György Kertész
Generation 2000
Tamás Kolosi: A terhes babapiskóta (The Pregnant Rusk).
Budapest, Oziris, 2000, 301 pp.
The fourth child of Hungary's 37-year-old Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, came into the world to unprecedented attention from the media. Given her family and its background, the youngest Orbán will have enormous opportunities and, when she grows up, she will no doubt belong to the elite. The opportunities for her coevals are also more or less outlined in the cradle: only a very few will have the chance to break through the barriers of the social class they were born into. Although Hungary in the coming twenty years is very likely to catch up significantly on the developed world, the chief beneficiaries of this economic growth will be the higher strata of society. Tamás Kolosi, however, envisions a different ideal for Hungary: the chairman of TÁRKI Social Research Centre thinks that, in the medium term, there is a chance to construct a kind of society where, besides the few rich and an equally small underclass, the majority is made up by the middle classes.
Equality of opportunity is a political slogan that voices an illusion going back centuries, and which seems increasingly impossible to achieve, says Kolosi. In his Terhes babapiskóta (The Pregnant Rusk) he attempts to describe the structural changes this society went through with the transition. The title refers not to a genetically engineered baby food, but to the shape* of an ideally structured society, in which the-though stratified-middle class dominates. Hungary is of course very far from this model, as only one third of the population has money to spend over and above their daily necessities, the remaining two thirds only being able to cover their bare essentials, and 10-20 per cent can be considered poor.
Tamás Kolosi is a social scientist who has a penchant for scandalizing both fellow sociologists and the general public. He does not believe, in the present circumstances, that poverty can be completely eliminated, and thinks that the real challenge facing social policy is not to do away with relative poverty, but to prevent mass pauperisation, and to provide the conditions of decent human existence for the poor. But research-including his own-shows that movement between the various classes and groups is limited, which is why for Kolosi the most important criterion for society is the extent to which it can provide opportunities to individuals to choose values beyond the social level they would otherwise remain embedded in, and whether they are allowed to act according to these values. The possibilities to choose are fewer at the top (due to group pressure) and at the bottom (due to constraints) than in the middle of the social hierarchy.
The question of the losers and winners of the transition is treated in detail in the book. This is no accident: the topic is of interest to sociologists and the public at large, and it has also received scholarly treatment from many hands. Kolosi refers to the almost complete agreement among sociologists that "both in societies of the Soviet type and market economies, those doing manual work can be found in the lower regions of the social hierarchy, and in this respect no change is to be expected in the course of a peaceful (non-revolutionary) transformation." It is not surprising, then, that works discussing the consequences of the transition concentrate on the elite, and that they study processes of mobility in the upper layers of the social hierarchy that were initiated by the transition, what happened to the old ruling class, and where the members of the new ruling class come from. To give a simplified overview of the difference between the situation before and after the transition, Kolosi suggests that we start from "the classic Marxist theory, according to which in a capitalist society it is the capitalists who are on top. In a society of the Soviet type, it is the party bureaucracy that is on top, and the question of the new elite is whether the capitalists, the new economic elite, derive from the party bureaucracy in the course of a peaceful transition, or from elsewhere."
There are several hypotheses in circulation about the development of the post-transition elite, into which no one climbed from below. These include Iván Szelényi's idea of the parking orbit, as well as "the revolution of deputy heads of departments", which is one of Kolosi's favourite notions. According to the former, the pre-war economic elite did not disappear during forty years of Communist rule, but hibernated, as it were, in a parking orbit. But they were only waiting for the moment when their skills could be used on a large scale, to continue where their fathers had been forced to stop fifty years earlier. In this hypothesis, it is the reactivation of pre-war capital that is responsible for the emergence of new enterprises after the transition. The revolution of deputy heads of departments, on the other hand, describes a situation in which the pre-transition second line, less visible to the public, was able to amass capital which it could use to the best advantage in the new era. Contributory to this was the fact that
at least in the early phase of the transition, position capital that was profitable earlier could become a downright disadvantage. During the transition from a one-party system to a democratic one, politics becomes necessarily more emphasized than in "peacetime". Previously filled political positions may provoke extreme reactions in this early phase-at least when viewed through the filters of the new political elite and mass media. As a result of this intense political "compensation", those persons or groups who in the one-party system filled the most conspicuous elite positions start with a handicap because of their political activity. They can, of course, continue to convert successfully their network capital, just like their cultural and material wealth, into new wares, but their one-time prominent political roles diminish the positive value of their capital. Exploiting this situation, those who were previously cast in the second line-having had a similarly elite position but not having to cope with the disadvantages of political exposure-now try to make use of the temporary power vacuum. Thus-at least in an initial phase of the transition-the coming of the second line to the fore is observable.
To sum up, the composition of the top 20 per cent of society was little altered by the transition, though there was great movement within this group. The uppermost 1-1.5 per cent, on the other hand, was completely renewed, though this is not to say that any of the lower, impoverished classes had a chance to rise into the economic or political elite. This transformation can be put down to, among other things, the more important function of money: in the eighties social roles were dependent on money only to a degree of 12 per cent, but this factor had become 40 per cent by the mid-nineties. This could well increase further because in developed countries-among which Hungary certainly belongs, though being one of the poorest in the club-the ratio of income dependence is about 50 per cent.
Yet, it is the increasing gap between incomes that has produced the greatest tension in Hungarian society. Before 1990 the difference between the top and bottom quintiles was fourfold; today it is eightfold. Despite this, there is the paradox that those on a higher level are more dissatisfied with their condition than the poor. Sociology created the concept of relative deprivation in the fifties, and this now neatly applies to post-transition Hungarian society. The reference groups have also changed, and while the elite of the Kádár era compared their situation to that of the elite in other Socialist countries (and could acknowledge with satisfaction that circumstances here could be considered enviable), now it is the elites of the developed countries that provide the benchmark. In comparison with them, Hungary has little to be proud of, as most members of the reference group live in better circumstances.
Hungary no doubt belongs among the developed countries, has even been a member of the OECD, the developed countries' club, for five years. But, Kolosi warns, once in, Hungarians can order only the cheapest wine-even in the former poorest countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) the well-to-do live better than in Hungary. In those countries people in the highest income bracket make twelve times as much as the poorest, exactly because this is how they can approximate their standard of living to that of the comparable groups in the richest countries. Which means that in Hungary the circumstances of those already quite well off will improve, and only when they have reached the international standard will there be a chance for the poorer classes to catch up.
The idea is supported not only by international evidence but by the experience of the transition. The winners were already among the beneficiaries of the previous regime, as Kolosi's own research proves. The new protagonists of the economic elite before the transition were "either members of the management of state-owned firms, or established their own businesses in the eighties, or were active in the "second economy". Some did all three before becoming significant entrepreneurs. Three fourths of the large capitalists of today come from one of these three typical groups. Even among the remaining fourth there are few who had no network or financial capital before the nineties. Those who did not, however, almost without exception maintained good relations with foreigners, and this was what provided for their success in the new socio-economic situation.
The most important question has always been, and still is, what one needs to get into the elite or to stay there. Those who succeed today give the same three or four tips. When questioned by Kolosi's team, one in two of them attributed success, apart from their own personal qualities, to the economic boom of the transition. Also, one in two entrepreneurs mentioned that they had been active in the second economy thriving in Hungary in the eighties, and already had a private business in operation before the transition-managing it perhaps as a sideline while keeping their main jobs.
Another reason for the entrenchment of these old groups is that the transition in Hungary was headed by what is called in Central Europe the "intellectuals", who asserted their own interests. Thus, for instance, they created a protective shell around the healthcare system, fearing that leaving it open to pure market principles would mean that they would have access to a service of-even if relatively-worse quality. The unfortunate state of the Hungarian healthcare system is notorious, as is the fact that even for the most basic services patients have to make their own contributions, given the appallingly low salaries paid to everyone in the health sector. The cash-filled envelopes you have to dash are just one aspect, but to know which doctor you have to dash you need connections. If the relative financial position of intellectuals has deteriorated, they were at least able to compensate for this through their connections; should conditions be clarified in healthcare, they will have no chance to make up for the relatively huge decline in their incomes. These habits and attitudes, ingrained in the Communist era, are so deep-rooted that only a new generation, the one now growing up, can do without them. This is like the wanderings of the Jews led by Moses, says Kolosi: those born in slavery could never arrive in Canaan.
Though it is difficult to compare the situation of education with that of health- care, what at least is similar is that in free educational institutions those coming from the higher social segment are in a better position, regardless of their actual financial status. The elite focuses its attention on a handful of secondary schools-primarily in Budapest and a very few in the provinces-and does everything to ensure that their children are accepted in these, since from them there is a road leading straight to the universities which guarantee the best jobs. These are closed circuits, where kindergarden friendships further develop at shared school desks, and reach their full maturity in boards of directors.
Qualifications had always been one of the most important factors of success, but this will be more so, says Kolosi, who calls attention again to the so-called school slope. This denotes the fact that Hungarian kindergardens are among the best in the world, primary schools do well in any international comparison, while the same cannot be said with full assurance any more about secondary schools. Universities and colleges clearly do not figure highly by international standards. Despite this-or for the very same reason-qualifications are of key importance for life opportunities, which means that the Prime Minister and his wife-like all other parents of a new-born child-must seriously consider what school career to prepare for their children.
This they will no doubt do, as children have become more important to young couples in the higher classes than ever before. For the generation of the prime minister's party, FIDESZ, still the party of the young, who were in their twenties when the change of system took place-and this perhaps distinguishes the majority from Fidesz-affiliated members of the political elite-having many children is not mere conservatism. It is in fashion among the young well-to-do to have three or more children, who are integrated in the family with a modern attitude, rather than in accordance with the traditional roles offered to children, says the sociologist. This too is a determining factor for the future success of Generation 2000. Family background will play an ever more important role in achieving success. This could even be considered natural, as before the nineties it was more difficult to keep privileges within the family-even if the elite of the late-Kádár era developed very effective mechanisms for this purpose. But now it is no longer necessary to promote the children in secret ways; parents can transmit their values, whatever their nature, to their heirs without scruples.
Kolosi also finds that in the future individuals will be more responsible for their own success, and that the concept of success has become multi-dimensional. While the future of the generation born in 1950 was pre-determined to a degree of 70 per cent, children born today stand a 50 per cent chance that they will not be constrained by the circumstances they are born into. The real appeal of the pregnant-i.e. the thickening- rusk model is that movement within a broader middle class would be easier than between different classes.
This does not mean that differentiation is not still with us. While in the sixties the indicator of a family's wealth was whether they had a television (later, a colour TV), today the home computer has a similar function. However, those who did not have a television in the sixties, did not start in life with the same handicap as those children who do not have access to a PC, and hence, to the Internet.
The elimination of social disparity is an illusion, but politics must undertake to reduce differences. The invisible borderlines within the country that separate the East from the West and the North from the South cannot be wiped out, but their effect can be diminished. Inequality between towns and cities can and should be reduced.
NOTES
* Hungarian babapiskóta have the shape of a bone or dumbbell with a thinning middle section. A pregnant rusk would be thickest in the middle. [Trans.] Back
György Kertész
is deputy editor of Figyelő, an economic weekly.
