperity and essential social developments
for their people. It follows that European states should form themselves
into a federation or a 'European entity' which would make them a joint
economic unit."
András Bozóki
is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science,
Central European University, Budapest.
