Graham Avery

Hungary Enters the European Union

Thoughts from Brussels

What does membership of the European Union really mean for Hungary? How will this historic step affect its place in Europe? How can Hungarians make the best use of EU membership, towards which they have been striving for so many years? In earlier issues of The Hungarian Quarterly Endre Juhász (Autumn 2001) has described the situation at a crucial moment in the negotiations for membership, and Béla Kádár (Summer 2003) has analysed the reasons for Hungary's choice to apply for the EU. As a friend of Hungary, who has observed its progress from a European viewpoint in Brussels, I want to share some thoughts on the lessons of the past and the prospects for the future.
Many years ago I was a junior member of the team that negotiated Britain's membership of the European Union- or rather, the European Community, as it then was- and later I moved to Brussels in 1973 to work in the European Commission. I know what it is like to be on the outside trying to get in, and then on the inside trying to make a success of membership. More recently, I have had the privilege to be involved in Brussels in successive stages of the enlargement of the EU.
Probably my reflections are coloured by my British background, as well as my European experience. Hungary's approach to Europe is not the same as that of the United Kingdom: its geographical position and its historical experience give it a different perspective. It is true that, historically, Hungarians have often looked to Britain as a political model, but Britain's relationship with the EU has been a difficult one, and in this case I think it is more a question of Hungarians learning from our mistakes than of emulating us.
Moreover my own perceptions are not typically British, since I have been an expatriate for a long time. One of the problems for us British abroad is that in other languages we are generally described as English- anglais in French, Engländer in German, inglese in Italian and angol in Hungarian. Having been born in Cardiff of a Welsh mother, I sometimes have to explain that my nationality is Welsh, my passport is British, and my citizenship is European- and that these three identities are not conflictual, but complementary. At any rate, I probably have a less insular view of Europe than many of my compatriots.

Hungary's path to the EU

Let me begin with some reflections on progress up to now. Why has it taken so long for Hungary and other countries of Central Europe to join the EU? Between the date of Hungary's application and the date of membership, ten years have elapsed, and that is an underestimate since the aim to join the EU was clear from 1989 onwards. The EU's initial hesitations, its exacting criteria for preparation, and its refusal to give a clear date for membership until the final stage, were a source of irritation. How was it that Hungary could join NATO in 1999, but needed to wait another five years to join the EU?
One of the jokes we had in Brussels- we didn't have many jokes in the negotiations for enlarging the EU, and this one came from Budapest- was that the Hungarians, with their talent for mathematics, always knew exactly when they would join the EU. They would become members in five year's time. Every year it was the same story: membership in five years' time...
Although I understood the frustration felt in Hungary and the other applicant countries, I always believed that the optimal outcome was a well-prepared one rather than a rapid one. Joining the EU is a complicated affair, much more difficult than joining NATO. The common rules and policies of the EU are demanding and sophisticated, and if they are not properly applied the result is likely to be disappointment for old and new members alike. That was the lesson of Greece, which joined the EU without an adequate period of preparation, and then for many years lagged behind the other members politically and economically.
So in my view the long time spent in preparation for joining the EU has been necessary and well-invested. It has equipped Hungary better for membership. Here I want to pay tribute to the way in which Hungarian politicians, negotiators and administrators handled this period of preparation. It was not amusing for Budapest to receive regular reports from Brussels, often critical of Hungarian progress, particularly when existing EU members were not subject to the same rigorous examination. But the injunctions were mostly accepted and used (as they were intended) to encourage necessary domestic changes and reforms. In many ways, the EU's expansion in 2004 is its best-prepared enlargement, and Hungary is certainly among the best-prepared of the new members.

The prize: a voice in Europe

Up to now, the messages coming from Brussels have been mainly about the obligations of membership: the need to apply the so-called acquis of the EU, the rules and policies applicable to its members which are laid down in 80,000 pages of legislation. The negotiations of 1998-2002 were essentially about how and when to apply these rules in Hungary, not about changing them. That was the principle inherited from preceding negotiations for membership: if you want join the club, you have to accept its rules.
But membership of the EU brings rights as well as obligations, and the most important right which a country gains by joining is a voice in the decision-making process, with votes and seats in the European institutions, on an equal basis with other members. The biggest prize of membership is not access to the EU market and subsidies from Brussels, but a seat, a microphone, and a vote in the meetings where important decisions are taken.
Hungary will be represented in all the EU institutions: by Ministers from its government in the Council of Ministers, which takes the main political decisions, by elected representatives in the European Parliament which has powers of co-decision, and by a Hungarian member in the European Commission which proposes and executes policies (however, the Commissioner is not there to speak for Hungary, but to serve the European interest).
Already Hungarians are present in Brussels as observers, and in Strasbourg when the European Parliament meets there. Hungarian is regularly heard in the streets, shops and restaurants. At a recent meeting I saw the representative of Magyarország, placed between Luxembourg and Malta as the alphabetical order of EU protocol requires. From 1 May onwards, this observer status is replaced by full rights of membership.
This new situation has important political implications. After being a 'policy-taker' during the years of preparation for membership, Hungary inside the EU becomes a 'policy-maker', able to influence its future development. Having a voice and a vote in decisions means making a choice of how to use them, and that in turn should be based on a domestic debate on how European policies should develop. That debate already began with the referendum in 2003, and has continued with the Convention on the Future of Europe, in which Hungarian representatives played a full part, leading to the draft Constitutional Treaty which is now on the table in 2004.
But the Constitutional Treaty is mainly about organising our institutions (how Europeans are to work together) not about the development of our policies (what Europeans want to do in common). The debate on those policies, and the definition of Hungary's long-term interests as a member of the EU, needs to get under way. For that debate to be well-informed, Hungary needs to mobilise not only the political circles (government, political parties, administration) but also the non-governmental organisations (social and economic interest groups, research institutes, 'think-tanks', and so on) and the public at large. As a non-member, Hungary was essentially in a 'reactive' mode, but now it needs to become 'pro-active' in European affairs. That requires an important political and psychological adjustment.
Another aspect of the EU which is not fully appreciated is that most of the decisions taken in Brussels are not matters of foreign policy, but touch directly on domestic national policies. Although Foreign Ministers have a role in preparing big decisions of the European Council- the 'summits' of Prime Ministers which take place three or four times a year- most EU decisions in fields such as economics and finance, agriculture, transport, energy, justice and home affairs are taken by national Ministers responsible for those fields, meeting in specialised Councils. Foreign correspondents of the Hungarian media based in Brussels - press, radio, television- are not reporting foreign affairs, but national issues.
Within government, because so many domestic issues are involved, the coordination of European affairs in member countries is often made by the Prime Minister's department, although Foreign Ministries have a role in defining strategy. The fact that, with membership, EU business becomes less 'external' and more 'internal' reinforces the argument for a wide-ranging debate in Hungary about European affairs- a debate not limited to diplomats or 'Euro-specialists' but engaging many interested in public affairs and social and economic policies.

Upcoming issues in Europe

The key issues that are likely to come up in the early years of Hungary's membership of the EU include many that merit in-depth study by Hungarian policy-makers and analysts.
To begin with, a European debate is beginning on the common budget for the period from 2007 onwards: how much should the EU spend- should its budget stay at the present modest level, or be expanded to take account of enlarged membership, or even be reduced. How should the budget be allocated between the different areas of policy? If agriculture retains a large share, what priority should be given to other policies?
In the field of economics, the management of the euro, and the path of new members such as Hungary towards adopting it, will be another priority question. The EU also has to fulfil its self-declared aim of making itself 'the world's most competitive knowledge-based economy by the year 2010' by means of the so-called 'Lisbon agenda'. Above all, the EU has to ensure that its financial and economic policies help members to achieve high rates of employment and sustainable growth, with a continued catching-up by the economies of the Central European members. At present, the 10 new members enjoy rates of growth on average about 1 per cent higher than the 15 old members,. We need to maintain such a differential to promote economic convergence within the EU. If we fail to do that, and wide gaps of social and economic development persist between members, the political cohesion of the EU itself could be compromised.
One of the fields in which EU activity is rapidly increasing is the protection of citizens' security: that is, cooperation between police and justice throughout Europe to fight organised crime, trafficking in drugs and humans, terrorism, and so on- threats which can be tackled only by international cooperation. Since Hungary has frontiers with non-EU states, it is in the front line of these developments, and has increased its efforts of cooperation. In return, it expects to join the EU's 'Schengen' area which allows free movement of persons within the EU without internal frontier controls.
After the arrival of 10 new members, future extensions of the EU are in prospect, with negotiations well advanced with Bulgaria and Romania, and a decision due in 2004 on negotiations with Turkey. The 5 countries of the 'Western Balkans'- Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania- all expect to join, while Ukraine and other East European countries also aspire to membership. The development of the EU's policy towards these countries in its neighbourhood, including its biggest neighbour, Russia, will be of vital interest for Hungary, and we expect an important contribution to discussion from Hungarians with their experience and ideas.
Last but not least, the EU has to develop a common foreign policy, and its mechanisms for external security and defence. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was accompanied by a deep split between EU members concerning relations with the USA, which must not be repeated if Europe is to make its voice effectively heard in the world.

Hungary's influence as a member

In the accession negotiations and preparation for membership, Hungary acquired a reputation in the EU as an efficient, reliable partner, able to make judgments and take positions quickly and realistically, without unnecessary problems and complications. That is not to say that Hungarian negotiators were weak or ineffective: on the contrary, they stated clearly what they wanted, and were determined to obtain it. Many commentators considered that Hungarians were- or at least, tried to be- the 'the best pupils in the class'.
That is an enviable reputation on which to build as a member. But Hungary as a country of 10 million, in an enlarged EU of 25 members with a population of 450 million, has to work hard to make its influence felt. Compared with Germany, the biggest member of the EU with around 80 million, or Italy, France and Britain with around 60 million, or even Spain and Poland with around 40 million, it is not in the 'big league'.
But nevertheless its representation in the Council of Ministers (in terms of votes) and in the European Parliament (in terms of seats) is proportionally greater than its population. For example, although Britain's population is 6 times larger, Hungary has 12 votes in the Council compared with Britain's 29, and 24 seats in the Parliament compared with Britain's 78. This bias in favour of smaller countries is a key feature of the 'Community' system, and is designed to reassure the smaller countries that their interests will not be overridden by their big neighbours, as happened too often in the past.
Paradoxically the method of 'intergovernmentalism', also present in the EU's decision-making system, is less advantageous for small countries, despite the fact that it is based on the principle of equality between states. In reality, the 'big boys' tend to dominate the intergovernmental game, not only because of their size and resources, but because the European Parliament and the European Commission are largely excluded from negotiations between states acting in the intergovernmental mode. Consequently Hungary, like the majority of the new members, will normally have an interest in pursuing the Community method.
To make its voice and votes effective in Europe, Hungary will often need to make alliances of interest with other members- not always with the same countries- depending on the interests and issues at stake. To act successfully in this way requires a good knowledge of European policies, and of the ideas and interests of the other members. In some cases, the dividing lines between members follow the traditional politics of right and left, depending on the parties in government, but in many other cases they relate to factors such as the level of economic development, the structure of the economy, and so on. Sometimes Hungary will need to find compromises to allow solutions acceptable to the majority, and at other times it will want to defend its interests stubbornly.
Personally I believe that Hungary can have a considerable influence in the EU, and we in the Brussels institutions expect much from it and the other new members. Ideas are the most powerful instrument at Europe's disposal, and we can hope for new ideas from Hungarians for several reasons. Since they come new to our policies, they should have a fresh approach to European questions. For many years they have been making social and economic reforms, in some areas more rapidly and courageously than the old members. For a decade we have been urging them to fulfil criteria for membership which we did not apply to ourselves, so now it is time for us to stop preaching and start listening!
One of the questions often posed in Brussels, and among the existing members of the EU, is whether the 2004 enlargement will lead to a weakening of the EU, a slowdown of its integration, and even its dissolution into a free trade area. This fear that 'widening' may be made at the cost of 'deepening' has accompanied every enlargement of the EU, but it is greater this time because of the number of countries involved. Having expanded progressively in the last 25 years from 6 to 15 members, taking in at most 3 at a time, the EU is now taking in 10. Since many of the new countries have only recently gained or regained their independence, they will not be enthusiastic to give up part of their sovereignty in the EU.
I do not share this scepticism. Experience has shown that each successive enlargement of the EU has been followed by steps forward, and that widening has driven deepening. For example, the development of a 'cohesion' policy in favour of poorer EU countries was the result of Spain and Portugal arriving in 1986, and joining forces with Greece and Ireland. In addition, I believe that the new countries now joining us want Europe to be more, not less, cohesive. When I listen to Hungarians and others talking of their ideas and aims, I do not sense a demand for 'less Europe' but often for more. For example, the new members plan to take over the European currency as soon as possible- unlike the British, who are still hesitating. I tell my British friends these days that if they do not make up their minds soon about the euro, they will be overtaken by the Hungarians. I observe that while new members seem to have the political will for integration, but often lack the economic means, some of the old members have the economic means, but still lack the political will...
For Hungary, like Britain, the early years of membership will be a period of learning and familiarisation. An important part of the process will be to learn the ways of European discourse: having decided what it wants in different areas of policy, Hungary will need to persuade its partners that it is in the European interest. I use the word 'persuade' because that is what is needed. It will not be sufficient to argue for a certain course of action in Brussels on the grounds that it is good for Hungary. The others do not expect you to support things that are against your national interest, and they are not really interested in your national arguments. In fact, the language of nationalism is the least effective in EU affairs. What you need to do is to convince the others that what you are advocating is good for Europe, not just for Hungary, and that requires a good understanding of the aims and mechanisms of European policies.

A historical perspective

From Brussels I sometimes go with my sons to pay our respects to my uncle Archie Lloyd, whose grave is in a military cemetery near Le Treport on the Northern coast of France. A soldier in the British army aged 22, he died on the day before the 1914–18 war ended. He was the oldest child of a family of ten, of which my mother was the youngest, and she could recall him leaving home to go to the war from which he did not return. My visits serve as a reminder to me that for earlier generations of Europeans, war was a 'normal' experience, but that in the second half of the twentieth century we succeeded in organising Europe in such a way as to avoid it. I like to think that Archie would be pleased to know that his baby sister's youngest son works for an organisation that has helped to make war in this part of Europe impossible!
My family link to the conflicts of the last century is only one of many millions of examples. For Hungarians, there are similar family stories, though the context is different. For the British, the individual experience of war was just as terrible as for others, but collectively it was perhaps less traumatic than for the continentals, since the British never suffered occupation and defeat, or deportation and mass killing. Britain's history, and its island situation, spared it many of the horrors which Hungarians and others suffered. I believe that this helps to explain why the British sometimes find it difficult to understand why other countries are willing to make such efforts for European integration.
But the political agenda in the EU has moved on. War between European states now seems so unlikely that we do not even consider it as a risk- though the conflicts in ex-Jugoslavia have reminded us that ethnic tensions can still lead to killings on European soil. Even in the wider world, the main security risks now seem to come not so much from states as from non-state actors such as terrorists. So if the EU succeeded in the last century in its mission to pacify Europe, its mission in this century must surely be to reunite the continent: after pacification, unification. It is in that perspective of reuniting Europe's divided peoples that Hungary's membership takes place.
When I was the European Commission's negotiator with Austria in its talks for membership in 1993–94, I developed an interest and sympathy for Hungary's progress towards the same goal. The Austrians have been advocates in the EU for Hungary, and I recall how their Foreign Minister Alois Mock, in an emotional speech at the end of the final negotiations in 1994, spoke of the realisation of his dream that Austria would join the EU, and would be followed by its neighbours. After all, it was the opening of Hungary's frontier with Austria that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist system, and the possibility for Central and Eastern Europe to be reunited with the West.
My Hungarian friends have spoken to me of their dream, in the years when the country was separated from the West, that one day it would return to European values, rights and liberties, and that their children would enjoy the same life-chances as other Europeans of their generation.
That dream has become a reality. Making a success of the dream will now depend mainly on Hungarians. The country has suffered many reverses in Europe in past centuries: while outsiders perceive its courage and resolution in the face of adversity, for Hungarians it sometimes seems an unremitting history of misfortunes, accidental or self-inflicted. Membership of the European Union now opens a new chapter, in which Hungarians can say farewell to their troubled past and share in constructing the future.
In his book The Russian Empire and its Rivals, Dominic Lieven in 2000 posed the challenge for Europe in this way: 'the problem is to reconcile our tradition of national sovereignty and democratic self-government with our attempt to create a system of continental scale, so as to achieve goals which go beyond the power of the nation state. The basic dilemma for the EU is to reconcile the expansion required for its economic efficiency, its security, and its external power with a sense of solidarity and legitimacy among its multinational citizens'. We look to Hungarians to help to find the answers.

Graham Avery
who is Chief Adviser in the European Commission in Brussels, writes here in his personal capacity.