Ferenc Rákóczi II's War of Independence

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The Hungarian war of independence was a determining factor in the European military power relations at the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. It kept some 20 to 40,000 men of the Habsburg Empire's armed forces for eight years in Hungary. With some exaggeration, perhaps, the French historian Pierre Chaunu said that Rákóczi's war of independence "saved France from complete destruction". Nor was Karl Otmar von Aretin, a German authority on the period, of a different opinion when he declared that "the allies failed, and ultimately France got out of the war unscathed". It is the more surprising that Rakóczi spoke of something more important, the common cause and interest of Europe.
The notion of the common interest of Europe can be well elucidated by two opinions, formed at two extreme points of Europe. In the summer of 1700, on the threshold of the War of the Spanish Succession, Rákóczi's impression was that "whether the French or the Habsburgs win this present war, the European balance of power will be upset." In the very same year, Daniel Defoe not only indicated a political tendency, but summed up past experience when he declared that "a just Balance of Power is the Life of Peace."
The balance of power became a guiding principle of political practice in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The mutual relations of large empires and small countries were to be settled in a way that allowed the peoples of Europe to live in peace and to trade with one another undisturbed. Pax sit Christiana, Universalis et Perpetua - this was the Westphalian principle to be cited in the peace treaty of Utrecht concluding the War of the Spanish Succession, also cited, more than once, by the Prince.
In several respects the Peace of Westphalia was of historic importance to Hungary, then still divided into three. On the one hand, the Principality of Transylvania was allotted a place in the Treaty of Westphalia. It was used as an argument by Ferenc Rákóczi II and his diplomats, in the context of international law, that the Principality, as an ally of France and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War, was included in the universal European peace treaty, and this fact was recognised by Ferdinand III, King of Hungary (the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II). Transylvania, then still a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, established its diplomatic and cultural relations with the Christian world very systematically, it gave shelter to all persecuted peoples and denominations, was tolerant in its religious policies, and could handle the Ottoman problem, consequently it was regarded as a stabilizing factor in the area.
On the other hand, 1648 was of decisive significance in the history of Hungary, since the Peace of Westphalia made it possible for Christendom to unite its material and spiritual resources and push back the frontier of the Ottoman Empire half a century later from the middle of Hungary to the threshold of the Balkans. However, there was a most vulnerable spot in the peace treaty, namely, the area now called Central Europe. Bohemia was an absolute loser, Poland lived under constant threat, the Eastern region, bordering on the Ottoman Empire, formed a critical zone ranging from the Ukraine to Croatia, with focal points of social and political tension and occasional outbreaks of armed conflict. What was generally expected of the Treaty of Westphalia all over Europe was that the Christian countries would make up their differences and, uniting their forces, would turn against the Ottomans. However, there was no agreement between the Hungarian political élite and the policy makers of the Habsburg Empire with regard to the Turkish war. In the interest of Hungary and Transylvania, it was desirable to get rid of the Turks in the area. At the price of enormous sacrifices, Miklós Zrínyi (1620 - 1664), Ban of Croatia, and his circle managed to form an international alliance including Leopold, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, and in 1663 - 1664 an offensive was launched with the participation of French auxiliary forces. A powerful group at the Habsburg court, however, opposed this scheme and insisted on maintaining the status quo, concluding a peace treaty behind the backs of the allies. Since the Treaty of Westphalia had limited the power of the Holy Roman Emperor over the German principalities, the Habsburgs, in the spirit of absolutism, fortified their positions, building up an integrated empire in keeping with raison d'état, ragion di stato notions. The Turkish - Habsburg trade agreement concluded after the Peace of Vasvár (Eisenburg), the establishment of the Orientalische Handelscompagnie, the Wiener Kommerzkollegium, the standing army, the bureaucracy, the regulated diplomacy, the forms of the monarch's self-expression, and the Baroque pomp of representation all served the formation of a strong, great power. As Jean Béranger pointed out, "public revenue rose from a yearly 4 million to 16 Rhenish florins", and the "dance of the millions" began only in the course of the Turkish campaign that followed the siege of Vienna.

From 1704 onwards England and the Netherlands were increasingly active in trying to settle affairs in Hungary. They regarded the Protestants as their brethren. They granted the Habsburgs loans, which were covered by the output from the copper and quicksilver mines of Hungary and Transylvania. Pamphleteers dipped their pens in vitriol, protesting that the Duke of Marlborough's soldiers should not shed their blood for the Habsburg Empire. However, the vast numbers of documents tend to prove that the increasing sympathy for a Hungary fighting for its liberty was due to the recognition of the fact that, in the long run, the country's liberty might be a factor in establishing the European balance of power. As indicated by his personal papers, George Stepney, the English Ambassador in Vienna and the mediator of the peace negotiations, carried out the most systematic, almost scholarly, research in order to get a realistic picture of the conditions in Hungary and Transylvania. When the negotiations were broken off in July 1706, in Stepney's opinion as a result of the too rigid attitude of the Hofburg, he sent a report from Nagyszombat (Trnava) to Minister Harley, concluding that since the Habsburg court would not consent to the Principality of Transylvania retaining its independence, "this is laying the Axe to the Root of the Tree and any man who has had the happiness of living under a free Government cannot but be a little concerned to see a poor people (where 5 parts of 6 are of the Reform'd Churches) depriv'd of their Liberties at one Blow, and given up to servitude and future persecution, notwithstanding a Powerfull Mediation, of the same Profession with themselves, has been pleased to appear on their behalf." The significance of the historic moment was well expressed by Richard Warre, Under-Secretary of State, namely, that the breakdown of the negotiations, and the failure to bring about a peace with guarantees because of the militarist circles of the Imperial Court, would be detrimental to the "common Cause of Europe".
Though several plans were made for a French - Hungarian alliance, France never concluded one with Rákóczi, while the Russian - Hungarian league of 1707 essentially proved to be of no use. However, it is characteristic of Rákóczi's view of Europe as a uniform whole that he initiated and tirelessly carried on diplomatic efforts to bring about a French - Russian alliance, which, in his own words, should have been "a construct of world-wide political significance".
In 1708 the armed forces of the Hungarian Confederation lost a decisive battle, yielding to the superior numbers of the enemy. As regards the reforms accepted at the Diet of Sárospatak, there was neither the money nor the time to realise them. Nor was the country spared the ravages of the plague which was devastating all of Europe. The Hungarian and Transylvanian confederation, confined to a narrower field, had to take up a defensive position with a view to preserving the corporate body of the state. As soon as the peace conferences of the Hague (1709) and Gertruydenberg (1710) made it evident that Europe was preparing for peace, Rákóczi initiated negotiations with the Habsburg government in August 1710, in the hope that he would be able to conclude the war with an internationally guaranteed universal peace treaty in which Hungary and Transylvania would be included as countries in their own right. He informed Queen Anne to this effect. She sent a special envoy to Vienna, Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough (1658 - 1735), to act as mediator in the negotiations. However, he achieved little, even with the help of the English and Dutch ambassadors to Vienna. Still, he had a share in attaining what Rákóczi and his Senate so persistently demanded; Prince Eugene of Savoy, the head of the War Council, came to realise that it was not possible to vanquish Hungary by force of arms. The commander-in-chief of the Imperial army, Count János Pálffy, Ban of Croatia, contracted a formal peace with General Sándor Károlyi on 29 April 1711. The Peace Treaty of Szatmár (Satu Mare) was a compromise; it prolonged Habsburg rule in Hungary and the existence of the feudal national institutions of the Kingdom of Hungary.
The war of independence saved Hungary from being integrated into the Habsburg Empire. However, Rákóczi refused to accept the Szatmár agreement. From Poland he went to France, still hoping that he might get Transylvania included in the peace treaties concluding the War of the Spanish Succession. But there was no chance of that at the negotiations, either in Utrecht (1713) or Rastatt (1714). A great deal of what the state of Rákóczi's war of independence aimed at was attained only as late as the "Age of Reform" (1825 - 1847) and the revolution and war of independence of 1848/49. The Central European Confederation conceived in the spririt of Westphalia became a memory and a future hope. The surviving leaders of Rákóczi's war of independence were given shelter by Turkey. The life of the Hungarians in Rodostó was recorded by Kelemen Mikes. He drew a true portrait of the Prince, who continued firm in his belief that a European balance of power was the only means to secure the peace of Hungary.
The memory of Prince Rákóczi's war of independence became deeply imbedded in the cultural traditions of the Hungarian and other nations living in the Carpathian Basin. Poems by great Hungarian poets, like Ferenc Kölcsey, Sándor Petőfi, János Arany, Endre Ady, Attila József, István Vas also prove this. His likeness, his personality and the events of his war were depicted by Ádám Mányoki, Viktor Madarász, Simon Hollósy and other, known and unknown painters. The tunes of the war became immortalised by the Marche de Rákóczi by Berlioz and Liszt's Rákóczi March.

Ágnes Várkonyi
is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Mediaeval and Early Modern History at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. Her many publications include books on Transylvania in the 17 - 18th centuries, on the Turkish occupation in Hungary and on Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II.