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On the basis of the rate of change, Tamás Sárközy divides the countries concerned into three categories. Although he does not state so explicitly, the picture obtained from this categorization, shows a close correspondence with the depth of the socialist reforms and, not independently from this, the methods applied. Apart from privatization in East Germany, a region in a unique position, there is the group of the "bigoted" socialist countries, with a relatively slow privatization, based mostly on redistribution. This process produced some form of state capitalism, rather than a market economy—with very frail economic results, we might add. The second group is that of the "reform countries" bent on introducing market methods, where the two successor states of Czechoslovakia are the odd ones out for two reasons: one is the traditional form of the planned economy, and the other is a significant volume of free, coupon-style privatization. Readers will get a detailed picture of corporate law and of the legal and institutional framework of privatization in the region from East Germany, through Belorussia and Albania, right on to Estonia and Latvia. This description—primarily drawing on German sources—concentrates on legislation: as to the empirical processes, conflicts and results concerning the transfer of state property into private ownership, Tamás Sárközy makes no claims to providing a detailed account.

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"Hungarian privatization has, by and large, been successfully completed," he describes the situation pertaining in late 1997. By and large successful? Or by and large completed? And what does the expression "by and large" mean? This element of uncertainty prompts the reviewer to contemplate the meaning of success (and the reader is invited to do likewise), as indeed Tamás Sárközy himself does in raising the question whether it could have happened in any other way. Another topic worth thinking about is how privatization can be brought to an end and on how we should proceed from there.

Let us start at the beginning of privatization, often referred to as "spontaneous privatization". It is somewhat confusing that Sárközy often calls this process as "decentralized" or "self-privatization", regardless of the point that this term was reserved for a later, specific construction for the transfer of property in Hungary. Still, we all know what he speaks about: the controversial and often tempestuous organizational and ownership changes of 1988–89, initiated by the firms themselves. Tamás Sárközy stands by his original view, and to my mind convincingly demonstrates it, claiming that these changes were set off not by the much-criticized Transformation Act of 1989 designed to facilitate the re-organization of firms, but by the resuscitation of two much earlier bills, of 1875 and 1930. ("Even poor Emperor Francis Joseph helped the Communists’ clutch on power," Sárközy comments ironically.) What the managers of large firms wanted was to avoid bankruptcy and to procure tax relief, not privatization. With a few exceptions, the result was merely change of organizational and legal forms, rather than privatization.

"Spontaneous privatization" was not a Hungarian speciality; it seems to have become a synonym for corruption in all the countries concerned, although outside Hungary the expression covered different phenomena in different countries. (In many places, for example, it was used to describe the practice of the work force’s renting out the firm’s assets collectively.) A specific Hungarian feature was, however, that following the establishment of works councils in 1984, the initiatives and decisions of firms were put on a legal basis. In other words, this was the direction of organic development in Hungary. Back in 1991 Tamás Sárközy would already have preferred, for firms outside the strategic industries, a privatization based on an agreement between the management and the outside investor—under government control; thus, he would have liked to see the mechanism of decision-making (respecting the tradition of enterprise autonomy, and taking over other elements of spontaneous privatization) to be decentralized as a general rule. Although this idea was applied to a small group of firms, sales after 1990 remained basically centralized.

While the political and economic reasons for this solution are made clear in Sárközy’s analysis of 1997, he still insists that a construction based on a combination of government supervision and company decision might, in principle, have developed into "a functioning system within a few years. Perhaps Hungary could have been the only country where privatization, based on the status quo of enterprise self-ownership, could be conducted voluntarily to some degree" (p. 182.). I happen to be one of the few who agree with this conclusion, suspecting that the centralized and bureaucratic methods did more harm than good. But what criteria can we use to measure success?

Bringing privatization to a close and "managing" the remaining state property pose new challenges. Existing laws and institutions, according to Sárközy, are unsuitable for meeting them. "A brand new show needs brand new actors" (p. 262). I have to repeat what I have said in connection with the evaluation of spontaneous privatization: I am one of the few who agree, without reservation, with all the basic principles expounded in the book: "in search for a new institutional framework, we should come up with a construction that is decentralized on the one hand, and is based on a variety of institutional forms on the other" (p. 262). According to the proposal, the legal successor of the privatization agency, the ÁPV Rt., should be a budgetary organization subordinated to the treasury, mostly to fulfil outstanding obligations. Having the necessary experience both in re-organization and in marketing, the fully state-owned Hungarian Development Bank would be put in charge of selling the assets that are still to be privatized. As to the small number of companies remaining on long-term ownership, their supervision would be returned to the ministries.

While one could argue about some details, at the time of writing, in the Autumn of 1998, this seems unnecessary. It would be unnecessary to elaborate on a model of a differentiated institutional framework, when people in decision-making positions favour centralization—just as was the case at the beginning of the privatization process. One might even say that whoever gets into power will automatically become a centralization addict. The successor of ÁPV Rt. was left essentially unchanged in a proposal ("Magyar Holding") submitted to, but not discussed by, the previous government. The new government has taken over the old organization, and has declined discussions about both the conclusion of privatization and the new framework of state asset management.

Tamás Sárközy still appears in his old roles: he proposes reforms, debates passionately and, if necessary, drafts bills; he is tireless in publishing one book after another. This old role, unlike that of the state, is good. It is always worth reading Tamás Sárközy.