[...]

The Romanian and Bulgarian armistice and the antecedents

After the Soviet offensive had opened on the southwestern front on 4 March 1944, and with the resounding victories of the Red Army in the spring of the same year, post-war Europe began to take shape. Concurrently, the military developments brought a new dimension in relations between the Allies, a dimension which showed them the post-war horizon for the armistice regimes to be imposed on those countries in the region allied to Nazi Germany (Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary), where the governments were called on to break away from Germany.

For the organization of the future control system, the Allies already had a precedent which tangibly demonstrated the potential difficulties, namely the Italian armistice.2 When the Foreign Office drew up, in the spring of 1943, a general plan for all European armistices, this plan was clearly inspired by the conviction that "the decisions concerning the occupation of the territories belonging to the common enemy... should be made jointly by the British, American and Soviet governments". The advantage of this "best possible formula" proved to be particularly obvious for British diplomats because they thought that Italy would be a precedent and the Russians would consider this as a "test case susceptible to determine their ultimate attitude in the question of co-operation".

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1944 it had become obvious that the control system established in Italy by the Western powers did not correspond to the pattern agreed on at the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers in November 1943. In other words, tripartite collaboration, which should have made possible the future cohesion of the Allies, had unequivocally failed in Italy. Even if it is true that London and Washington did not deliberately intend to exclude Moscow from Italian affairs, it is indisputable that the Italian armistice was considered as a test case by the Soviets, one which they subsequently used as a pretext to exclude the Western powers from the East European armistice regimes.

Of Nazi Germany's three satellites in Southeastern Europe, Bulgaria had declared war only on the Western powers, but the other two, Hungary and Romania, had participated actively in the war against the Soviet Union. The Hungarian and Romanian governments had expected a British-American landing in the Balkans to protect them from a Soviet occupation and its consequences. These governments made several secret approaches in 1943 and 1944, in the hope of concluding a separate armistice with the Western allies.

However, the Western allies were not willing to abandon the demand for unconditional surrender to help assure the survival of enemy governments. On 16 March 1944, when Prince Barbu Stirbey arrived in Cairo to discuss the conditions for Romania's withdrawal from the war, the Soviets conveyed to him, in the name of and with the benediction of the Western powers, armistice conditions which anticipated Romania's surrendering to the Soviet Union, the country responsible for the military operations.3

Recognizing the "Soviet Union's primary interest in Romania", the most important political aim of the Western powers was to ensure, according to a State Department memo of 30 March 1944, "Romania's continued existence ...as an independent country".4 As for the British, the Foreign Office also considered that "policy towards Romania is subordinated to relations with the Soviet Union and [they] are... unwilling to accept any commitments or to take any action except with the full consent of the Soviet Government". The Foreign Office also concluded that "since the Red Armies would be the first Allied forces to reach Romania... [Moscow] would have to play the principal part in determining the armistice terms".5

On 20 August 1944 the troops of General Malinovsky and Marshal Tolbuchin launched their offensive on the Iasi–Kishinev front. Three days later King Michael summoned the pro-German dictator Antonescu to the Royal Palace and had him arrested. In a proclamation, the King announced the end of war against the Allies, ordered Romanian troops to cease fire against the Red Army and immediately formed a new government, ready to collaborate with the Soviets. He appealed for an armistice.

Indeed, the Romanian armistice terms reflected clearly that, in line with the military aspects, the Western powers considered Romania to be primarily within the Soviet sphere of interest. According to the preamble, the execution of the armistice "was entrusted to the control of the Soviet High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied Powers", and article XVIII of the armistice called on the ACC to assure "the regulation and control over the execution of the [armistice] terms under the general direction and instructions of the allied [Soviet] High Command ".6

As Bulgaria had not declared war upon the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian government, whose emissaries also arrived in Cairo in August 1944, addressed itself solely to the Western powers in order to withdraw from belligerencies. However, the Bulgarian attempt at disengagement was doomed to failure: on 5 September, Moscow suddenly declared war upon the Muravev government and three days later Red Army divisions crossed the Bulgarian borders. The Soviet Union only accepted the Bulgarian plea for an armistice when a "Popular Front" government was formed on 9 September 1944. Negotiations were resumed in Moscow and an armistice with Bulgaria was concluded by the end of October 1944. Previously considered to be of secondary importance, the stipulations of the Bulgarian armistice document on the establishment of an Allied Control Commission acquired an increased and unforeseen importance following the Soviet declaration of war. In an attempt to assure a more balanced Western participation within the Bulgarian ACC, Sir William Strang, the British representative to the European Advisory Commission (EAC), proposed a modification of the armistice terms on 15 September. However, the immediate Soviet response left no doubts: Ambassador Gusev declared that, in the given military situation, the sharing of authority proposed by the Western powers "would work against the common interest" and he insisted on complete Soviet control of the Bulgarian ACC.

[...]

In August 1944, after King Michael's successful coup in Romania and with the Red Army at the Hungarian borders, the problem of an armistice became acute. Regent Horthy undertook one final attempt to reach an agreement with the Western allies, which induced the Foreign Office to note that "the Hungarians are at last facing realities and seriously considering coming out of the war."13

At the same time, the Hungarian government finally established direct contacts with Moscow. At the beginning of October 1944, Molotov informed his Allied counterparts that "a few days ago a Hungarian mission had been allowed to pass through the Red Army's lines and was now in Moscow... to conduct negotiations for an armistice."14

Meanwhile, between 9 and 17 October, British–Soviet negotiations were taking place in Moscow. The famous "percentage deal" on the share of respective influence zones reached by Stalin and Churchill on 9 October 1944 provided the Soviets with a 50 per cent influence in Hungary. However, as a result of long discussions between Molotov and Eden during the next few days, Molotov managed to increase this ratio to 80 per cent in Moscow's favour. For many observers of the Cold War, this agreement amounted to a symbolic bargain with enduring consequences for the region. However, I am inclined to consider the impact of this deal to be rather limited. Indeed, its logic was entirely compatible with British objectives, notably to reassure the Soviets that the British accepted their strategic dominance of the region.

Whatever the impact of this agreement, during the days of October 1944, Hungary's internal evolution took a dramatic turn again. On 11 October, the Hungarian delegation in Moscow had already signed a document that settled the preliminary armistice terms, and on 15 October, the Regent issued a proclamation on the armistice that he had just appealed for directly to the Soviets.

However, this was the worst ever prepared renversement des alliances: the Germans, once they had learned of it, had no difficulty in seizing key positions in Budapest only a few hours after the Regent's proclamation and arrested Horthy and his associates. Horthy was forced to sign his resignation and to agree to appoint Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian Nazi party, as prime minister. Szálasi seized power immediately and the very same night he published a counter-manifesto declaring the utmost support for the German command. Hungary had become merely a name.15

The collapse of the Horthy regime naturally led to an end of the armistice negotiations in Moscow. In an analysis on the repercussions of Hungary's new situation, Frank Roberts pointed out in the Foreign Office that "the situation has changed by the failure of Admiral Horthy's coup d'etat. It is now possible that the Russians may occupy Budapest, while the Szálasi government retreats with the Germans to Vienna, leaving no government in Hungary with whom an armistice could be negotiated. Russian policy elsewhere suggests, however, that they dislike a vacuum of this kind and that they will wish to see established, or to establish themselves, some sort of alternative Hungarian government with whom an armistice could be negotiated..."16

That was exactly what happened in November and December 1944 as far as Hungarian domestic politics were concerned, for which policy was entirely prepared in Moscow. At the beginning of December, in compliance with Stalin's intentions, a tripartite government was formed, comprising the members of the armistice delegation, some generals of Horthy's army, and some Hungarian Communists in exile in Moscow. During the Moscow negotiations, Molotov's preoccupation-confirmed by Stalin's irregular interference-was to assure the political transition without offending either the Allies' sensitivities or public opinion in Hungary. Therefore, the Soviets explicitly insisted on the "democratic character" of the future regime: no revolutionary ardour, no precipitous moves against private property. Of course, this behaviour only confirmed the image of a careful and moderate Stalin, who was not in a great hurry in relation to Hungary, a country that he considered as a stake altogether secondary.

[...]

Frictions between the Allies

The preparations for peace in Europe in spring 1945 were closely connected with the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, and particularly with the implementation of the "Yalta principles" in the ex-enemy countries. In this regard, the way the Groza government of Romania was established on March 6, 1945 (barely two weeks after the Yalta Conference) proved once again the difficulties and limits of Allied co-operation. In the light of this experience, the Foreign Office tried to reconsider and redefine the British policy towards East Central Europe. On 27 March 1945, in a memorandum that he called an assessment of Soviet policy after Yalta, the British ambassador in Moscow affirmed that "it is safe to assume that the Soviet government are under special temptation, at this stage of the war, to press ahead with their plans for Eastern and Southeastern Europe while they have a relatively free hand... They now have a unique opportunity, with the Red Army in occupation and with the complete disruption of pre-war social systems, to bend internal developments in those countries according to their will." All the same, Sir Anthony Clark-Kerr concluded that "this Russian policy, however distasteful it may be to us and however great a strain it may at times put on our patience and upon our belief in the whole system of collaboration and consultation between the three Great Powers, has the air of remaining a policy of limited objectives, none of which immediately endangers essential British interests."24

The Deputy Undersecretary, Sir Orme Sargent, also advocated a policy toward East Central Europe that was subordinated to the fundamental British policy of post-war co-operation with Moscow. Sargent felt that "His Majesty's Government ought to remember that the [Western] form of parliamentary democracy had never established itself in Central and south-eastern Europe, except in Czechoslovakia... The exhausted populations of these countries were unlikely to put up any fight for parliamentary institutions which in any case they have never learnt to rely on or to respect..."

According to Sargent, the Foreign Office seriously had to ask itself "how far and how long it would continue the loosing battle of enforcing the Yalta principles." He recommended to end this "unheroic course" in order not to endanger "the fundamental British policy of post-war co-operation with the Soviet Union for the sake of an issue which, even if not entirely academic or quixotic, [was] at any rate not vital to British interests in Europe." Therefore, Sargent proposed to accept tacitly the governments which the Soviet authorities were setting up, "no matter what their political colour and their domestic policies may be."25

Foreign Secretary Eden summarized the British-Soviet debates in a note to Churchill on 25 May 1945. Eden pointed out that "our aim in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary was to secure their evacuation by the Red Army and the establishment of independent governments." Yet, in the territories liberated and occupied by the Soviets, the British and American military missions delegated to the ACCs could only act in the capacity of observers and the execution of the armistice agreements was wholly controlled by the Soviet military authorities. In these circumstances, according to Eden, three courses of action were open to the British government: (a) seeking for an improvement in the status of [British] Missions, (b) withdrawal of Missions (from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania), (c) an offer to conclude peace treaties with the three countries.26 Eventually, Eden proposed to pursue the third course, which was supported also by Clark-Kerr because he was convinced that this course of action should lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Thus, the British government raised the issue of concluding peace treaties with the ex-enemy countries as early as May 1945. At the same time, the State Department contrived a policy that differed from both the Soviet and the British courses of action. In fact, Washington insisted on the reorganization of governments and the earliest possible holding of free elections as prerequisites for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of peace treaties. Consequently, on 23 June 1945, the State Department informed the Foreign Office that "the US government could not give more than a qualified support to the British proposals, since they did not wish to conclude peace treaties with the existing unrepresentative governments of the Soviet-controlled countries."27 Moreover, on 6 July, after having consulted the American missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, the State Department even doubted that the "conclusion of peace would necessarily result in withdrawal of Russian troops, especially if real political authority remains in the hands of communists." 28

In this context, it is interesting, however, to see that, compared to the other ex-enemy countries, the Hungarian briefing paper prepared by the State Department for the Potsdam Conference reflected a perception more favourable with regard to Hungarian internal developments: "there have been some instances of direct Soviet intervention in Hungarian internal affairs, but there has been no attempt, as in Romania, to substitute a purely leftist regime for the coalition government."29 Nevertheless, the State Department considered that the non-Soviet representatives delegated to the ACC "were not allowed to exercise all the rights vouchsafed to them by the agreed status of the Control Commission." That is why in early June, Washington proposed to reorganize the Hungarian ACC.

Still, the Foreign Office presumed that the Soviet Union would hardly consent to the US proposal to ensure equal status for the Western military missions in the ACCs. As the British representative in Budapest, Gascoigne, wrote to Churchill: "Although the Americans seem to have hopes that they will be able to induce the Russians to change their present methods, by taking the British and Americans into partnership with them, there are no indications here that we should achieve anything concrete by such a démarche. The Russians have got their teeth into Hungary [sic!] and I find it hard to believe that they will take them out until they actually leave the country."30 On 12 July 1945, the Foreign Office expounded again the British position: "really democratic governments can only be established if the peace treaties are concluded before the present governments can entrench themselves too strongly." 31

But it appears that the Soviets were not interested in admitting the failure of the ACCs before the new tripartite conference in Potsdam. The Soviet commanders submitted new proposals on 11 July 1945 in Bulgaria, the day after in Hungary and on 16 July in Romania, likely to ameliorate the functioning of the ACCs "in connection with the termination of the war against Germany."32

At Potsdam (16 July–2 August 1945) President Truman and his new Secretary of State Byrnes raised almost immediately the non-execution of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and declared that Washington would not extend diplomatic recognition to the East Central European satellites until their governments had been made more representative. The Soviet dictator had, however, a different perception on the general aims of Allied policy, arguing that "after these countries were defeated and the Control Commission of the three powers started functioning to keep these countries under control, it was now time for a different policy, a policy of concessions." Stalin insisted that Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland be granted equal treatment with Italy because he judged the "artificial distinction" of the four countries as "discrediting the Soviet Union".33

During the July 20 session, the Foreign Secretaries discussed again the question of resuming diplomatic relations with the ex-enemy countries. According to the Soviet political stance, "in Romania and Bulgaria as well as in Finland and in Hungary since the signature of the instruments of surrender... due order existed and legal power in acting [sic!] which had authority and [was] trusted by the population. The governments of these states faithfully carried out the obligations assumed by them... Romania and Bulgaria gave the United Nations serious assistance by their forces in the struggle against German troops... Under these circumstances, the Soviet government saw no reasons for interfering in the domestic affairs of Romania or Bulgaria."34

In the course of the discussions, Eden remarked that the British representatives in Romania and Bulgaria "had few facilities to see anything and still less to get anything done." Molotov retorted that "the number of British representatives in these countries was greater than the number of the Soviets... in addition, the Soviet representatives recently made proposals for greater co-operation." Byrnes sought to convince Molotov that the American government "had no interest in the government of Romania and Bulgaria except that they be representative...

If the Big Three will see to it that free elections are held the US would recognize any government formed... [Washington] is interested in having governments friendly towards Russia." In an effort to paper over the differences, Byrnes proposed on 30 July a package deal likely to settle all controversies in the frame of one compromise: the Western borderline of Poland, the German reparations, the peace treaties with the ex-enemy countries and the admission of Italy to the United Nations.35

Thus, according to the Potsdam Protocol, "the three Governments considered it necessary that the anomalous position [of the ex-enemy countries] should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties." In pursuit of this goal, they created the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) which was entrusted "to draw up... treaties of peace with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of war in Europe." Simultaneously, the three governments agreed "to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries." 36

Regarding the East Central European satellites, it is fair to believe that the Allied debates in Potsdam reflected a perception more favourable towards Hungary. This difference in perception widened in the aftermath of Potsdam: compared to the violent political passions in Romania and Bulgaria, Hungarian domestic policy evolved in a more peaceful fashion in the second half of 1945. It would appear that Moscow was more disposed to respect the "Yalta principles" in Hungary than in Romania and Bulgaria. In other words, similarly to Finland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary was becoming part of a Soviet "open sphere" in the making.

[...]

While the political evolution in Romania and Bulgaria reflected surprising similarities, in autumn 1945, the "Hungarian difference" vis-ŕ-vis these two countries became more emphatic. In the wake of the Potsdam conference, on 15 August 1945 the President of the Hungarian ACC, Marshal Voroshilov summoned the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Dálnoki and the Chairman of the Hungarian National Assembly Béla Zsedényi. Voroshilov explained to them that "in accordance with discussions at Potsdam, the Allied governments would not make peace or have diplomatic relations [with the provisional government]... it was therefore-Voroshilov said-for Hungary's own good that [he] was advising the holding of immediate elections." He also declared that it would be desirable "to hold an election prior to a peace treaty so that the ACC could insure orderly voting."38

This is at least what one of the leading figures of the Hungarian Smallholders' Party István Balogh reported the day after to Schoenfeld. Dismayed by Voroshilov's initiative, Schoenfeld sought to obtain the authorization of the State

Departmen "to request that election question be placed on ACC agenda." Still, the Secretary of State reiterated to him: "Dept does not feel that ACC which is charged only with execution of Armistice terms should intervene... either collectively or through individual members." Nevertheless, on 22 August 1945 during the next ACC meeting, the American military representative, General Key, raised the issue of elections before the above-mentioned instructions had arrived in Budapest.

According to Schoenfeld's account, during the meeting "Voroshilov vehemently denied the truth of the rumours [about his ‘friendly advice' to the Hungarian politicians] and spoke excitedly for as much as fifteen minutes on the subject after General Key had stated his acceptance of his colleague's assurances."39 The "friendly advice" of Voroshilov surprised the Foreign Office, too. But their analysis was that this Soviet action clearly testified that the Soviets attached great importance to early elections and even more "to the emergence, as a result, of Communist or Communist-controlled governments which would keep these countries in complete subservience to Moscow... At the same time, the Foreign Office considered this initiative at least an indication that [the Soviets] would prefer not to maintain this subservience by stationing large bodies of troops in these countries for an indefinite period."40 Still, according to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, "[in Hungary] no immediate British action was required" and concurrently he underlined to Gascoigne that "I can not authorise you to give any assurance that we should be able or willing to supervise the elections."41

In fact, the representatives of the Smallholders' Party exhibited more than once their distress to Gascoigne in Budapest, as they were convinced that "if elections were held with Russian troops in the country and with the lack of Anglo-Saxon participation in control, it would be impossible to prevent them from being rigged." But in response to their "cry for help", Gascoigne tried to convince them that "it was not the policy of HMG to interfere in the internal political affairs of foreign countries by supporting political parties..."42 In this context it is interesting to mention the discussion which took place at that time in the Foreign Office regarding the attitude of Gascoigne, and which reflected also the dilemmas British policy had to face in Hungary. According to Professor Maccartney (of the Research Department): "Mr Gascoigne in his despatches does not weary of expressing his dislike of the Hungarians-whether [they] are pro-Russian or pro-British they are always wrong... [according to Gascoigne] all elements in the present government coalition are lumped together as either Bolshevik agents or spineless cowards." In lieu of this "policy of total discouragement" Maccartney advocated finding "some active expressions of support to the middle block of Social Democrats and Smallholders ...the ‘democratic' and ‘popular' Hungary for which [Great Britain] was constantly agitating during the war."

Nevertheless, the Chief of the Southern Department, John Addis, had a completely different opinion on that matter. According to him, "[the British] attitude to all the parties which make up the Hungarian coalition should be the same. [The British] influence on Hungarian politics must be exercised from outside, in the CFM for example... [the British] should not try to play a part inside the country. If [they] were to attempt to do so now [they] should at once find themselves trying to bid against the Russians which would be totally unavailing..."43

Yet, insecurity was emblematic for Hungarian politicians. On September 10, the leaders of the Smallholders' Party confidentially inquired of Schoenfeld "whether to announce non-participation of [their] party in forthcoming election... or to await result of election and then determine whether it was sufficiently free to warrant acceptance." Again, Schoenfeld did not feel authorized to give them any guidance whatsoever on that matter. All the same, following the enactment of the electoral law on September 14, Schoenfeld hinted to Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi that it would not be long before American diplomatic recognition was extended to Hungary. It is, however, fair to assume that rather than a concern for the provisions of this law, it was the objective of American diplomacy to draw a clear distinction among the East Central European ex-enemy countries which influenced this decision: "it was felt [by Washington] that the restoration of normal diplomatic procedures between Hungary and the United States would emphasize and give added validity to their refusal to do business with the governments in Romania and Bulgaria".44 Still, the announcement of Byrnes on 21 September 1945, during the CFM meeting in London, created a sensation. The Secretary of State declared the willingness of the US to recognize the Hungarian government "provided that full assurances were given that free elections would be held". Regarding the required guarantees, the official response of the Hungarian government referred to the new electoral law and to the composition of the coalition "on a wide democratic basis", and offered a "full guarantee that free and untrammelled elections will be held... in Hungary". Interestingly, even before the Hungarian reply, on 25 September, the Soviets hastened to afford diplomatic recognition to the Provisional Government "in view of the Hungarian Govt's compliance with the armistice terms and [their] general good conduct".45

The first test to assess the balance of power among the Hungarian parties took place on October 7, 1945 during the local government elections in Budapest. Giving way to the pressure of the Communist Party, the Social Democrats decided to run on a common list with them and they together obtained 43 per cent of the votes. Surprisingly, the great victor of the elections was the Smallholders' Party- with more than 50 per cent. Commenting on these results, Gascoigne changed his tone: "this victory for Moderates should have a considerable influence throughout the country and it augurs well for the general elections".46 Influenced by these results, but also by the initiative of Byrnes, the Foreign Office decided to accept a Hungarian emissary in London "on the same basis as the Italian government representative".47

However, the unexpected failure of the leftist parties had immediate repercussions. On October 16, Marshal Voroshilov sought to convince all the parties to make up a common list for the forthcoming legislative elections, and to distribute beforehand the percentages among them: "Voroshilov told [the party leaders] that civil war might ensue and he urged that Smallholders' Party should go on a common list with other parties." At the same time, Voroshilov stressed that "he did not wish to interfere with internal affairs of Hungary... he was only acting as ‘mediator' between the political forces in order to save what might resolve itself into a disastrous situation".48 What alarmed the Western powers was that the day after, all three main parties, including the Smallholders, treated the "very friendly intimation" of Marshal Voroshilov favourably. Beforehand, representatives of the Smallholders made inquiries about the attitude of the Western powers, but Schoenfeld gave them an evasive answer. Similarly, Gascoigne remarked that "[he] did not consider that [Great Britain] could take any hand in controlling the elections or in helping to maintain public order".49

On October 19, the American chargé d'affaires in London, W.J. Gallman learned that the "first impact on Foreign Office of Voroshilov's step [was] that recognition by British may be held up for some time as Hungarian Govt will not be fulfilling its pledges of free elections. [They] probably will not receive any Hungarian representative in England until situation is clarified." Gallman added, however, that "no blame [was] attached to Hungarian Government itself as this situation had been created entirely by Soviets." Gallman also telegraphed to Washington that "Gascoigne will be given instructions [by the Foreign Office] to urge Hungarian Government to resist [the] Russian pressure."50

In fact, on October 18, the Foreign Office authorized Gascoigne to inform the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Dálnoki that the reception of a Hungarian representative in London "must be considered further... the [British] pledge referred to ‘free and untrammelled elections' and the prospect of these [was] rather dimmer..."51 Informed of this British decision, the Prime Minister, although "obviously weak and frightened", was inclined, however, to believe that "despite Russian pressure, the political parties would eventually decide against the joint list..." In contrast, Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi, who was seemingly not surprised by the British attitude, "took the line that the parties had no alternative but to accept the joint list." According to Gascoigne's account, Gyöngyösi seemed however very uncertain as to the result of meeting of the Smallholders' Party leaders.52

Encouraged by British intervention, the Smallholders' Party leaders discussed during the whole night of October 19 the attitude to take regarding the Soviet demand. According to Kálmán Saláta, who attended this meeting, Zoltán Tildy (the future Prime Minister) desperately tried to convince the participants to accept the common list. Nevertheless, at dawn of October 20, the party chairman Ferenc Nagy declared the intention of the Smallholders not to meet the Soviet demand. According to Saláta, "Nagy could read the emotions on the faces... the decision was not easy to take as it was the first time we defied the Russians..." 53

In fact, after this decision the parties "definitely gave up the idea" of running on joint lists in the forthcoming elections. The significance of this was however limited by a new agreement "proposed" by Voroshilov to maintain the coalition structure, whatever the outcome of the elections should be.54 Thus, on October 25 the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax informed the Foreign Office that "having now learned of the agreement between Hungarian parties to contest the elections on separate lists, the State Department consider[ed] that action on their part [was] no longer necessary and they assumed [the Foreign Office] would take the same view."55 Indeed, on October 26, M.S. Williams formulated the British stance : "if the Russians accept this rebuff and the elections in fact proceed as arranged, we can presumably agree to accept a Hungarian representative in London as originally decided."56

On November 4, 1945, indisputably multiparty elections took place in Hungary. These gave the Smallholders an absolute majority in the newly elected parliament with 57 per cent of the votes cast, the Communists obtained 17 per cent. However, under the preliminary agreement, the governing coalition was maintained and the new government contained Communist ministers as well. Because of these results, the Hungarian elections attracted worldwide attention. On November 15, the new government (with Tildy as prime minister) was immediately given diplomatic recognition by the U.S. and Great Britain. On November 20, the daily of the Communist Party considered the fact that among the East Central European countries Hungary was the first to send a diplomatic representative to London as a "real victory of Hungarian democracy". But, as early as December 1945, the historian István Bibó affirmed in a perspicacious article that "Hungarian democracy was in crisis because she lived in fear..."

[...]