There is, however, a question of approach
beyond the minor issues mentioned so
far that deserves a somewhat more detailed
discussion.
When first delineating his subject, the
author states that the nationalist struggle,
with Budapest as its "holy city", has had a
profound influence on the political culture
of modern Hungary. He believes that this
culture could historically have led to
liberalism, progress and receptivity as well
as to xenophobia, intolerance and exclusion
(p. 3). As we proceed in the book (and
thus in the history of the "Magyarisation" of
Buda-Pest), the ratio of these two historical
options slowly changes. The nationalist
movement greatly contributed to the selforganisation
of civil society and the
stratification of the polity, due to which
more and more formerly "invisible" social
groups became public actors, such as
women, workers and Jews (p. 12). Yet,
according to the author, "Nineteenthcentury
nationalism had a darker side
as well", and this darker side began to
dominate, resulting in chauvinism, coercion
and segregation, thus allowing
exclusion, intolerance and intimidation to
spread in Buda-Pest (pp. 12-13). The author
regards the "national activist" as the
principal hero of the age, who above all else
strove to implement the national programme
(the "Magyarisation" of the Twin
Towns) and endorsed liberal reforms-the
programme of economic, social and
political modernisation of the country-
only as a means to that end. He regards
the language programme-the insistence
upon the Hungarian language-as the
turning point: in his opinion this created
the first "foreigners" in the formerly
common "Hungarus" fatherland, and thus
necessarily gave rise to the forces of the
"darker side" (pp. 50-53). Nationalism
thus has a "Manichaean logic", it divides
the world into "us" and "them" (p. 45),
and-as the author concludes some pages
later-this distinction is the first step
towards exclusion. The author registers
this in the 1840s: according to him it is
from this time onwards that the young
national activists started to use a sharper
tone in the press and that xenophobia
appeared in the streets of Buda-Pest
(pp. 105-106).
Nemes' application of sociological
categories and assertions to national
sentiment as expressed in nineteenthcentury
Hungary is somewhat problematic.
These categories are often revealing, so that
their use is justified-yet sometimes they
suggest a value judgement the actors of
that period can hardly meet, as these
categories also include the experiences and
lessons of twentieth-century history. At
several points, for example, the author
discusses with clear sympathy the
emergence in the eighteenth century of the
possibility of the so-called 'Hungarus'
identity in Hungarian history-i.e. that
someone as a German, Croat or Slovakspeaking
subject could be loyal to the
Hungarian kingdom (e.g. pp. 73-74). This
(non-nationalist) patriotism, however, was
overcome by aspiration for a "pure"
national state, calling forth the aforementioned
"dark forces" which were
influenced by the language movement.
Nemes notes that the "national activists" at
home were aware of the fact "that Magyars
were less than half the population of the Hungarian kingdom" which "was taken as a
spur to decisive action, rather than as
evidence of the unsuitability of the nationstate
idea in Hungary" (p. 51).
The author ignores a basic dimension,
i.e., the socio-psychological character of
the national movement. He considers
nationalism to be mainly a political strategy,
and from a politological perspective
the assertion is understandable. Statistics
do convince a strategist that the relative
strength of forces is decisive for the
outcome of the struggle and ultimately
renders the national "efforts" futile. Whoever
fails to acknowledge this brings his
fellow men much pain and suffering. Such
language runs the risk of missing a basic
socio-psychological aspect of the national
movement. However, national identity is
by no means merely a rational political
strategy. It may be to some extent, yet it
is mainly a peculiar communal self-suggestion
with a pseudo-religious structure,
symbolism, rituals, group mechanisms etc.
Throughout the history of Hungarian
nationalism-but mostly in its early period
-the noble/aristocratic view of the
past, according to which the Hungarians
were the only state-founding nation
in the Carpathian basin, has been held
particularly strongly. Examination of
this religion-like frame of mind, full of
mythological moments, should provide
a counterpoint to quantitative studies
of populations of various ethnicities.
This surely sheds an unfavourable light
on Hungarian nationalism, especially
bearing in mind present attitudes to human
rights-yet it is a fact that renders the
author's critical perspective difficult to
apply. |
In sum, it is not helpful to construe a historical alternative that the people of a given time could not have been aware of.
There is another point as well. The
appearance of nationalist sentiment in
Hungarian history-emerging from the
medieval situation through more intense
contacts due to language, tradition and a
modern economy-is inseparable from the
position of Hungary in the Habsburg
Monarchy. Two hundred years later, a
historian looking back at the achievement
of Hungarian modernisation within the
Monarchy sees a story of success and may
be inclined to forget what an important role
the assertion of Hungarian interests had
played in this achievement. Thus, the
historian may easily disregard the facts
showing to what extent Vienna's economic
policies impeded the achievement of civil
society in certain Hungarian regions in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Nemes helpfully notes this several times
(p. 60, p. 65, p. 75), yet somehow fails to
establish a causal relation to the virulence
of nationalism. Unfortunately, historians
outside Hungary writing on the Habsburg
monarchy pay little attention to the
question. Viewing the region as a whole
from the perspective of the twenty-first
century, the situation of Hungary at the
time does in fact seem to be so idyllic and
sheltered that some scholars easily
condemn all opposition to Vienna as
nationalist turbulence.
Such was not the case. One example:
András Gergely's study1 on the Fiume
question shows that in the first half of the
nineteenth century the Hungarian liberal
opposition had a complex economic programme
asserting Hungarian interests.
Gergely argues that they sought compromises
in customs and trade policy with
the Viennese court to diminish or even
overcome the disadvantages of the Hungarian
economy. The author believes
that the actions of the Protection Association (Védegylet), for example,
emerged out of xenophobic rhetoric (p. 187)
-yet support for the Association came
mainly as a reaction to exploitation through
customs tariffs by the Habsburg economic
administration. Also in the air was a
political fear of Austrian absolutist aspirations
inspired not only by a long historical
memory, but by Josephinism, when feudal
constitutionalism was, in Nemes' words,
"suspended", as well as by the lingering
resentment produced by Metternich's
repressive policy in the second half of the
1830s. The Hungarian national movement
may have been responsible for the appearance
of the "dark forces" in the streets
of Buda-Pest; however, by opposing policies
intended to preserve the disadvantageous
position of Hungary within the
Monarchy, it was also inseparably intertwined
with the ideas and aspirations that
were fostering the emergence of communal
self-governance.
This also holds true of the Magyar
language movement. As far as facts are
concerned Nemes gives a thorough account
of Ferenc Kazinczy's language reform
movement and work, and he notes some of
its positive aspects such as the creation of a
terminology for the sciences. He does not,
however, stress that the movement also
worked to create a defence against the
absolutist aspirations of the Monarchy, as
well as aiding the struggle for selfgovernance.
As reflected by the words of
Ferenc Kölcsey, the poet who wrote the
national anthem Himnusz: "fatherland and
progress" (haza és haladás); the national
movement and the issue of the socialeconomic
reforms were inseparable and
present in every thought and action.
The author's final evaluation is sufficiently
differentiated in its approach. Right
from the beginning Hungarian nationalism
was associated not only with the worst
political tendencies of the century, i.e. the
language policy and the preservation of the
power of the nobility, but also with the best,
with cultural innovation and liberal reforms
(p. 186). Yet in the larger part of his book he
is inclined to simplify what were complex
conflicts and to consider language nationalism
as the "greatest evil" among all the
conflicts of an emerging civil society.
By the end of the nineteenth century the
burghers of Budapest declared in every
aspect of their life-as if by a daily referendum
-that they were Hungarians. The
author discerns the essence of their situation
claiming that it would have been extremely
difficult for them to do otherwise. And that is
absolutely true. Would a Cherokee Indian
have been better off if he had not started
down the Trail of Tears? Or a Sicilian, if he
had wanted to reject that Piedmontisation,
which was inseparable from the Unification
of Italy?
Rhetorical questions or not, Robert
Nemes's book offers an excellent occasion
for reflection.  |