|
Few would dispute that Hungary and
the world have changed dramatically
since state socialism dissolved. Regimes
collapsed and new ones have taken
their place. Whole social and economic
systems—systems which had stood firm
until the end of the 1980s—were reconfigured.
With the hindsight of twenty
years, it is clear that the end of the 1990s
marked the irrevocable conclusion of an
era. The future, it now appears, will be no
less provoking.
Our Place in the World. The Path of
Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 21st
Century assesses the post-Communist
upheaval and looks ahead. The book
offers more than yet another academic
study, and its tone is informal. Lajos
Péter Kovács, its editor, talked to László
Csaba, Professor of Economics at the
Central European University and the
Corvinus University in Budapest and at
the University of Debrecen, the historian
Géza Jeszenszky (foreign minister,
1990–94 and Washington ambassador,
1998–2002), and János Martonyi, who
had a distinguished diplomatic career
and, among other important posts, was
foreign minister during that latter period.
Martonyi is reprising his role in the new
government of the Fidesz–Christian
Democratic alliance. The conversations
situate Hungary in the context of Europe
and, more narrowly, in Central and
Eastern Europe. They discuss the two
decades since the democratic transition
as well as new challenges and opportunities
lying in wait in the new century.
The exchange of views is introduced
by the family histories of the participants,
detailing not only their personal background
but also illuminating Hungary’s
recent and more distant past. Their own
lives show how manifold the links are
that tie Hungary to the region, and not
only to territories inhabited by ethnic
Hungarians. A shared element of the
three family histories is a western and
European orientation which backs a
many centuries old traditional wish to be
considered part of the West.
It is hardly surprising that a whole
chapter is devoted to Trianon, a traumatic
peripeteia for Hungarians. It continues to
cast a long shadow ninety years after the
peace treaty that forced Hungary to give
up two thirds of its territory. Here, Géza
Jeszenszky takes the lead. A historian and
diplomat, Jeszenszky has confronted the
costs of Trianon on many occasions. He
brings into focus Hungary’s negative
image abroad at the start of the 20th
century1 and the role this picture played in
the period leading up to Trianon. In itself,
this provides a useful lesson for the
present day. László Csaba approaches
this sensitive question from a different
angle, discussing the discrepancies
between the often emotional reactions of
people and the views of historians. In the
subsequent chapter, “Desires and Dead
Ends”, Martonyi and Jeszenszky discuss
the dangers posed by a misleading
national identity and revisionist “national
daydreaming”. Csaba stesses that
Hungarians are bad at facing up to the
past and the scarcity of public debate is
lamentable; a clear-eyed view would help
Hungarians surmount the obstacles of
such odd catchphrases as “the sinful
nation.”2 Martonyi offers an outline of
ideas about how Hungarian communities
outside Hungary’s borders can survive
while leaving them the freedom to live life
however they please.
The fate of Hungarian communities
beyond the borders is a central subject
which returns over several chapters. This
fate is important not only to Hungarian
national identity and public thinking. It
also has an impact on Hungary’s
relationship with its neighbours, as well
as being a seminal feature of cooperation
in Central Europe. However, the situation
of Hungarian minorities—despite all
the achievements of Euro-Atlantic
integration—is strongly dependent on the
political setup in the mother country.
Hungary is sometimes an initiator in this
area (an example is the Act of 2001 on
Hungarians Living in Neighbouring
Countries). But usually it is the other way
round, and Hungarian diplomacy is
forced to react to measures taken by
neighbours. As far as Hungarian–Slovak
relations are concerned, Martonyi insists
that “they have been shaped by Bratislava
for the past 20 years.”3
The issue of Hungarian minorities is
also addressed in the chapter “Autonomy
or Regionalism?” For the Hungarian
intelligentsia, the inadequacy of concepts
related to autonomy has underpinned
disillusionment with the transition to
democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe. Hungary and the Hungarian
elites abroad regard self-governance—
which has worked well in several places
in western Europe—as the best way to
serve Hungarian minorities and the
region’s stability.
The majority populations
of neighbouring countries on their part see
it as an infringement on sovereignty and
an attack on their interests.
Csaba sees
little hope for autonomy; it would be
more pragmatic to work towards
economic integration while restoring
transport and other types of cooperation
between regions now divided by frontiers.
|
Jeszenszky mentions that despite initial
high hopes and aspirations at the start of
the 1990s, support for strivings for
autonomy on the part of the European
Union, too, has lost priority status. He
confronts autonomy-based-on-separation
with multiculturalism, citing several
negative examples as to why the latter has
proven illusory in resolving ethnic conflict.
In his opinion, autonomy should be the
way forward in our region, even if western
European attitudes are often controversial,
something that János Martonyi also
emphasizes. Csaba, too, highlights the
ambiguous results of multiculturalism,
calling attention to the dangers in stalling
real integration. In addition to foreign
examples, Csaba also refers to the colossal
task of integrating the Roma, a problem
particularly acute in north and eastern
Hungary, and generally in the countryside.
Under the heading “Hopes and Realities
after the Regime Change”, talk centres
on the global political implications of the
collapse of the Soviet bloc in Central and
Eastern Europe. Jeszenszky and Martonyi
give particularly interesting insights into
the West’s ambiguous reception of the
transition to democracy. Mention is made
of the global political role of the US, too,
while Csaba focuses more on the conflicts
and problems which emerged after the
Cold War. Csaba holds that we must face
up to the fact that many events and
processes in the world are beyond our
control, often even unpredictable. The
emergence of this more unpredictable,
multipolar world has triggered the
appearance of new challenges, such as
transnational crime and disease, terrorist
networks and the danger of internet
abuse. In the chapters “Changing Power
Relations” and “A Dangerous World” he
adds to the list demographic problems
and value system crises.
Present-day Hungarian society is
examined through the prism of its past
tribulations, but instead of dwelling on
loss, an examination of how possible
future breakdowns can be averted
follows. Csaba offers glaring facts and
figures as the backdrop to past tragedies,
but Hungarian society, he argues, should
get over the emotional blow of such
losses which cloud its mentality. He
draws a startling comparison between
post-civil-war Greece or Spain and
Hungary after the change of regime.4
After the transition Hungary did not
experience armed conflict but, he insists,
divisions here are greater than in those
countries after their civil wars.
The last three chapters feature separate
tȇte-à-tȇtes between the editor and
contributors. First, János Martonyi
expresses his view that during Hungary’s
Socialist-Liberal coalition in 2002–2010, a
consensus on foreign policy built up over
the preceding ten years disintegrated, and
now a new national strategy is needed. The
Gabčikovo dam and EU accession are
mentioned as well. Csaba recalls the
regime change from an economic point of
view, focusing on the “double game” of the
West and the International Monetary Fund
targeting the thawing of the Hungarian
regime in the 1980s5. Jeszenszky highlights
the minority question, while touching on
another intriguing problem—chances for a
potential revision of borders after 1990. To
show how unrealistic this is he brings forth
objective arguments: Hungary’s limited
opportunities and the changed ethnic
composition since Trianon, but he also
points out a “total lack of inclination on
Hungary’s part to fight any kind of battle
since 1990.”6 For all the above reasons the
Hungarian government has not taken up
the issue of border revision despite
receiving plenty of criticism in this respect,
both from Hungarian minorities in the
neighbouring countries and within
Hungary. Much attention is devoted to the
personality and politics of József Antall,
Hungary’s late first prime minister, to
whom the book is dedicated.
The book covers several further
themes, as the conversation of participants—
all of whom possess wideranging
knowledge and rich professional
and life experiences—wanders off in all
directions. However, the discussion does
not fall apart. The dangers of using an
informal genre are alleviated partly
thanks to the superb editing and partly
to the clarity of argumentation demonstrated
by the participants, as they
illustrate their thoughts with clear
examples and related experiences
throughout. The message is thus easily
absorbed and makes the text an enjoyable
read. Another welcome factor not to be
overlooked is that the guests, owing to
their dissenting political and world views,
often assess or criticize, but they do this
in a reserved style and with a sense of
proportion at all times.
Our Place in the World makes interesting
reading. Its aim is not to dazzle the
reader with new theories or revolutionary
proposals, but to provoke thinking on
the events of past and present, while
illuminating interconnections and
context. It does not strive to teach, but
there is much here to learn from. 
|
Jeszenszky has written a book on the topic: Az elveszett presztízs. Magyarország megítélésének
változása 1894–1918 [Lost Prestige. Changes in the Image of Hungary 1894–1918]. Budapest:
Magyar Szemle Alapítvány, 1994.
