Geocultural tectonics

Gusztáv Molnár (THQ 149) #1 embraces Huntington’s thesis with a somewhat incautious enthusiasm. He devotes a number of pages to supporting it against critics such as Horia Patapievici. To be sure, Molnár has every right to rehearse with joy the features of Western civilization, which are "the classical heritage, Western Christianity (first Roman Catholicism, then Protestantism), the separation of Church and State, the Rule of Law, social pluralism and a civil society, and, last but by no means least, that individualism which became dominant by the 17th century. On the other hand, I would be less inclined than Molnár to echo the claim made by the celebrated American political scientist that this combination is unique. Not because it is not unique—anything concrete is unique, but I do not think that Huntington has demonstrated convincingly that it is only this combination of characteristics which is compatible with those features of modernity that recognize each other and which, in their powerful interaction lay down the foundations of relations that are peaceful in their very nature.#2 Nor was Gusztáv Molnár in a position to add decisive arguments of his own. He appears to opt without any misgivings for the metaphor of geocultural "layers" that float on the asthenosphere of universal existential conditions (resources, economic activities, media, &c.)

This plate-tectonics metaphor has perhaps inspired one of the most profitable observations by the director of the Geopolitical Research Group in Budapest. With reference to Huntington’s elaboration of the paradigm of civilizations, Gusztáv Molnár remarks: "Huntington engages in what is called grand geopolitics. With his elaboration of a paradigm of civilization and his firm repudiation of Western daydreams of universality, he may have succeeded in producing the most precise outline so far for an international world order in the next century. He does, however, ignore details and finer shades—frontiers within particular countries, or even smaller territorial or administrative units. These are the concern of what is called micro-geopolitics". Gusztáv Molnár insists on the importance of greater refinements. The inspiration derives from the fact that the richest and most unpredictable geologic phenomema appear where tectonic plates meet. Analogical thinking gives rise to the expectation that political processes of extraordinary sophistication would appear where two regions with significant cultural differences march on each other. One would therefore miss out if one did not plough more deeply in the micro-cultural zones where two geocultural plates intersect, since it is there that interesting (rich and unpredictable) transformations of cultural features into political phenomena take place.

In my view the example provided by Gusztáv Molnár is crucial: "In his study on the results of the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections and the county results of the 1992 local government election, István Székely points out that while in 1990 the opposition received over 40 per cent of the vote in only the four counties where the proportion of Hungarian population is the highest, in 1992 the counties of Bihar, Arad and Temes also joined Hargita, Kovászna, Maros and Szatmár—with over 50 per cent." [...] "By 1996, however, the Transylvanian vote practically decided the national results."

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Why did Transylvania vote differently? How come that the option of the uneducated, of the old, of industrial workers, the rural masses, categories of a limited and conservative civic and political understanding dependent on the propaganda of a partisan television or a demagogic discourse, #3 was defeated in a decisive ratio in this region? #4

One of the irrevocable losses of the period of transition was the absence of financial and human resources (in all the region formerly under Soviet influence) needed to study the leap from Communism to an Open Society. We here confront a typically uneven process. Empirical data of great subtlety have to be gathered, conceptual categories have to be refined. Sociological analyses have to be carried out, public opinion polls, politological evaluations; about all of these we know that, in the case of Romania, they do not meet the standards of comprehensive research. In this absence, the only explanations available to us are opinions and observations of the kind cited by Gusztáv Molnár: "thanks to the beneficial influence of the Austrian Empire", the Romanians of Transylvania are "more reliable than those in the Regat." (Horia Patapievici); "The Central European values of the Enlightenment, the Reformation, tolerance and competition, primarily those of the Transylvanian Romanians," he writes, "are joined in Romania by social and political forms of contemplation and passivity and belong to the values of the Orthodox eastern world." (Emil Hurezeanu); Gusztáv Molnár him-self declares: "by the specific cultural identity of Transylvanians—Romanians, Hungarians and, naturally, the remaining Germans—I mean primarily a given work ethic and closely related political attitudes."

For a variety of reasons Gusztáv Molnár prefers to refer to the Transylvanian identity; what I should like to stress, however, is the considerable influence of the Hungarian minority on the formal realities and the practices of the Romanian state. Through their political struggle for the rights of national minorities, the Hungarians have exercised an extraordinary pressure on the mentality of Romanian society. In conditions in which protochronist mythology, the belief that Romanians anticipated many Western technical innovations and ideas, visibly marked public thinking and the majority of Romanian intellectuals of the best sort is still in the thrall of the cultural adventure of the period between the wars, the Hungarian strategy of differences, rights, autonomies and self-determinations appeared as a conceptual torrent that swept over an obsolete architecture. For a society that lives under the impression that Romania was projected by Burebista, King of the Dacians at the time of Julius Caesar, and that Greater Romania is the fullfilment of history, the placing of the problem of Transylvania at the centre of discussion, in such a dramatic manner, almost placed things the right side up. The formula which was oft repeated after UDMR-RMDSz, the Hungarian party, joined the government coalition, that for the first time in the history of Romania the Hungarian minority has been politically integrated, can also be extended to the cultural plane: at the end of seven years of post-communism, for the first time, otherness has been integrated in the cultural fund of Romanian society. #5

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First of all, the myth of great geocul-tural plates presupposes the inertia of culturally homogenous areas, as if these were subjected to a sort of macro-mechanics. But such a macro-mechanics would in fact be geopolitics dominated by culture. I feel that idea is bluntly contradicted by reality. An obvious counter example is the movement in Romania which had its origin in the 1848 Revolution.

As regards religion, the Danubian Principalities formed part of the same Orthodox space as Greece, future Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia. The last named experienced no 1848 Revolution—and neither did Slavophone Poland. In no way can one say that Moldavia or Wallachia were closer to Western Europe in other respects—cultural or social—then Greece or Bulgaria. They were conservative societies, perhaps even backward, and closed societies—perhaps even hostile. They were certainly part of the Orthodox-Balkan geocultural space, and not of the West.

The Fortyeighters movement, of which the revolution was an essential aspect but not the whole, forced an extraordinary growth path onto the Romanian world. Their political demands—a republic and universal suffrage—and their social demands—the emancipation of Jews, abolition of the death penalty and of degrading forms of punishment—confronted the Danubian Principalities with the most advanced European ideals. These were no mere plans, this was a movement which succeeded, within a few decades, in modernizing Romania at an amazing speed. All this was the work of a few dozen hommes de politique, an insignificant proportion of the total of Romanian society, whose human typology was far from that of Balcescu, Rosetti, the Bratianus, the Golescus and others of their kind. This is a spectacular example of a process which, thanks to a highly sophisticated interior web and in an extraordinary interaction with the international community, lifted the Romanian world from a given cultural space into another. In the absence of the deviation of the twenties and thirties which led to two successive totalitarianisms, this shift would have continued to a point of irreversibility.

To return to the present. What is the message of the political debate which has so far produced the Madrid and Luxembourg decisions? Obviously, the Madrid option was for a further extension, and at this moment in time, the least that can be said about Romania is that she is on course towards integration. For the EU the position is even firmer, a decision exists to extend it into regions of Orthodox dominance (Romania, Bulgaria) in as much as these countries satisfy the criteria for integration, criteria which are political and economic and not cultural. To be sure, obstacles in the way of these processes may arise—within Romania too, or outside the country. The satisfaction of criteria is not simply a question of time and goodwill. What then, is the role of Huntington’s logic in this evolution? It has none. In fact Gusztáv Molnár embraced the ideology of cultural scepticism for motives that are pure conceptual speculation. He prefers a high-falutin’ theory to an analysis of data which are at his disposal and with which he shows himself to be familiar. In other words, he prefers "ideology," turning his back to empirical argument.

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Gusztáv Molnár may well answer that, in time, the trend towards devolution may become dominant, whatever the present process of evolution. He could even refer to the latest idea that has come from Jassy, that is Constantin Simiriad’s Party of Moldavians. On my part, I am opposed to the irritation or indifference with which Romanian public opinion has responded to an initiative which is not only absolutely legitimate and of obvious importance but an innovation in Romanian mentalities. Once again, however, I propose an authentic analysis of the situation in Romania rather than day-dreams.

Any analysis of the situation in Romania will show that the British model does not apply. The speed of events in Britain—a special referendum in Scotland, a constitutional reform which produced a parliament for Scotland and an assembly for Wales depended on a British legal and political framework of great permeability as regards devolution in Scotland and Wales.

There is nothing comparable in Romania. Devolution means constitutional changes, that is a considerable majority in favour of devolution, over two thirds of Parliament over several stages. #6 When Gusztáv Molnár speaks of the political will of Romanian society, he should consider that this means something highly concrete, two thirds in Parliament needed to amend the Constitution. Let us ask ourselves if a political current in Transylvania and another in Moldavia can be imagined which would produce those needed parliamentary two-thirds. To my mind, certainly not within a reasonable period of time. A rational policy and the present course of political integration of the Hungarian community suffice to produce the moderni-zation of Romania. There are no insurmountable obstacles in their way, of the kind faced by the devolution option.

There is another aspect which must not be neglected. What I have in mind is the temporal competition of concurrent processes. Within a centralized state the problem of the administrative and political structures demanded by the affirmation of regional identities on occasion appears with dramatic intensity. Things are different in an integrated system like the EU. There the regions appear as actual units—geographic, linguistic, economic or whatever—not as mere administrative units. As we approach the year 2000, this process of joining major international structures appears much speedier than a pos-sible internal development towards devolution.

Gusztáv Molnár’s gauntlet is opportune, it helps to introduce something of the savour of contemporary debate to the Romanian political discourse. The manner, however, in which he deals with the issue of Transylvania, calls forth basic objections. Let me try to sum up what I have been arguing. It is an error to think of identities, like the Transylvanian identity, as monads. #7 Thinking in terms of monads, Gusztáv Molnár considers that we must stick a politico-administrative label onto a cultural identity. That is not true. If the Transylvanian identity is itself complex, it manifests itself in different ways, and has no need of a formal cover. (As I said, the major characteristic, that with most effects, is nevertheless the presence of a powerful Hungarian community.)

In the first place, however, I should like to stress the essentially ideological character of his contribution. Ideology is a way of thinking which grinds down reality in making it fit the logic of the desired model. I am curious indeed how ideological and how analytical will be the responses to Gusztáv Molnár’s position.

NOTES

• 1 "The Transylvanian Question" by Gusztáv Molnár, originally published in Hungarian and then in Romanian, also appeared in an English version in THQ No. 149, Spring 1998. It provoked a lively discussion in Romania. Two of the more significant Romanian comments are published below, together with Gusztáv Molnár’s rejoinder. It goes without saying that the latter expresses Dr Molnár’s right of reply and not THQ editorial policy.
• 2 Huntington’s major thesis is not that the cul-tural boundaries are mere lines of demarcation but that they are inherent sources of political tension.
• 3 I use these terms non-judgementally, in a descriptive sense.
• 4 It would be wrong to argue that people voted "against" and not "for." The principle is valid to a degree, but uniformly all over the country, in every region. Thus it is irrelevant in an explanation of differences between regions.
• 5 We have to be cautious when referring to tradition in an explanation of the present. The German presence was powerful in Transylvania, and the reception of their influence on the part of non-Germans was high. Nevertheless, I cannot see its role in these processes in which the Hungarian minority happens to be a driving force.
• 6 Since the form of government and the unitary character of the state cannot be the subject of amendment according to the present constitution, Article 148 (1) must be abolished for a start.
• 7 Hence the objection that even I do not go all that far when drawing all possible institutional consequences from the above. But what could be "further" than to consider that Transylvania has tipped the scales of Romanian political reality and has already essentially changed the self-consciousness of Romanian society.