A Slap in the Face of Europe

Paul Lendvai on the EU elections - An Interview with Eszter Rádai

 

Today's European Union is going to be more difficult to govern than yesterday's, claims the Hungarian-born political commentator Paul Lendvai, editor-in-chief of the Vienna-based review Europäische Rundschau and author of The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat. Lendvai, a well-known expert in East Central European politics, believes that the surprisingly low turnout in the European elections has, in a way, discredited the European Union and the idea of Europe. This is, Lendvai suggests, likely to increase political tensions within the EU. From now on it will be more difficult to reach consensus in issues of economic policy. There is reason to fear that tough decisions which leaders have been putting off until now will continue being put off indefinitely or they will end up being "watered down."

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Eszter Rádai: How do you view these election results? Typical negative mid-term results for governing parties or something else? A response to how the electorate feels their own country is weighted in the European Parlament and in EU decision-making, to the perceived benefits from membership? A response to the Union itself and its decisions-including the decision to allow the countries of Eastern Europe to join?

Paul Lendvai: The election was basically negative. Voters were not responding to the achievements, shortcomings, the plans of the European Parliament, the European Council or Commission, or the European Union. In almost every country, including Hungary, voters took the opportunity to deliver a slap in the face to their own government and governing party-not to conservatives or socialists as such, but to whichever party happened to be in government.

Is this especially new in elections for the European Parliament?

Not new, but never so pronounced before in Western Europe, never expressed so strongly and never has the turnout been this low. And even more striking, and this shocked Western Europe countries as well, was the low voter turnout in the new member countries: it had always seemed as though there was nothing that these countries wanted more than to join the Union, to "return to Europe".

So why were voters indifferent and why didn't the parties campaigning address common European issues?

A great expert in matters European named Friedrich Nietzsche said that finding advocates of the truth is hardest not when the truth is dangerous, but when it is boring.

The concept of a unified Europe and the EU are boring?

Well, they have become boring to some extent, for different reasons in the West and the East. In the West, because they have been living in the Union for so long, and in the East because they only know the clichés about Europe. But maybe there is a positive side too: if the election had taken place at a later stage, the new member countries would have been even more disenchanted. Right now they still expect to gain a number of direct benefits through the Union. And, obviously, there are going to be plenty of benefits, not in the short run but in the intermediate and long term.

Everyone in Hungary complains that they don't know what EU membership will mean for them, that's why they feel frustrated. Yet whenever any TV or radio programme tries to provide in-depth information, its audience ratings plummet.

I would blame politics. Even though the Hungarian political system has proved to be much more stable than in other post-communist countries, there has still been many problems in recent years. Political rhetoric has become more European, but on a deeper level the discourse is considerably more provincial than it used to be. Hungarian domestic politics and parties have a kind of navel-gazing preoccupation, and that sometimes gets exported to Europe. By the way, viewed from Europe, Hungary's image is a good deal more positive than from within the country.

Hungary showed a more positive face in the European elections than most of its neighbours. Its thirty-eight per cent turnout was better than the EU average, and extremist, anti-EU parties failed to garner significant support.

Sure, but the context has to be taken into account. Compared with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania or Bulgaria, the problems confronting Hungary seem less dramatic. In other respects, however, the situation is just as troubling. Transparency International has now downgraded Hungary from thirty-third to fortieth place in its ranking of countries on their lack of corruption. Finland occupied the first place, its economic performance and growth was strongest according to the World Economic Forum in Geneva. This shows the close connection between the absence of or low level of corruption and the high performance of an economy. The other major problem Hungary now faces is the diminishing dynamism of foreign investment. Now these problems do not manifest themselves in a dramatic manner, but they are quite serious. There is another side of the coin, however: the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, a very reliable and well-informed newspaper, reported that Hungarian economic indicators have improved and that the International Monetary Fund has a more positive assessment of the state of the Hungarian economy than the Hungarian National Bank, which paints a downright pessimistic picture. Now, as for the positive tendencies in the European elections, they testify to the maturity of Hungarian politics and the patience of Hungarians: compared to the Polish, Czech, Estonian, Latvian or Slovakian situation, this is clearly something we should welcome. Not in terms of what Hungary could have achieved, but what it is capable of.

To return to the European elections. What was at stake for Hungarian voters?
Are Hungarian interests within the EU a function of the party affiliations of the twenty-four Hungarian MEPs?

Although the European Parliament's role is becoming more important, its potentials are limited, since the composition of the Parliament calls for constant compromise. Even though the conservatives had the plurality in the last elections, through an alliance with the liberals the socialists managed to have their way and thus Romano Prodi became President of the European Commission. Things will continue to be done this way in the future.

An institution whose authority is limited and which is still struggling to define its own identity.

Yes, that is the case in a certain sense, for decisions are made-following approval by the European Parliament-by the European Council, whose members are deputed by the national governments, the prime ministers of the twenty-five countries. Still, I would say that the stakes were high and a great deal was lost. This strikingly low turnout has in a certain sense discredited the idea of Europe, the spirit of Europe, the EU, and the very process of Europeanization. It was a slap in the face not just for the national governments but for Europe as well. The EU has the third largest population in the world and accounts for twenty-five per cent of global GP. But after this round of elections, how can we expect the US, China and India to view the decisions reached by European heads of government as the decisions of a global player? Out of indifference or antipathy, the majority of its citizens chose to ignore the European Union, whose leaders purport to represent the people and countries of Europe. This presents an enormous problem, because it gives a huge boost to populists and demagogues. It will give rise to tremendous difficulties in Hungary, and even more so in Poland, where one out of four or five earn their livelihood in agriculture. For a while yet their situation will keep getting worse and there are irresponsible political forces that will seek to exploit the frustration felt by these people. Just look at Germany: the Schröder government is going to be ousted-it lost the European Parliament elections-because the economic performance of the old East Germany is still less than seventy per cent of the EU average and this is despite the 1300 billion euros in subsidies lashed out over twelve years. These East German regions (Länder) are now expected to lose a great deal, which makes voters in those states very angry. If you take all this into account, you may get an idea of what we should expect in the new member countries, where the heroes of the transition era are gone, and people are now facing everyday reality. Everyday reality is devoid of revolutionary pathos; it's all about calculation, and whoever doesn't calculate carefully, loses the game. But the outcome of the election is also likely to make conflicts within the EU sharper: it will be harder to reach agreement on questions of economic policy and the fear is that the tough measures leaders have been putting off until now will continue to be put off or end up being passed in a "watered-down" form. It is now going to be much more difficult to find the appropriate form for the European constitution. When work on the constitution started under Giscard d'Estaing, The Economist suggested in a leader that the draft be discarded right away. At that time, I thought that this approach was too cynical, now I think that there was a fair amount of truth to it. It is extremely important that political consensus is reached, that the leaders know what they want, how far they can go, what kinds of concessions and exceptions they can make, and how much difficulty voters can put up with. Democracy is an experiment fraught with risk, but I still have to agree with Churchill's comment that it's a terrible system but nothing better has been found so far. This is true for every country in the EU: a fascinating experiment is underway, which, as this election has shown, continues to surprise us and which is not without its dangers.

Is there any chance that this slap in the face might prompt the government here to end procrastination and take up some long-overdue reforms? The Hungarian Socialist Party lost one and a half million of its votes; arguably, it could not have lost more even if it had relentlessly imposed the required measures.

Look, it's easy for me to talk. I am neither the circus animal-tamer nor the animal jumping through hoops-I'm just a spectator. But since you ask, let me remind you that 2006 is still pretty far off. Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, once said that a week is a long time in politics. So, two years after the Medgyessy government raised the salaries of public servants by fifty per cent, no one remembers, even though the extra money has been pocketed. But it's no use complaining of the ingratitude of people because they cannot be sacked, it would be wiser to admit that the raise cost the country too much. One might ask, what about the Opposition, which has astutely and ruthlessly taken advantage of the situation? Of course it has. By the way, Hungary has a strange kind of bipolar system: the governing coalition consists of the small liberal party (SZDSZ, Alliance of Free Democrats) and a civic party (MSZP, the Hungarian Socialist Party) within which a wide range of left-wing, liberal, middle-class, pro-reform, and hard-line tendencies and individuals co-exist and contend with one another, without in any way concealing their conflicts (quite the opposite, in fact). In contrast to the Socialists, the main opposition party is a highly disciplined organization. Victor Orbán, its leader is endowed with an authority that cannot be questioned. There are no debates within the party, its public relations are handled very efficiently. It is much easier to get by for a party such as this, especially when it is in opposition, than for the continually bickering governing coalition. Especially on crucial issues, no party can afford to speak with multiple voices. At some point arguments must be set aside. In Britain, for instance, Gordon Brown would never take up publicly a position against his Prime Minister Tony Blair. He might decide to do so at some future point, but only when it is clear that Blair must go. In the meantime, however, the leadership of the party remains loyal to Blair even amidst the greatest difficulties. We find the same situation in Germany, with Schröder and the SPD. So the Socialist Party in Hungary must first present a clear profile, and then the government coalition must do the same in order to get started with reforms, and not just on a rhetorical level. Clearly, no government can afford a full implementation of the ruthless austerity package proposed by Lajos Bokros, the ex-minister of finance; all the same, the government will have to espouse at least some of these urgently needed measures. Even more importantly, political leaders on both sides must be "clean" and seen to be so. For sooner or later everything comes to light. If someone's hands are not clean, if someone is doing exactly the same things as those whom he criticizes (and less smartly to boot) then he will lose not just his credibility but also the backing of his own supporters. The expectations are not good for a governing party that keeps putting off unpopular measures, while its members abuse their position in order to advance their own private interests and, while they are at it, engage in power struggles and back-stabbing. I also want to draw attention to another mistake vitiating both sides: just as Viktor Orbán was ill-advised to try to incorporate the MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) into FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party), it has been a frequent mistake on the part of the MSZP to ignore SZDSZ, without which it wouldn't have a parliamentary majority. Perhaps if the Socialist Prime Minister Gyula Horn had been more willing to heed his coalition partner between 1994 and 1998, the first socialist-liberal coalition might not have lost the 1998 elections.

The tiny opposition party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, managed to pick up one seat that might have gone to FIDESZ, whose leaders are talking about a land-slide victory, with over four hundred thousand votes more than the Socialist Party's. To what extent do you think Viktor Orbán will stick to the strategy his party has followed up to now?

Following the FIDESZ defeat in the 2002 general election, Orbán disappeared from day to day politics. He is occasionally to be seen on various forums, for instance, I heard him speak in Vienna. He is a professional politician, who has understood that a double strategy-keeping a low profile while others argue-can be effective. Something similar can be observed with respect to the line followed by FIDESZ: plenty of voters are attracted by the declaration of conservative, Christian, national, and at the same time, to a certain extent, European values, as well as by rhetorical expressions of solidarity for the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. In this regard, FIDESZ can congratulate themselves and keep on this track.

FIDESZ organised a "national petition" demanding parliamentary discussion on changes in the budget and certain legislation packages.

I have never heard of an opposition party attempting such a thing anywhere else. I have no idea how many people signed this petition but I saw a great number of people collecting signatures and it seems that the approach has worked. And this shows that there are political factors in present-day Hungary that the other side and the intellectual elite of Hungary has underestimated, ignored or only partly understood, and so they did not know how to counter them.

What do you think about the performance and relative success of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which were the two major parties of the transition era? Will the Free Democrats be the party that can, at some future point, tip the scale by entering into alliance with either of the two major parties?

I believe the success of both parties is a positive sign, since it would be unfortunate if voters in Hungary had only two parties to choose between. There needs to be a liberal, reformist party in Hungary; and there needs to be a conservative, center-right party in the Western European style, similar to the CDU or the CSU in Germany or the ÖVP in Austria, which is not willing to advocate or put up with everything just for the sake of attracting voters. As far as the quality of political discourse is concerned, I think it is a positive development that none of the extremist parties got a seat in the European Parliament and that the chances of the Alliance of Free Democrats have improved. This means, or so I hope at least, that there will be less hatred and more intelligence, more patience and openness in political debate, a diminution of the kind of seething anger one so often encounters when reading Hungarian papers. But for someone looking at the situation from the outside, the decisive factor remains the performance of FIDESZ.

Going back to the make-up of the European Parliament, has anything changed now that the European People's Party won 269 seats, the Socialist Party 199, the liberals 64, with 100 eurosceptic and anti-Union MEPs, quite a few of them from the far right?

The proportion of conservative and socialist representatives has barely changed. But lets not forget that the European Parliament has populists not only on the right but also on the left. In the Czech Republic, the only country in the region which was a democracy during the interwar period, the Communist Party got eighteen per cent of the votes, while the social democrats only achieved eleven. Similarly, in Germany, the PDS party, appealing to those nostalgic for the GDR, achieved amazing results in Thuringia and other East German Länder. In other words, there is danger lurking not only on the right but also on the left, with the ghosts of the communist era haunting the region. Eurosceptic populists achieved unexpected results in Austria, Holland and Sweden. The greatest danger is that these extremist groups, whether on the left or on the right, will be able to hinder constructive political work. There are, of course, positive signs as well, such as the losses suffered by Le Pen in France and by Haider's Freedom Party in Austria. In sum, the EU today is just as diverse and multicultural as Europe itself: in some countries the conservatives have the upper hand, in others the socialists or the liberals, and the European elections have reflected this diversity-they have reflected the stupidity, the successes and the failures. In any event, today's European Union is going to be harder to govern than yesterday's. But for most if not all people, their own country comes first, which is why, for instance, Romano Prodi is returning to Italian politics.

Could the EU have reached the point where centrifugal forces begin to outweigh the centripetal ones? Could it be that Hungary has gained admission to an elite club which is no longer what Hungarians were so eager to join?

One of the possibilities for the EU was development towards a supranational body with a common military force, a common foreign policy and a common currency. The monetary part has been accepted by everyone but the British, the Swedes and the Danes. But thus far nothing has come true of the other dreams. The other possibility was the transformation of the EU into a "hallowed" free trade zone. Already today, the EU means more than that, much more in fact. Thus the question now is whether this process can be continued or will any further experimentation with additional transnational elements simply strengthen centrifugal forces. Although we must choose between these, the EU has already weathered a number of crises. Its future depends mainly on whether the economic situation improves. Speaking for myself, I do not think that the EU will become a transnational state. I think it is going to remain a loose-that is to say, only regionally strong-confederation of states in which individual states, and the national interests they purport, for better or worse, to represent, continue to enjoy primacy. That said, the story of the EU is still the greatest success story of the twentieth and (let's hope) of the twenty-first century.

 

Eszter Rádai
is on the staff of the Budapest weekly Élet és Irodalom. She has published several volumes of interviews.