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The marked cultural identity of Transylvanian Romanians, more clearly western in character than that of those from the Regat, as well as the existence of a relatively large and well organized Hungarian community which had systematically opposed post-communist Romanian nationalism, have led to a particular state of affairs. As opposed to Belarus, the Ukraine and Serbia, today's Tran sylvania, i.e. Transylvania in a wider sense, as that part of Romania which was part of Hungary before Trianon, as a Central European fragmentary region, may be able to play a role in Romania that is vital for the future of the whole country. It must be pointed out that by the specific cultural identity of Transylvanians--Romanians, Hungarians and, naturally, the remaining Germans--I mean primarily a given work ethic and closely related political attitudes, features that are relevant in the circumstances of mass democracy and manifest themselves at the level of a "majority" rather than the élite.
H. R. Patapievici is right to doubt that the creativity of Hungarians is more powerful in Transylvania or the Vojvodina than in Hungary; he could have said the same about Romanians in Transylvania and Bucharest. At the same time, he is sure that, "thanks to the beneficial influence of the Austrian Empire", the Romanians of Transylvania are "more reliable" than those in the Regat.6 Tran sylvania's political creativity might be of vital importance to Romania because it has manifested itself just at a time when, following from the indifferent logic of majority democracy, the elitism of the Regat committed to Western ideals, was about to be sidetracked.
The fundamental difference between Transylvania and the rest of Romania was already conspicuous at the time of the first election in May 1990. In Tran sylvania, with 34 per cent of all voters, Ion Iliescu obtained 29 per cent of his total, Ion Ratiu 40, and Radu Campeanu, then believed to be an authentic opposition candidate, 66 per cent. This is a fact that some try to ignore. In his outstanding book on Romanian historical myths, Lucian Boia points out that Pavel Campeanu, in his analyses of elections between 1990-92, entirely ignores the data broken down by counties and provinces. "Nevertheless, and this is the most astonishing thing of all," the head of the Centre for Historical Studies of the University of Bucharest writes, "especially after the 1992 presidential elections, we see two distinctly separate zones emerge along the two sides of the border that had once separated Romania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire."
In his study on the results of the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections and the county results of the 1992 local government election, István Székely points out that while in 1990 the opposition received over 40 per cent of the vote in
only the four counties where the proportion of Hungarian population is the highest, in 1992 the counties of Bihar, Arad and Temes also joined Hargita, Kovászna, Maros and Szatmár--with over 50 per cent. Finally, in 1996 there was a breakthrough in those Transylvanian counties which have a clear majority of Romanians. With this it has become clear that a structural trait and an increasingly strong political trend are at work, the importance of which extends far beyond the Hungarian factor. In 1990, the "specificity" of Transylvania could be put down to the election preferences of the Hun garian block which makes up some 20 per cent of the population, and did not command a majority even within Transylvania. In 1992, a regional majority was achieved, yet it did not grow into a countrywide majority. By 1996, however, the Transylvanian vote practically decided the national results. This is not to underrate the results achieved by the former opposition in old Romania. However, it may not be mistaken to say that these indicated disappointment with the earlier regime, rather than a positive--clear and above all enduring--option.
The Romanian intelligentsia have produced diverse responses to the Tran sylvanian phenomenon. Boia and Patapievici indicate, as mentioned above, that they explain it as something rooted in the specific traditions of the Austro- Hungarian Empire. Emil Hurezeanu, in his commentary on the 1996 election results, also explains the conspicuous differences between the two regions on the basis of differing historical traditions. "The Central European values of the Enlightenment, the Reformation, tolerance and competition, primarily those of the Transylvanian Romanians," he writes, "are joined in Romania by social and political forms of contemplation and passivity and belong to the values of the Orthodox eastern world." And this is not a value judgment, Hurezeanu adds very properly, but "a fact".
Though Transylvania's otherness is obvious to almost everyone, a possible regional role was pointed out by Gabriel Andreescu alone. Should the Hun garians of Transylvania emphasize competition, multiculturality, the maximum development of relations between the regions along the Romanian-Hungarian border, instead of fetishizing various forms of national autonomies, the chairman of the Bucharest Helsinki Committee warns in good time, "they could set in motion the bourgeois self-awareness of the whole of Transylvania." Gabriel Andreescu says that it would be a luxury, an unpardonable waste, not to make use of the advantages "of a wonderful province that deep down in its social structure still preserves the civilisational power of the Mitteleuropa of old". Yet even he cannot go as far as to draw the institutional, let alone constitutional, consequences of this position.

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The Hungarian political élite, living under the allure of national unity, most resolutely turned against this very natural demand that arose out of the traditions of Transylvania, both at the time of the 1848-49 Revolution and between 1867 and 1918. The problem therefore was not Transylvania but the Hungarian state, clinging, as it did to a rigid centralism at all costs. Nor is the problem now Transylvania, it is a Romania that continues with the bad traditions of 19th-century Hungary.
Since the Transylvanian question is, ever since the collapse of the historical Hungarian state, no longer a Hungarian but a Romanian question, contingent on the coherence, or to put it more dramatically, the survival, of the Romanian state, the clue is in what in the near future is going to happen in, or more appropriately, to Romania.
Taking things a bit farther, we may say that Romania will either be able to grow up to Transylvania or will be adrift in a crisis zone of unsuccessful or failed states stretching from Montenegro to Siberia, dragging Transylvania with itself.
If we say that a state is successful if it continues to be operational also in the post-national period of history, as a "signal box" between the principal scenes of economy and politics, the local and the supranational; then an unsuccessful or abortive state is one that fails to latch on to the dynamic movements at work at local and supranational levels. Disregarding here a number of other aspects, from the viewpoint of constitutional law it means that a failed state does not or dares not allow more leeway to lower administrative units because it thinks, more or less by right, that this would be taking a first step towards secession of these territories. Since the inner integration of failed states is problematic (only a state certain of not losing its identity and coherence in the process can afford to grant autonomy to its administrative units in devolution), they cannot join any supranational integration structure which in turn could extend a protective net for it at a time when its own institutions inevitably decline. This is, unfortunately, a perfect catch.
While failed states are astray in the labyrinths of inner and outer integrations, one cannot help notice that the expansionist zeal of the West is losing momentum. The processes that have already started will enable some Central European states to be integrated into the Western system of institutions, which is facing enormous challenges from within. But it is futile to dream of a series of new circles and waves of enlargement. Huntington's latest study is remarkable in this respect--since we started with him, why not end by citing him again? The same author who in past years considered a NATO enlarged with the Visegrád Three as vital for the coherence of the West, now warns of threats to the coherence of the United States and proposes the urgent shaping of an American foreign policy serving the national interest.
The selective enlargement of NATO is only possible because it fits in with both the strengthening of the European positions of the US and the internationalist sense of calling the Clinton administration has nurtured. Those wishing to join after 1999 cannot expect another fortunate coincidence like this.
Wedged between two zones of failed states, the post-Yugoslav and the post-Russian, Romania is running out of time. What can it do if, in its long-term interests, it wishes to proceed along the path of integration but the West ignores, certainly in the coming years, its overtures?
Resorting to aggressive centralism directed against Transylvania and, with this, the economic and political positions of the Hungarians, no matter how loudly this is demanded by the new Romanian leftist-nationalist opposition, would be an all too risky undertaking. Such a move might destroy the long-term prospects for the country's integration, and raise a question mark over the outcome of one hundred and fifty years of the modernization process; it may also jeopardize the integration of parts of the country with differing traditions. In less developed Moldavia there is already a political movement taking shape, a regionalism feeding on frustration and disappointment with Bucharest. Tran sylvania may easily decide to follow suit if it wants to preserve its status as a region whose economy and civilization is more developed.
Such processes that pose genuine threats to the stability and integrity of the country must be preempted. Any anti-regionalist hysteria can only aggravate the situation. A new etatist chauvinism may destroy all compromises. In order to avoid this, the powers interested in Western integration and the democratization of Romania shall have to consider reorganizing the country on a federate basis, or at least offering Transylvania, together with other regions that may claim it, the opportunity for devolution.