Assimilation and Identity
François Fejtő on the Singular Marriage between Hungarians and Jews
Your book Hongrois et Juifs-Histoire millénaire d'un couple singulier (1000- 1997), en collaboration avec Gyula Zeke, was commissioned and published in 1997 by Editions Ballands, in France. A Hungarian translation has just appeared, Magyarság, zsidóság (Budapest, História-MTA Történettudományi Intézet). The French subtitle was left out in the Hungarian edition. The title itself was also somewhat altered in meaning. The Hungarian version is more abstract than the original-"Magyardom, Jewry" would be its precise translation. The French subtitle is telling, however, as there is no doubt that the nexus between Hungarians and Jews deserves a special chapter in the general history of Jews.
Perhaps they cautiously toned down the original. In Hungary, anything concerning Jews is still more sensitive than in France. They may have felt that outspokenness might tread on some toes. The French has another dangerous subtitle: Addenda to Studies in Exclusion and Acceptance.
The idea of the "odd couple" was inspired by an article by Endre Ady, "Korrobori". Ady described the relationship of Hungarians and Jews as a love relationship, and compared it to an African myth. [A Corroboree is in fact an Australian aboriginal dance ritual.-Ed's note.] Ady, at the turn of the last century, was the first to think that the wavering relation of Hungarians and Jews is like a love affair with its ups and downs. Let me add, this love at times seemed completely one-sided. That's exactly why I call it odd, since real love is always mutual.
You talked about caution and sensitivity, but one has to take a stand. If you're afraid of offending sensitivities you shouldn't write on Jewish topics, as you are bound to end up offending someone. I don't dispute that it's a sensitive issue. It's like prying into the relationship between two people, their private life. As if we wanted to study the phases of a marriage, and at the same time to comment. Obviously, neither party will welcome publicity. What they're especially irritated by in Hungary is the possibility of foreigners looking into Hungarian-Jewish relations. But I've never wished in my writings to consider others' sensitivity, I only think of my own. I consequently always write what I think is true.
In the 19th century, Jews in the Kingdom of Hungary wanted to be like Hungarians not because of outside pressure, but as a consequence of a particular, inner resolution.
Much had to be sacrificed for the sake of assimilation, since it meant a switching of culture for Jews. The change was radical, and in its course not only religious and communal identity fell apart, but ethnic identity as well. Jews fitted themselves out with Hungarian culture after they had wiped out their own. I want to emphasize that this special process was induced by the extraordinary talent of Hungarians in assimilating others. The strength of Hungarians in ethnic and cultural assimilation is attested by a thousand years of history, and is unequalled in Europe. Germans, for instance, settled outside the Carpathian basin, in the Balkans, and in Russia they got as far as the Volga. Wherever they settled they kept their language and ethnic-cultural separateness. Saxons were able to maintain their identity even in multicultural Transylvania. Ninety per cent of the Germans in Hungary, on the other hand, assimilated to Hungarians. Jews, the vast majority of whom were German-speaking, also changed their particular identity in the 19th century. We know that in the age of Maria Theresa, the majority in Pest were still German in language and culture, but by 1900 the bulk had become Hungarian. Jews in Pest were German in culture, as the first great wave of settlers came from Western Europe, from South Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and other territories where the Jews had started to assimilate to hochdeutsch and German literary culture. As immigrants in Hungary they were markedly German. But the advance of German culture soon slowed down, and went into reverse, allowing a new trend of assimilation to come to the fore in Hungary. Jews learnt Hungarian at a breathtaking speed, and soon felt at home in Hungarian culture. The avidity with which they adapted to Hungarian ways appeared excessive at times.
The concept of voluntary assimilation must, however, be handled with care. Assimilation was not entirely voluntary; I'd rather call it a mutual contract. The aristocracy and the lesser nobility, the major figures in the Hungarian political elite, Baron József Eötvös and others, spearheaded the movement for Jewish emancipation, incidentally started by Joseph II at the end of the 18th century. Those who claimed to speak for the nation made it a condition of assimilation that Jews give up all those secular and religious features that distinguished them from Hungarians. If they wanted to be citizens with equal rights they had to learn the language of the country, acquire its culture and commit themselves to the pursuit of the nation's aims. No one demanded this explcitly, but it was implied by Ferenc Deák, József Eötvös, Ágoston Trefort, that is, the most prominent emancipationists, and also by Lajos Kossuth. Thus assimilation was not a completely voluntary undertaking, and some Jews rejected it, though they were only a small minority. They were primarily Orthodox Jews from the northeast, especially Galicia, with Yiddish as their vernacular. But even these learned Hungarian to a degree. But they exhibited no readiness to melt into Hungarian culture, would take no part in its organization, and held back from universities when they were opened to Jews. Many assimilated Jews at the time chose those disciplines that fuelled national sentiments most intensely, such as history or Hungarian linguistics. Jews soon made outstanding contributions to these fields, many were elected members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
My paternal ancestors, the Rossis, went from Italy to Bohemia, and from there to Hungary. The process of assimilation was completed by my paternal grandfather, who converted from Judaism in the interests of his career and social acceptance. The novelty for my father was no longer assimilation but exclusion, the Jewish Laws. As for me, I chose a third option. While retaining my Hungarianness, I returned to the Judaism of my ancestors. Historical experience told me that my grandfather's generation, for understandable reasons, overdid assimilation.
I am of the same opinion. This is something I say on countless occasions in the book, providing various examples. At the time they exaggerated assimilation, completely renounced their past and traditions, though they had no reason to be ashamed of them. They thought that having left the ghetto they had to break away from all Jewish traditions, and on joining Hungarian culture they had to renounce their whole Jewish heritage, even though this heritage meant not only religion but a vast national and cultural inheritance as well. They wanted to be more Hungarian than the Hungarians, and this triggered off dislike and rejection, excessive assimilation was found to be repulsive. On the other hand, it was damaging to the Jewish community. They rejected a vast inheritance which up to that point had been unambiguously theirs, largely thanks to their faith. The renunciation of several thousand years of Jewish history was a hasty decision, which can only be accounted for by the enthusiasm the openness of the liberals induced in Hungarian Jews. The main principle the majority adopted was that Jews had to become Hungarians heart and soul, and this could be best proved by severing all ties with their Jewish past and with other Jews in the present. This caused immense psychological damage within the Jewish community. It caused many to conceal their origins and always feeling ashamed of being of Jewish descent. All this in spite of its being quite obvious that if there is anybody that can be proud of their history, their past and all the cultural treasures it gave to the world, then they are the Jews.
I completely agree with you that in Hungary assimilation was overdone. In my book I express my satisfaction over the fact that the best in the latest generations of Jews in Hungary artists, writers, intellectuals have chosen a way that differed from their fathers'. Though they don't want to terminate the assimilation contract, they are proudly reviving and maintaining their Jewish culture. Indeed, they continue the process, once aborted, of Hungarian-Jewish culture.
Here in France I have many friends of Armenian origin. They are completely French: so much so, that recently they gave a prime minister to the country; Balladur's father was still called Balladurian. Armenians in France never denied their ancestors, they maintain and develop their cultural links with all parts of the world. All this in no way prevents them from seeing themselves as French with all the rights of citizens, just as the French consider them true compatriots.
The enthusiasm for assimilation first became apparent at the time of the 1848-49 Revolution. In the spring of 1848 there were serious anti-Semitic riots in many towns and embittered Jews opened an emigration bureau, but they did not go to America, and the bureau was transformed into a recruiting office. According to Lajos Kossuth's data, in an army of 180,000, there were 20,000 Jews fighting for the independence of Hungary.
In this case, I do not consider the role of Jews in 1848 as excessive. Let me add that Hungarian Jews were by no means of one mind in their attitude towards this conflict. Just as there were pro-Austrian Hungarian noblemen, aristocrats and others, so too there were pro-Austrian Jews. There were Hungarian Jews fighting on the other side, too, in the Austrian army, though certainly considerably fewer in number. The Hungarian political elite and intelligentsia emphatically condemned the 1848 spring pogroms. It is common knowledge how sharply Petőfi denounced anti-Semitic riots in Pest. These were instigated primarily by German artisans, journeymen and apprentices, who had an interest in maintaining the feudal guild system, but when the Hungarian political elite expressed its approval of Jewish emancipation anew, and thus gave fresh support to Jews, it is no wonder Hungarian Jews reacted in solidarity when the conflict with the Habsburgs started, or that they were pro-Hungarian in the War of Independence. So I think the involvement of Jews in 1848 cannot be considered excessive.
Jews took an active part in the War out of proportion to their numbers, and a beneficial reaction was felt in public discourse; from 1875 on, however, Győző Istóczy spoke in Parliament in an openly anti-Semitic tone, and anti-Semitic propaganda reached its height with the 1882 Tiszaeszlár blood libel.
Developments in Hungarian history took on a greater pace after the defeat of 1849. Istóczy's generation appeared two decades later, and these two decades were immensely important in the history of the Hungarian economy. The country was being radically transformed at a rapid pace. This period is often called the Gründerzeit, the period of foundings. The foundations of modern Hungary were laid down during these decades. Today we're probably in a similar foundation-building phase, preparing for globalization. Preparations for socio-economic change always produce great disturbances, as every form of change has its winners and losers. Jews had an important role, even before emancipation, in the changes that started in the 1860's. The establishment of various industries, banking, home and international trade required new professionals, and Jews were quick to answer this demand. They acquired Hungarian quickly and successfully, as well as a Hungarian mentality. Consequently they took important steps in culture as well, with considerable success. This process had its losers, and the fact that winners included not a few Jews-while most of those who lost out were the old lesser nobility, those who could not adapt to modernization-became one of the main reasons why anti-Semitism revived. In addition, the importance of the church was lessened by secularization, and the growing importance of the central state administration. This was the first time church leaders of the old guard saw a chance to retaliate, as they thought Jews were responsible for secularization, and considered them its beneficiaries. This was the time when obligatory civil marriage reduced the importance of church weddings. That the retaliation by the forces of the past had no deep effects, and that the majority of Hungarians aligned themselves with liberalism, and not conservatism and political reaction, became apparent in the outcome of the Tiszaeszlár blood libel case. In that affair liberalism gained an important victory in modernizing Hungary. This is to the credit not only of the Upper House, the aristocracy, but also of the Independence Party and other liberals. The fight against anti-Semitism, which meant waging war on an anachronism which endangered the progress of the country, became of public concern at the time of Tiszaeszlár, and the majority of the elite could be mobilized in this cause.
Let me return to the problem of overdoing things. Excessive commitment to the Hungarian cause by Hungarian Jews in relation to ethnic minorities was later of vital importance: whenever Hungarians, after 1870, decided to radically negate the liberal ethnic policy championed by József Eötvös, and force assimilation within what is now Slovakia and in Transylvania, Jews gave their unconditional support to Hungarians, against the minorities. They ignored the fact that these "minorities" in these territories constituted the majority, which foreshadowed the possibility of their forming, sooner or later, their own nation state. History later failed to underwrite the uncompromising backing of Hungarian nationalism and the refusal to show solidarity with ethnic minorities who suffered many wrongs-the occasion for frequent protests in Parliament and elsewhere. Such Hungarian jingoism on the part of Jews must be considered excessive. The "reward" was odd, since the Hungarian authorities played the dominant role in the deportation of Hungarian Jews from Transylvania: they did not even wait for the intervention of the Germans.
That Jews found themselves on shaky ground as a result of this exaggerated assimilation is shown by the fact that by the end of the 1860's Jews were divided between two opposed camps, who stopped communicating with each other. The Orthodox and Reform Jews mutually anathematised each other, and severed practically all links, something which had not occurred anywhere else. Such a deep disagreement, such institutionalized discord has never happened since. You mention all this without trying to varnish the facts.
I tried to describe how it was, a cardinal rule of writing history. You have to insist on setting down all the relevant facts, regardless of any one wanting to make things appear in the way that fits their interests. The orthodox-reform split had a long cultural prehistory. It happened largely thanks to the fact that Jews in cities and towns, most of whom had settled in the 18th and 19th centuries, had come from Western Europe. When assimilation to Hungarians was in progress, they no longer possessed a Jewish culture, their traditions had weakened. In sharp contrast to them, Jews living in the east of Hungary, having come mostly from Galicia, were deeply embedded in Jewish culture, which meant not only religion, but an ethnic-national culture and a language of their own. This made a major contribution to the split. Two cultures clashed, two cultures departed, two cultures started off in different directions. Bear in mind that the Jews of the Diaspora are of almost as many kinds as the territories they inhabited for a longer period. If you walk down a street in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv you will meet almost all human types. The rupture in Hungary proved to be radical. Nevertheless, when Orthodox Jews had to choose between Zionism and the Hungarian nation, only a few chose the former.
The father of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, who spent the first eighteen years of his life in Budapest, wrote that if anyone wanted to import Zionism into Hungary, he would first have to repaint it Red, White and Green.
Herzl was right. Religious communities in Hungary strongly inveighed against Zionism to demonstrate their loyalty to Hungary. Again a sign of excessive devotion.
I may go so far as to say that the overdoing of assimilation resulted in Jews losing the ground beneath their feet, their own past and self-identity and, consequently, their self-respect. That's how a self-hatred emerged, a tendency to neurosis and permanent anxiety. Some of them, in search of certainties, found that Communism, an ideology full of Messianistic promises, gave them a purchase.
This is a difficult question. Whether you consider Hungary or Western European countries, where a clash between tendencies occurs you will find Jews on both sides. In science, political ideology, even in culture. I'm not certain at all that the number of Hungarian Jewish merchants, lawyers, doctors, bankers, etc., in other words, members of the middle class, did not far exceed the number of those Jews who joined leftist movements, the Galileo Circle or the radicals in the early nineteen hundreds, or who were active in the organization of trade unions or in Socialist-Communist messianism. Why Communists, especially the founders and leaders, included so many men of Jewish origin, needs a separate analysis. Leftist Jews broke with their own Judaism even more radically than was the norm, and what was really responsible was not their disillusionment with capitalist societies, but their confidence in various universal ideologies. Equal civil rights, equality before the law, and emancipation had a great appeal. The then emerging working class movements appeared to promise new truths. The masses who joined the Social Democrats or the Communist Party were not Jewish. That Jewish intellectuals should have played such a role on the left can be explained by an attraction in Jews, inherited or ingrained, often unconscious, towards complete redemption and apocalyptic visions. "This fight shall be the last." The idea had immense attraction for Jews. Christianity was born of this same Jewish messianism. The complete story, however, includes that those dissatisfied with, and critical of, Communism later included at least as many of the former Jewish Communists, as there had been amongst those gathering around Lenin.
You said Ady was the first to call the Jewish-Hungarian nexus a love affair. As if a woman sang to a man "I'll love you even if you give me a hiding".
There is some truth in it. She would still be running after the cart when it's already obvious that it won't pick her up. It's tragicomical. But this is only one side of the coin. Talking about relationships: many mixed marriages worked perfectly. It is
also interesting that great figures in Hungarian culture, from Endre Ady to Béla Bartók, found many of their audience and patrons among Jews. It was also characteristic that countless leading Hungarian intellectuals had Jewish spouses. Jewish-Hungarian coexistence has not only a past but a future as well, many things go smoothly. This is partly personal experience, as I spent my childhood not amongst Jews but amongst Christians-Catholic, Protestant or even Greek Orthodox. It is also important and promising for the future that anti-Semitism does not spring from the character of Hungarians. It's an inorganic social phenomenon. Hungarians are not xenophobic or racist. You couldn't say the same about the Poles or the Ukrainians. On the contrary, patience,
sobriety and wisdom are also parts of
the national character of Hungarians. Anti-Semitism in Hungary is solely the work of an active, hateful and frustrated minority.
A different factor is that Jews make easy scapegoats. This goes back two thousand years in Europe, not only Hungarians need scapegoats. Those in power resort to anti-Semitism at times of great social or economic upheaval even in countries where there are no longer any, or hardly any, Jews. So people can't really know what Jews are like. In accordance with a certain anti-Judaic tradition, "the Jew" has become a mythic concept, and has been invested with diabolical characteristics.
Village people traditionally keep a safe distance from Jews.
That's true, though this is a typical attitude towards all kinds of strangers. And everyone's a stranger who is not quite like them, who goes to a different church, or does not go to church at all, or whose ancestors do not rest in the same village church-yard. You can say the same about village people in any country. They're cautious even towards their own kind. People have often complained to me that Hungarians do not treat Hungarian refugees from Transylvania too kindly. The ancestors of Transylvanians are not buried in the cemeteries of Transdanubia or the Great Plain. They come from somewhere else, their native land is somewhere else, and wariness of difference is an everyday psychological phenomenon you couldn't call anti-Semitism. Real anti-Semitism starts when those in power and the public look for a legitimate way of persecuting Jews.
As a young man in the thirties, you were an active Westernizer in the clash between westernizing and populist intellectuals.
It wasn't such a bloody conflict as it was later represented. I lived in the thick of those controversies, and I find it strange how later the intensity of the conflict was exaggerated.
Új Szellemi Front, which took the populist line, was founded in 1934. It was promoted by Gyula Gömbös, a former member of the General Staff, later Prime Minister, whose enthusiasm for Mussolini earned him the nickname "Gömbölini." At that time even the essayist László Cs. Szabó, a highly cultivated contributor to the most highly esteemed literary review, Nyugat, no populist at all, hoped to find the foundations of Hungary's future on "the broad shoulders of Gyula Gömbös."
The populist writers and their sympathizers were deceived. At that time they were far from being the accomplices of those in power. The populist-Westernizer controversy started in 1934, but it was concerned with only one question. The populist writers felt they had an interest only in a national agrarian reform. The break between the two camps, however, never became complete. Until the literary journal Szép Szó was founded, I regularly published in Válasz, a journal on the populist side. At that time a volume of verse by Gyula Illyés appeared and he asked me to review it for Válasz. The controversy had started when I still wrote for Válasz, and it did not upset either of the parties.
The populist writers' belief, or illusion, was that with an appeal to national sentiment and patriotism, the Hungarian ruling class could be won over to the cause of a serious national agrarian reform. They insisted on one thing, that the reform be demanded not by the left wing, but by populist-nationalist intellectuals. This was because demands by Social Democrats were at that time dismissed as being the work of Jews. This was in spite of the fact that agrarian reform had been demanded by the Social Democrats for far longer and more insistently than by the populists.
The point was that the populists wanted to stick to their strategy of agrarian reform through thick and thin, while we Westernizers were convinced that what Hungary first needed was democracy, and that the land issue could only be solved when the Hungarian people were mature enough for democracy. We laid the emphasis on liberties, democracy and the fullness of human rights. But ideological differences meant little to the populists, what counted were successful tactics. Because of their indifference to ideology, the poets József Erdélyi and István Sinka easily found their way to the Arrow Cross Party, and writers such as Péter Veres and József Darvas later collaborated with the Communists. On the other hand, no one among the Westernizers joined these extremes, it would have been unthinkable for us.
This is the edited transcript of an interview broadcast by Magyar Rádió on
18 February, 2001. Endre T. Rózsa has been a senior editor at Magyar Rádió since 1978. Back
