Géza
Jeszenszky
The
Genesis of a Lasting Quarrel
in Central Europe
Ignác Romsics:
The Dismantling of Historic Hungary: the Peace Treaty
of Trianon, 1920. Translated by Mario D. Fenyo.
New York, Columbia University Press, 2002, 201 pp.
Compared to other trouble spots, Central
Europe today is a tranquil place, nevertheless we should keep in mind that
both world wars broke out here and were caused partly by the national aspirations
and border disputes so typical of this region. More than 80 years ago a peace
settlement tried to reorganise Central Europe along ethnic lines, but that
caused more problems than it solved. Bálint Vázsonyi, the recently deceased
concert pianist and political writer (the great-nephew of Vilmos Vázsonyi,
the first Hungarian cabinet minister who was a practising member of the Jewish
community) wrote an essay about the 1920 Hungarian Peace Treaty, calling it
a "bad treaty that won't go away."1 Indeed, that is the problem
with that old piece of international law, and that explains the appearance
of another book (following scores of earlier publications) on the subject.
Though even the average well-educated person is unaware of it, most readers
of this journal are aware that the Hungarians, a nation looking back to eleven
centuries in Central Europe, received a devastating and unjustified blow in
the aftermath of the First World War. Ignoring President Wilson's principle
of self-determination, the victors partitioned the historic Kingdom of Hungary
by arbitrarily assigning 3.5 million ethnic Hungarians, a third of the nation,
and two-thirds of the country's total territory to the newly-created or enlarged
states of Czechoslovakia, Romania and "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes."
Ignác Romsics, a highly acclaimed and prolific Hungarian historian, a frequent
contributor to these pages, in a rather short and therefore easily digestible
book recapitulates the process that led to that uniquely unfair yet lasting
settlement, which has many unfortunate repercussions even today.
By now practically every document pertaining to the making of this treaty
has been studied by professional historians, there is a vast literature both
on the narrow subject and on its larger background, nevertheless the book
can be recommended to all those interested in Central Europe. Romsics begins
with a description of the national tensions in the ethnic mosaic of the old
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and tells of the dreams concerning its future of
Pan-Slavists, the die-hard Habsburg centralists, nationalists of various colour
and degree, and idealist intellectuals on the Left and Right. It is vain to
ask whether the Empire had any chance for survival, but in view of the fact
that Winston Churchill proved right, independence indeed brought terrible
sufferings to its inhabitants and their descendants (Bosnians included!),2
an attempt to give an answer is justified. Romsics's answer is a cautious
"no":
the empire was subjected to centrifugal
forces propelled by nationalism which neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian
leadership could counteract effectively. It cannot be ascertained that the
federal solution, advocated by many of the contemporaries, would have been
an effective counteraction (p. 18.)
The present writer, who has devoted much study and thought
to the subject, is of a somewhat more positive opinion: the First World War
was not inevitable, and without that, if reasonable politicians in Hungary
(like Prime Minister Tisza) would have prevailed over the Radical Right and
the Radical Left, the dualist structure might have given way to federalism
in both halves of the Empire, meeting many of the legitimate demands of the
national minorities.
The chapter on war aims reveals the strength and depth of the forces that
were bent on destroying the Empire and replacing it with new states based
on one dominant language or another. These forces were external rather than
internal: French plans for a post-war Europe dominated by France, helped by
a group of client states in the back of Germany, and Russian plans of creating
a large sphere of influence in central and southeastern Europe. The mini-imperialism
of the Czechs, Romanians and Serbs fitted well into the aims of both Great
Powers. The book shows that it was not easy to overcome the reluctance of
the British (and later that of the Americans) to embark upon such a drastic
change in the power structure (today we would say "security architecture")
of Europe, but the Russian revolution and the failure of a separate peace
with Austria followed by the latter's total subordination to Germany led to
the decisions made in late Spring, 1918, to embrace the programme of the exiled
politicians (the Czech Masaryk and Benes©, the Polish Zaleski, the Croat Supilo,
the Slovak Stefanik, etc.) and their British and French friends (R.W. Seton-Watson,
W. Steed, L. Leger, E. Denis). Romsics raises the issue of how much support
this programme enjoyed among the respective populations. Taking the number
of deserters and POWs ready to enter the volunteer Czech, Romanian etc. legions
organised by the Entente, he concludes that a considerable, perhaps an overwhelming
part of the so-called "subject peoples" of the Monarchy welcomed the chance
for independence. I do not question that, but one must also add the influence
of war weariness, the possibility to escape from POW camps, and mainly the
wish to be on the winning rather than on the losing side and receiving generous
frontiers, which nobody had dreamed of. But, granted that caveat, one can
only agree with the author that
the decisions of the Great Powers would
not have taken the direction they did had the Austro-Hungarian Empire not
been multinational, or if the leaders of the nationalities had declared
in favour of preserving the Monarchy and Hungary, as the Czechs and the
Croatians had done in 1848-49 (p. 51.)
Important as the decisions made in the Allied capitals and
War Councils, later at the Paris Peace Conference, were the new borders were
settled basically on the spot by the French-led Serbian, Romanian and Czechoslovak
armies, which by the end of 1918 occupied almost all the territories demanded.
For Hungarians the debate that will never end is whether it would have been
possible to resist those armies and thus to prevent the occupation and subsequent
cession of territories where about 3,5 million ethnic Hungarians lived who
refused to become citizens of the newly created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
or of the greatly enlarged Romania. The answer hinges on how one assesses
the personality and policies of Count Mihály Károlyi, the pro-Entente new
leader of Hungary and his Radical and Social Democratic allies. Romsics describes
the illusions, the hesitations and the actual decisions of the revolutionary
government, also the anarchy caused by the soldiers infected with the promises
of the Bolsheviks, but refrains from coming to any judgement. Perhaps he deliberately
left that to Horace Rumbold, the British Minister [not Ambassador, as stated]
to Berne, who, speaking about a certain step of Károlyi, wrote that it "is
so naďve as to strengthen the impression that Count Károlyi is not really
fitted for the role he has assumed." (p. 60) Romsics gives a realistic picture
of the weakness of the Hungarian armed forces and the re-luctance of the population
to continue the war. He should have given reasons for the contrast between
the defeatist mood in Budapest and the aggressive optimism of the Czechs,
Southern Slavs and Romanians.
The reader can follow how the new borders
were drawn up: in principle during the discussions of the Supreme Council
(composed by the Heads of Delegations and the Foreign Ministers of the five
Great Powers), and in practice by the junior diplomats who made up the territorial
committees. The pattern was typical: the American experts proposed frontiers
as close to the ethnic lines as possible (where it was possible to draw such
a line), the British were wavering between a sense of fairness and the drive
to punish the vanquished and reward the smaller allies, the Italians generally
inconsistent except where their "sacro egoismo" was involved, while the French
gave all possible support to the often extravagant claims of the emerging
successor states. The most important argument for the latter was military
and economic strategy, particularly the existence of railway lines in the
most disputed areas. Eventually that decided the fate of close to two million
Hungarians, who were separated from the compact bloc of Hungarians, despite
their protests against the denial of the principle of self-determination.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the most outrageous claims, like
the creation of a "Corridor" in Western Hungary between Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia, the incorporation of the Börzsöny, Mátra and Bükk hills into Czechoslovakia,
or the cession of Baja and Pécs to Yugoslavia, were turned down by the Great
Powers, despite the many false figures presented to the Conference by the
Czech Kramar© and Benes© or by the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion[el] Bra×tianu.
Romsics reiterates the view held by most modern historians (as opposed to
the traditional belief in inter-war Hungary) that the proclamation of a Hungarian
Soviet Republic on March 21, 1919 and its subsequent policies did not influence
the territorial decisions of the Peace Conference. The evidence for that is
only circumstantial. In fact it looks quite probable that on a few debated
points, like the fate of the Csallóköz (the large Hungarian-inhabited island
of the Danube), that of the Baranya Triangle, the Muraköz, and the village
of Ligetfalu on the right bank of the Danube facing Pozsony/Bratislava, "the
danger of Bolshevism" and the conduct of the the Hungarian Bolshevik leadership
did influence the verdict taken against Hungary. The decision to accept the
Austrian claim to a strip of Western Hungary (eventually known as the Burgenland)
had undoubtedly much to do with Bolshevism having
captured Hungary. (The Austrians supported their claim, made on ethnic grounds,
with the need to stop the spreading of Bolshevism.)
Foreign, particularly British, influence
on the fate of Hungary did not stop with the drawing up of the new borders.
Following the collapse of Béla Kun's Bolshevik regime, and during the weeks
of Romanian occupation, there were chaotic conditions in the country, unbridled
plunder by the Romanian army, self-proclaimed but powerless governments in
Budapest, and the Red Terror replaced by White terror in the countryside occupied
by the small "National" army led by Admiral Horthy. Sir George Clerk, a British
diplomat, played a major role in consolidating conditions and installing a
widely representative government. That opened the way to inviting a Hungarian
delegation to Paris to be presented with the terms of peace. In Budapest expectations
ran high, and the documentation prepared by a highly capable staff under the
future Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki was indeed impressive. In Paris, however,
few cared to study it and it did not influence the terms in any way. Despite
the eloquence of Count Apponyi, the Head of the Hungarian delegation that
arrived in Paris on 7 January, 1920, and the many notes, the terms presented
by the victors were as harsh as agreed almost a year earlier. The Hungarian
call for plebiscites on the territories to be detached was of no avail, and
for good reasons. In addition to the 3,5 million Hungarians, a good many non-Hungarians
(Germans, Slovaks, even some Romanians and Serbs) would have most likely voted
against being torn off from Hungary, severing traditional economic connections.
The only person who paid attention to the Hungarian arguments was Lloyd George,
the British Liberal Prime Minister. He spoke out against so many Hungarians
being detached from their country and proposed the revision of the borders
planned, but his subordinates foiled the only serious attempt to mitigate
the terms to be imposed upon Hungary. A few weeks later a new French team
at the Quai d'Orsay, headed by Maurice Paléologue, in combination with some
French business circles, played with the idea of revising the Hungarian borders
after the signing of treaty, provided Hungary were ready to join the client
states of France and were willing to give France a paramount influence over
the Hungarian economy. Nothing came out of this scheme, so Hungary had no
alternative but signing the treaty, probably the most unfair one in modern
history, on 4 June at the Grand Trianon Palace at Versailles.
The Hungarians had their last hope in providing military help to the Polish
Army fighting the Red Army near Warsaw, and, in exchange, to receive back
some Hungarian-inhabited areas from Romania. Britain and France, however,
turned the offer down on July 27–28. The formation of an alliance between
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania, known as the Little Entente, made
any Hungarian plan for border change practically hopeless, at least as long
as there was no Great Power to support the revision of the territorial clauses
of the Treaty. Hungary had no alternative but to ratify the Treaty in November,
1920. Soon the victors also ratified it. The fact that it was only passed
after extensive debates in the British Parliament, against a large number
of votes in both Houses, and that in France 74 members also voted "no" (against
478 "yes") is telling. It shows that many European politicians thought that
the treatment of Hungary was clearly unjust and did not serve the cause of
peace. Nevertheless, when the commissions charg-ed with the delineation of
the actual border on the spot recommended minor rectifications in favour of
Hungary, the Conference of Ambassadors and the League of Nations turned most
of them down. The only alteration in favour of Hungary, awarding the town
of Sopron and its vicinity to Hungary, after a plebiscite held on 13 December
1921, was due to the military action of Hungarian irregulars, whose resistance
induced the Allies to opt for the compromise of asking the people for their
preference.
For those who do not have the time
to read even this short, concise book but nevertheless want to understand
why Central Europe is still full of ethnic tensions, the Epilogue (with telling
tables) and the maps provide ample explanation. All the national problems
of the old Habsburg Empire survived, in an aggravated form. The ill-treatment
of national minorities provided an inviting pretext for intervention to Hitler,
border change and war. Romsics ends the story here, more exactly with the
restoration of the Trianon borders in the 1947 Treaty of Paris. But there
is a sad follow-up, which shows that the legacy of the 1920 treaty continues
to poison the political air in the successor states of historic Hungary.
Despite or because of decades of mistreatment, the Hungarians torn from Hungary
(and their descendants) have never ceased to regard themselves as part of
the Hungarian nation. The imposition of Communism following the Second World
War worsened their lot considerably. Close to half a million were expelled
from Czechoslovakia and Romania to the rump state of Hungary. Those who were
allowed to remain in the land of their ancestors faced the expropriation of
their properties and the banning of their schools and associations. They suffered
under double oppression: while everyone suffered under the iron hand of dictatorship,
anti-minority policies and practices added to the plight of the Hungarians,
who could not even protest as all political expression was stifled. Improvements
have been painfully slow even after the fall of the Communist regimes. For
example, only a fraction of the Hungarian communal or private assets has been
restored to the previous owners since 1989. Even today the Hungarians in the
seven neighbouring countries around Hungary feel that their very existence
is in jeopardy. The policy of uprooting, expelling, discriminating, and occasionally
outright killing, combined with "socialist industrialisation" and deliberate
colonisation (transfering a large number of non-Hungarians to territories
traditionally inhabited mainly by Hungarians and thus changing the ethnic
composition of the area), has considerably reduced the number and, to a larger
extent, the proportion of the Hungarian minorities in all the states neighbouring
Hungary. Since 1910 the number of ethnic Hungarians in the areas detached
from Hungary has declined from 3.3 million to 2.6 million. Their proportion
has drastically fallen from 30 to 11 percent of the population in Slovakia;
from 32 to 20 percent in Romanian Transylvania; from 28 to 16 percent in Vojvodina
(Serbia); and from 31 to 12 percent in Subcarpathia (Ukraine). The ethnic
composition of the cities has changed even more dramatically, as graphically
demonstrated by the case of the capital of Transylvania, Kolozsvár. In 1910,
82 per cent of the city's population was Hungarian and 14 per cent Romanian.
Today it is called Cluj-Napoca, where - due to the relocations and other methods
of deposed dictator Ceaus¸escu and the notorious present-day mayor Funar -
Hungarians comprise only 18 percent of the population.
These figures reveal a sophisticated form of ethnic cleansing. The aim, policies
and tendencies of intolerant majority elites inevitably generate constant
tension and conflict. There has been, however, an unforeseen but fortunate
result of the partition of the Hungarian nation into eight units. Hungarians
beyond the borders are strong adherents of the Euro-Atlantic orientation of
their countries and substantially contribute to the stability of their own
country and of the whole region. They have never resorted to violence; they
struggle for their civil rights, indeed for their survival, solely by political
means. They deserve recognition and support not only for moral but also for
practical reasons.
The problems arising out of the Trianon Treaty are not unique to Hungary.
The ill-treatment of national minorities is a world-wide phenomenon. The principles,
the model and the framework for solving the problem are at hand and easily
ac-complished given a little good will and considerable foresight. In the
western half of Europe, decentralisation, devolution,
local democracy and territorial autonomy are everyday practices. A report
drawn up by Andreas Gross, a Swiss parliamentarian, and passed by the Assembly
of the Council of Europe on July 24, 2003, points out that
most present-day conflicts no longer occur
between states but within states... Autonomy allows a group which is a minority
within a state to exercise its rights, while providing certain guarantees
of the state's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In the interests of stability and fairness the various European
institutions should urge every state, including Hungary's neighbours, to end
all forms of discrimination against their national minorities. If that does
not happen, there will be endless tension between the majority nation and
the national minority, and also with the kin state of the minority. It is
in the interest of all the states of Europe, and it is a special responsibility
of the powers that drew up the peace treaty signed in 1920 at Trianon, including
the United States, to ensure that the Hungarian minorities will at last be
able to breathe freely and feel they have a future in their native land, where
their forebears have lived for well over a millennium.
Notes
1 The Washington Times, June 4, 2000.
2 "There is not one of the peoples or provinces that
constituted the Empire of the Habsburgs to whom gaining their independence
has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians had reserved
for the dammed." Sir Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (London,
1948), 14.
Géza Jeszenszky
is a historian specialising in Hungary's relations with the English-speaking
world. He was Foreign Minister between 1990-94 and Ambassador to the United
States, 1998-2002.
