[..]

On the basis of recollections of conversations, Kádár’s behaviour in 1968 has been judged to date in East- and Central-European countries, and primarily in Hungary, to have been more sympathetic to DubcŠek than that of the other party leaders. However, there is a flaw in this image, namely, that the documents that have become accessible in the Soviet Union and Hungary show that every time before his "spontaneous conversations" with DubcŠek, the Hungarian leader discussed the main issues with Brezhnev over the phone or through mediators, providing a detailed report afterward. On occasion, at the Kremlin’s request, he pretended "to give his own well-intentioned opinion" when he told the CPCS leaders things that would have been akward for Brezhnev himself to say, #1 as for instance, that the Russians would have to adopt a harder line in case they were not ready to go along, etc. In spite of his native common sense and long years in the party apparatus, DubcŠek failed to notice that his paternal Hungarian friend was playing with loaded dice. After the Velvet Revolution—when he had the opportunity to read archival documents revealing Kádár’s duplicity—he bitterly remarked: "Now I know that Kádár met me on Brezhnev’s instructions. And I also know that he was as much a product of ‘Leninist morality’ as the others." #2

[..]

A few days after the Prague celebrations, the leaders of the socialist countries met again in Sofia at the usual Warsaw Pact conference where, also under the influence of their Czechoslovak impressions, they discussed the latest news from there with increased anxiety. During the break they all saw Brezhnev, urging him to do something about Czechoslovakia. By this time, János Kádár, along with Gomulka and Zhivkov, #3 was arguing against DubcŠek. Later, in their absence, Brezhnev blamed them for not telling him what exactly they meant by "restoring order". Nevertheless, the simple pledge of support from its allies came in handy for the Kremlin, since henceforth Brezhnev could safely refer to the "collective will" of the socialist countries when taking steps against DubcŠek. But following the Sofia summit—where he made many solemn promises to "control the situation" soon if only they would leave him alone for a while—DubcŠek started to play hide and seek. Sometimes, without giving a reason, he did not take Brezhnev’s calls. Sometimes, he reported sick like a reluctant student before a test. At other times, he avoided meeting the Soviet Ambassador, Stepan Chervonenko, who spent hours in the antechamber waiting to see him. Something that Novotny, this "cunning old fox", as his Soviet partners called him, would never have dared. #4

[..]

The Soviet leadership was dismayed when DubcŠek removed Defense Minister Lomsky without their prior approval. Brezhnev asked Kádár to go to Brno in Moravia, where DubcŠek was addressing a district party conference, and convey their "shared misgivings". #5 On March 16 the Soviet leader spoke to Kádár more affably than ever before in order to get him to consent: "Comrade DubcŠek… suggested that he would call Comrade Kádár, and perhaps come to Hungary for discussions. It was noticeable that he was looking forward to meeting Comrade Kádár, he was feeling good about it as their relationship is very good and the trust is complete.

According to Comrade Brezhnev, this meeting would be very advantageous, Comrade Kádár could talk about shared ideas and prepare the ground for the enlarged meeting of the Four." #6

DubcŠek was again evasive and again eluded his allies’ "embrace". But now, in addition to the Soviet leaders, he was also avoiding Kádár. After DubcŠek returned from Brno, "he told me he could not meet Kádár. But he did not say why," an annoyed Brezhnev said at the March 21 meeting of the CPSU CC Politburo. #7 It was obvious that Kádár also took offense and abandoned his plan to visit Czechoslovakia. After all the delays, Moscow finally managed to organize a meeting of the "Six". Oddly enough, DubcŠek, the chosen victim of the planned attack, was allowed to pick the venue. On March 19, 1968, Brezhnev sent word to Kádár: "He [DubcŠek] thinks that it would be best to meet in Dresden because he has never been to the GDR and it’s neutral ground, so to speak." #8

[..]

This, too, indicated the great change in communication among the leaders of the socialist camp during these months. In the wake of Czechoslovak developments and Romania’s efforts to follow a separate course, Ulbricht and Gomulka sometimes spoke to Brezhnev in a condescending tone, raising their voices. DubcŠek, on the other hand, tried to gain time and room to maneuver by stubbornly adhering to old-style Byzantine homage practices. Zhivkov, on his part, refused to give up, praising the Russian Big Brother even in serious discussions which demanded concrete and concise answers. #9

Kádár assumed a position somewhere in the middle: he expressed his own opinion coating it with praises of Soviet friendship. #10 Otherwise they would hardly have excused him the demonstrative ceremony he organized for DubcŠek and CŠerník in Budapest at the end of June 1968. Astounded, Soviet Ambassador Fyodor Titov called the Brezhnev Secretariat’s attention to it. This notwithstanding, Brezhnev told Kádár in their next phone conversation that they in Moscow "…view the results of the Czechoslovak leaders’ visit in Hungary as very positive, they think it will be useful for C[omra]des DubcŠek, et al. They consider Comrade Kádár’s speech at the mass rally very positive: he found the appropriate form wherein he assured the Czechoslovak leaders of his support while also pointing out the dangers and the tasks on the basis of the Hungarian experience." #11

Kádár understood the message well: Brezhnev expected him to take a firm stand against the reform wing of the Czechoslovak leadership and "back" DubcŠek’s left-wing opposition. Kádár could not have thought the latter idea disagreeable in view of the fact that by then the HSWP leadership had for some time informal relations with the Prague and Bratislava conservatives. Two of the five signatories of the subsequent letter of invitation—Oldrich Svestka and Vasil Bilak—kept in regular touch with Hungarian diplomats and with officials visiting Czechoslovakia on the pretext of taking a vacation or for an exchange of views.

The information Kádár received in the first half of June did not fully convince him that the time had come for military intervention, #12 but articles published almost simultaneously in Prague, did. Ludvík Vaculík’s manifesto, "2000 Words", enumerating the democratic non-communist values of the Masaryk period, which caused quite a sensation even in Czechoslovakia, hit him and other HSWP leaders like a cold shower. Kádár took the other, an article by the eminent Czech historian, Machatka, commending Imre Nagy on the tenth anniversary of his execution, as a personal affront, virtually as a slap on the face. #13

These two circumstances were Kádár’s psychological motive for giving in at the official negotiations in Moscow in early July. But on his return to Budapest he kept quiet about having given his consent to Czechoslovakia’s expected occupation. The report prepared for the HSWP CC Politburo—that is, for the party leadership comprising barely a dozen men—omitted the fact that in Moscow he voted in favour of armed intervention in the presence of Prime Minister Jenoý Fock, György Aczél, Kádár’s closest associate, a member of the Political Committee, and Károly Erdélyi, Deputy Foreign Minister, Kádár’s confidant and former secretary, a KGB agent. This would never have come to light had the working notes of the Soviet Politburo not been made accessible recently. The document, of which only one copy was made, strictly for internal use, contains the following: "Comrade Brezhnev said that during their last conversation he informed Comrade Kádár of the Czechoslovak situation and of our position. He said that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo is working on the letter to the CPCS Central Committee Presidium. He recounted what it approximately contains.

Comrade Kádár reacted as follows. He said that the document titled "2000 Words" is a counterrevolutionary programme aimed at overthrowing Soviet power, subverting the party, and turning its leadership over to the social democrats.

Furthermore, he said that, unfortuna-tely, even after this document [was published] the CPCS Central Committee Presidium failed to take firm action. It is employing methods that are ambivalent and inconsistent. He agrees that the CPSU letter has to be sent. They, too, will draw up a similar letter addressed to the CPCS Central Committee Presidium in the forthcoming days. Comrade Kádár agreed that the meeting of the Communist Party leaders of the socialist countries in the matter of the Czechoslovak question is urgent. He’s ready to take part in such a meeting at any time. In his opinion, a large delegation of Czechoslovak comrades should be invited to these talks. Speaking about the Czechoslovak situation, Kádár then went on to say: the way the situation now looks, Czechoslovakia will probably have to be occupied. If this becomes necessary, we’ll go ahead without any doubt. He also said that they will discuss this at the [Hungarian] Political Committee meeting. But he is certain that the Political Committee will back his standpoint on this question. Fock, Aczél, and Erdélyi participated in this discussion on the Hungarian side. Fock tried to say something, but Kádár cut him off by starting to speak, so he remained seated, pale and silent. This discussion was very useful and, in my opinion, entirely frank ... #14

[..]

Diplomacy in the Pissoir

Members of the Soviet Politbureau, preparing for a military intervention as far- back as the Spring of 1968, in their deliberations weighed up the advantages of obtaining an invitation from Czech and Slovak "healthy forces". In the middle of March, even the former Czech First Secretary, Antonin Novotny, was considered as a possible signatory of such a "request for assistance".

Weeks passed and the letter did not arrive. This upset the masters in the Kremlin. A membership list of the new Prague Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government (a name coined by Kádár back in 1956) made up of healthy forces was already available, a number of volunteers had presented themselves in both Prague and Bratislava, but the dogmatics always finally cried halt. That is why Brezhnev, on July 20th 1968, exactly a month before the invasion, sent Pyotr Shelest, who headed the Ukrainian CP, to Balatonaliga in Hungary, where Vasil Bilak, a trusted Czech friend of the Soviet Union was staying at the holiday home for party leaders. The idea was to persuade Bilak to set to and draft a letter asking for assistance, collect signatories for it, and transmit it to Moscow through KGB channels.

Negotiations were held in great secret, and no more than half a dozen individuals, including Andropov, who headed the KGB at the time, and Kádár, were aware of them. According to Shelest’s diary, at the end of a conversation lasting several hours in Kádár’s lakeside villa, which KGB officers, concealed in a neighbouring room, recorded on tape, Shelest put it straight to Bilak: "We need a letter from you which states that you are asking for our help. We give you guarantees that it will not be published and that no-one will discover who signed it. I said to him: there can be no delays concerning this letter asking for help. We need this declaration today."

Vasil Bilak had, for months, encouraged his Soviet friends to be as firm and tough as possible, and who was ready to figure as collaborator, suddenly took fright. Finally, he undertook the job, albeit reluctantly. In the following days Stepan Chervonenko, the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, and the KGB residents there approached a number of Czech and Slovak politicians with similar requests. The result were a number of separate letters asking for help, in Russian or Czech. One of these was handed over to Shelest by Bilak in a public pissoir in Bratislava. "I agreed with him that he would turn up there at 20.00 hours," Shelest noted in his diary. The scene is out of a spy thriller. "I was to turn up at the same time and he would pass on the letter to me with Savchenko of the KGB acting as intermediary. We met in the pissoir as if by chance. Savchenko received the letter without anyone noticing it, and then passed it on to me. It discussed the situation in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the impertinence of the right-wing elements, the ways of anti-communist politics and the moral terror. Anti-Soviet revelry is present in the country. The economy and the politics of Czechoslovakia have taken a completely Western turn. The letter includes the request to interfere in case of need, and to take a stand against civil war, blood-letting and the counterrevolution…"

Why the Soviets insisted on a letter they promised to keep secret remains a mystery to this day.

• 1 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Katushev, cynically remarked during a break in the meeting of the "Six" in Bratislava at the very beginning of August 1968, that the Soviet leadership deliberately used this ploy.
• 2 Dubcek 1993: 173.
• 3 Based on a numbered xerox copy of the work notes of the CPSU CC Politburo, placed at my disposal by the Russian historian Rudolf Pikhoya, for which I wish to express gratitude. Rabochie zapisi 1968: 123.
• 4 Rabochie zapisi 1968: 124–125.
• 5 HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. Cf. Rabochie zapsi 1968: 124.
• 6 HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
• 7 Rabochie zapisi 1968: 124.
• 8 HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. The Soviet leadership was surprisingly irresolute before the Dresden conference of the "Six." Pondering how pressure could be exerted on DubcŠek, Aleksandr Shelepin proposed that Kádár inform them of his own negative experiences in 1956. "Our point of departure should be that we’re not surrendering Czechoslovakia to anyone," Shelepin said. "DubcŠek is obviously a transitory figure. It is right for us to show resolution, but we must also consider how to proceed… We should be prepared to use radical methods, Novotny probably can’t be saved, but as long as they—he, Lenárt, and Lomsky—are [in position] we must somehow get them to turn to us for help before [the CC] meeting. Whatever happens, we would be in possession of their request. It’s clear that we must help. This help will sober everybody, first and foremost our enemies." Pikhoya 1994; 13–14.
• 9 Weit 1973: 195–214.
• 10 Aleksandrov-Agentov 1994: 156.
• 11 HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
• 12 "The DubcŠek leadership can be seen to take several measures that may help them realize the correct course," was how he occasionally defended the followers of "socialism with a human face" to Brezhnev. NHA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. Some Czech and Slovak conservatives shared Kádár’s opinion. One of the experts of the Hungarian party leadership "in charge of Czechoslovak affairs" at the time, the editor-in-chief of the party daily, Népszabadság, János Gosztonyi, arrived at the same conclusion when he recorded what his Czech colleague, Svestka, said on July 11, 1968: "…according to him, the situation in Czechoslovakia is not counterrevolutionary, on the other hand, they told the Soviet comrades several times that should it come to that, they still possess the force to face it, but if their forces were to fail to defeat a possible counterrevolutionary attempt, they would be the first to call in Soviet troops. …In answer to the question of what happens if the right-wing gains complete control, he said that in that case the danger of a split in the Party arises. He considers even the Party’s division into a Slovak and a Czech party disquieting. However, in his opinion, even if the right wing was to gain complete control, it would not automatically mean a counterrevolution and definitely not a bourgeois restoration. In his opinion, in this case something like the Yugoslav formation would be established, but of a definite anti-Soviet character." HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
• 13 Kádár protested against both writings in the name of the HSWP leadership in a letter addressed to Dubcek. HNA fonds 288, file 11, unit 2436. The Machatka article was very embarrassing for the CPCS leadership, particularly for the conservative forces and one of their influential representatives, Jozef Lenárt, who, as a CC secretary, was in charge of the Party’s foreign relations in the summer of 1968. This is what the information sent by the Hungarian chargé d’affaires in Prague to Budapest on July 9 refers to: "In connection with Comrade Kádár’s letter, Comrade Lenárt expressed indignation over the Machatka article, calling it shameful filth. He called the people in Prague cowardly and jittery, who don’t have the guts to react to the article. He added that they were already thinking of asking somebody from Új Szó [the Bratislava Hungarian language paper] to react. Comrade Lenárt continued this line of thought by saying that if a Czechoslovak leader were attacked in the press, there would be a great outcry right away. He stressed that similarly to the Machatka article, the answer, too, has to appear in the press [the Literárni listy]. He implied that a party-inspired reaction to the Machatka article was to be expected soon." HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
• 14 Rabochie zapisi 1968: 399–340.